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Preface: Scope of this Work
Acknowledgements and Project Idea
The initial idea to this project originated during a lunch break at the European 
Survey Research Association conference in 2009 by Mark Trappmann, head of 
the research department ‘Panel Labour Market and Social Security’ (PASS) at the 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), and Ivar Krumpal, University of Leipzig.
The rationale of the project was to contribute to the improvement of data 
quality for information that is relevant to the PASS study, and known to be 
difficult to collect in labor market surveys due to respondents’ incentives to 
misreport. Engagement in undeclared work and receipt of basic income support, 
a form of means-tested social security payment (more precisely, unemployment 
benefits II) are such information. It can be reasonably assumed that the receipt of 
welfare benefits and undeclared work might be perceived as socially undesirable, 
potentially stigmatizing or as behaving antisocially by those respondents 
possessing this sensitive trait or who are engaged in this behavior. Undeclared 
work even being pursued by the authorities if disclosed. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that this behavior is often denied or underreported in population surveys 
and that estimates derived from these survey reports will be inaccurate.
The main idea of the project was to assess the use of special techniques to 
collect information on these sensitive topics in large-scale labor market surveys 
in Germany, for potential future implementation in the PASS, which is a low-
income panel study in Germany focusing on dynamics of welfare benefit receipt 
and poverty (Trappmann et al., 2010). In order not to jeopardize the PASS study 
itself, an evaluation of these ‘dejeopardizing techniques’ (Lee, 1993)—the most 
prominent example is the randomized response technique (RRT; Warner, 1965; Fox 
and Tracy, 1986)—within the PASS study was not possible.
Thus, Mark and Ivar initiated a project called ‘Measuring Undeclared Work 
in Labor Market Surveys’ which I joined in February 2010, finalizing the project 
proposal for funding at IAB. Due to the relevance for PASS, some limitations with 
respect to the choice of the interview mode or the sample selection were pre-
imposed.
While the main idea is from Mark and Ivar, we jointly worked out the 
exact design and details of the project. I was by and large responsible for the 
management of the entire data collection process. My particular contribution 
involved: 1) managing the request for proposal (RfP), 2) sampling and preparation 
of the frame data (including data confidentiality), 3) designing the experiments 
and the questionnaire, 4) training of the interviewers, 5) supervising fieldwork, 6) 
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cleaning and preparing data for the analysis. Furthermore, I conducted a large part 
of the data analysis and contributed to the drafting of the manuscripts.
During the course of the project, Ivar acquired further funding as a part of 
the project “Asking Sensitive Questions: Possibilities and Limits of Randomized 
Response and Other Techniques in Different Survey Modes” (Leipzig VO 684/ 
11) funded by the German Research Foundation within the Priority Programme 
on Survey Methodology (1292). This allowed us to initiate a second project, 
‘Measuring Undeclared Work in Labor Market Surveys’ with the same goals. 
However, this project aimed at evaluating another prominent dejeopardizing 
technique: the so-called the item count technique (ICT; Droitcour et al., 1991; 
Biemer et al., 2005). Hagen von Hermanni joined this second project as student 
assistant at the University of Leipzig and was responsible for a large share of the 
operational activities in Leipzig.
Due to the cooperations within the projects, parts of the work presented here are 
based on publications that were prepared in jointly with co-authors. For reasons of 
internal consistency, the entire dissertation is hence written in the ‘we’ form, even if 
chapters are single authored by myself. Parts of the ideas of the co-authored papers 
were also included in the introductory Chapter 1, as well as the concluding Chapter 4.
I presented all of the papers that form the basis of the individual dissertation 
chapters at different conferences and received valuable comments (such as Kirchner 
et al., 2011, 2012; Kirchner, 2013). Furthermore, for one of the joint papers (Kirchner 
et al., 2013), I was responsible for an initial draft which was then revised jointly, 
the analyses as well as the revise and resubmit. This paper on which Chapter  2 is 
based, is meanwhile published in Zeitschrift für Soziologie, while the paper that 
forms the basis of Chapter 3 is published in the Journal of Survey Statistics and 
Methodology. Ben Jann, University of Bern, joined the project team for this latter 
paper. Aside from his contribution to the preparation of the manuscript, he derived 
the likelihood functions and contributed the Stata program for the analyses.
Table 1 provides an overview of the cooperations:
Table 1: Cooperations, co-authors and publication type
Chapter Based on Manuscript by Publication Type
2
Kirchner, Krumpal, Trappmann, von Hermanni (2013), 
‘Measuring and Explaining Undeclared Work in Germany’ 
Published 
3
Trappmann, Krumpal, Kirchner, Jann (2014), ‘Item Sum:  
A Novel Technique for Asking Continuous Sensitive Questions’
Published 
4 
Kirchner (2013), ‘Validating Sensitive Questions:  
A Comparison of Survey and Register Data’
Under Review 
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I really enjoyed working with Mark Trappmann, Ivar Krumpal, Hagen von Hermanni 
and Ben Jann on this project and learnt a lot about how to conduct survey research 
from all of them. I want to give Mark and Ivar a special thanks for letting me join 
this project and for letting me use the results for my dissertation. Further, this 
research would not have been possible without the support of the two funders, 
the Institute for Employment Research and the German Research Foundation.
Also, without this project, I would have not had the opportunity to work with 
Frauke Kreuter, who has been a wonderful supervisor of my thesis and mentor over 
the past three years. I also want to thank my second supervisor, Thomas Hinz, who 
gave me many opportunities to present the project ideas and results in his research 
colloquium in Konstanz. I am especially thankful to the members of the so-called 
FKRG (Frauke Kreuter Research Group): Stephanie Eckman, Barbara Felderer, 
Julie Korbmacher, Joe Sakshaug, Jennifer Sinibaldi and Frauke Kreuter herself. I 
really value our regular meetings, giving me room for discussion, questions, much 
feedback and most of all, a great education on how to conduct survey research.
I received valuable comments and encouragement from many other people 
in preparing this dissertation. I hope the few who I will leave out, will accept 
my apologies. I learnt a lot during my meetings with Helmut Küchenhoff and 
Thomas Augustin. My colleagues at IAB, especially the PASS group and the KEM 
group, always supported me, both substantively as well as with cookies. I am 
particularly grateful to my friends Inna Becher, Gerrit Müller, Hagen von Hermanni 
and Mihaela Anastasiade for their constant encouragement and patience with me. 
Last but not least, I’d like to express my gratitude to my (extended) family!
Contribution
This dissertation focuses on the main results of the projects outlined above, 
henceforth referred to as the RRT study (commissioned by the IAB) and the ICT 
study (commissioned by the University of Leipzig). All empirical analyses are based 
on data collected in these two German population surveys, conducted on the 
telephone in 2010. In order to evaluate the different techniques, the experimental 
set-ups and designs of both surveys—the RRT study (n = 3,211) and the ICT study 
(n = 1,603)—were kept as similar as possible.
Furthermore, the RRT study incorporated two experiments that were not 
replicated in the ICT study (due to budget and data confidentiality constraints). 
We developed and experimentally tested a method to collect information on 
continuous sensitive information (quantity of undeclared work): the item sum 
technique (IST). Additionally, we included an experiment to allow an in-depth 
analysis of the RRT, using administrative records for validation of survey reports 
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welfare benefit receipt. These analyses were conducted using logistic regression 
analyses (Jann, 2011).
Fourth, we developed the so-called item sum technique (IST) to collect data for 
continuous sensitive characteristics. Although RRT schemes tailored to continuous 
sensitive characteristics have been proposed in the literature (cf. Himmelfarb and 
Edgell, 1980; Eichhorn and Hayre, 1983; Gjestvang and Singh, 2007), there is only 
little evidence on how these techniques perform in practice. The majority of RRT 
applications are typically used for the collection of dichotomous sensitive variables. 
Due to its complexity, it can be expected, that an RRT scheme for continuous 
variables is even more difficult to implement than standard—binary—RRT and 
imposes an additional cognitive burden on the respondents. Contrary to that, the 
ICT is less complex in implementation and imposes less cognitive burden on the 
respondent. We are not aware of any implementation beyond the collection of 
binary data for the ICT. Thus, another contribution of our study is a generalization 
of the ICT for the collection of data on quantitative sensitive variables by means of 
the IST. We applied our novel technique for gathering information on earnings from 
and hours engaged in undeclared work. We evaluate whether the IST outperforms 
standard direct questioning and for whom this technique works particularly well. 
We further demonstrate how IST data can be analyzed and what a potential survey 
design should look like for a successful implementation.
Fifth, our particular RRT study design provides a unique opportunity to 
investigate the so-called ‘more-is-better’ assumption, which is so often relied upon 
in the literature (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a). The opportunity to validate the 
RRT is very rare in the literature on sensitive questions (Lensvelt-Mulders et  al., 
2005a; Wolter, 2012). We combine information from administrative records and 
survey data on welfare receipt, and thus know the true percentage of respondents 
who have received transfer payments, and hence the percentage of people who 
should have reported receipt. This permits us to validate the reported percentage 
against the known true rate for the responding cases and to analyze underreporting 
in depth (also at an individual level).
Structure of the Dissertation
The outline of the dissertation closely mirrors the goals stated above.
Chapter 1 provides an outline of the major problems associated with the collection 
of data on undeclared work. It gives insights into how respondents approach the 
task of answering survey questions, and the problem of measurement error in the 
presence of sensitive questions (Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988; Groves, 1991; 
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Tourangeau et al., 2000; Groves et al., 2009). Furthermore, the main ideas of the 
randomized response technique and the item count technique will be introduced—
providing examples of the particular variants we have implemented—along with 
their estimators. Chapter 1 concludes with an overview of the research questions 
and an outline of the main dissertation chapters (Chapter 2 to Chapter 4).
Chapter 2, ‘Measuring and Explaining Undeclared Work in Germany,’ aims at 
evaluating two research questions. The first research question deals with whether 
we can obtain valid estimates of undeclared work using the RRT or the ICT (given 
the ‘more-is-better’ assumption). The second research question addresses the 
issue of which factors contribute to the explanation of undeclared work (using 
individual-level survey data).
Chapter 3, ‘Item Sum: A Novel Technique for Asking Continuous Sensitive 
Questions,’ is dedicated to the development of our new technique. The main 
research question we address in this chapter, is whether the IST can outperform 
standard direct questioning. For this evaluation, we collected data on hours 
engaged in undeclared work and earnings from undeclared work. Solely for the 
purpose of this dissertation, the other research question is to examine whether 
the IST performs differently in different subgroups, depending on differential 
cognitive abilities.
The final substantive Chapter 4, ‘Validating Sensitive Questions: A Comparison of 
Survey and Register Data,’ analyzes underreporting of welfare benefit receipt in 
surveys, relaxing the ‘more-is-better assumption.’ Relying on administrative data, 
we know the ‘true’ answer of the respondent and compare response bias in the 
RRT and direct questioning condition. More specifically, this chapter addresses 
two research questions: First, whether item specific response bias in surveys can 
be reduced by means of the randomized response technique with respect to a) the 
true value in the administrative data and b) direct questioning (DQ) in the survey 
data. And second, which subgroups are especially affected by response error.
This dissertation ends with an overall conclusion in Chapter 5, summarizing the 
main results, discussing the limitations of the studies, and implications for future 
research.
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1 Introduction
According to recent publications by the Institut für Angewandte Wirtschafts-
forschung (IAW), the size of the shadow economy in Germany is at an all time 
low since the 1990s (IAW, 2013). Many of these studies estimating the size of the 
shadow economy rely on macroeconomic approaches. While these approaches are 
often useful, their estimates depend heavily on the underlying assumptions. Over 
the past years, it has thus been much debated which of the different approaches 
yields the most accurate estimates (Thomas, 1999; Thießen, 2011). To give one 
example of the resulting discrepancies: Macro-level estimates regarding the 
magnitude of shadow economic activities range from 14.7% to 16.3% of the 
gross domestic product in 2000/01, while micro-level approaches estimate the 
magnitude at 1.3% for the same period (Feld et al., 2007, p. 7). The fact that shadow 
economic activities in general, or undeclared work in particular, remain unobserved 
in most instances (Koch, 2005) does not provide a satisfactory explanation for 
this observed discrepancy. Further, drawing inferences based on macroeconomic 
approaches often does not allow for a precise distinction of the different aspects of 
shadow economy. Aside from undeclared work, shadow economy, for example, also 
comprises criminal activities such as the trade of illegal goods and outputs. Thus, 
in order to obtain an estimate of the magnitude of undeclared work, additional 
approaches at the microeconomic level are commonly used (Merz and Wolff, 1993; 
Mummert and Schneider, 2001; Pedersen, 2003; Feld and Larsen, 2005, 2008; EC – 
European Commission, 2007).
Approaches at the macro-level are very inclusive as well as non-reactive 
and often lead to upwardly biased prevalence estimates, while approaches at 
the micro-level yield downwardly biased estimates (Schneider, 2003; Breusch, 
2005; Koch, 2005; Feld et al., 2007; Pickard and Sardà, 2011). Given that 
undeclared work is a socially undesirable behavior and will be pursued by the 
authorities if disclosed, it comes as no surprise that this behavior is often denied 
or underreported in population surveys (Feld and Larsen, 2008). Although both 
approaches provide prevalence estimates for undeclared work, survey data 
at the micro-level have one major advantage: They allow an investigation of 
relationships at the individual level, and thus individual motivations for engaging 
in undeclared work. In order to model such relationships accurately, however, 
it is necessary that such data do not contain any systematic error, such as 
underreporting (Hausman, 2001).
To combat misreporting on sensitive topics, survey designers have developed 
various data collection strategies aiming at eliciting more truthful and accurate 
answers from respondents by increasing the anonymity of the question-and-
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answer process. The main idea of these ‘dejeopardizing techniques’ (Lee, 1993) 
is to increase respondent anonymity and reduce respondents’ concerns about 
honestly reporting undeclared work in a survey. The most prominent examples of 
such techniques (Lee, 1993) are the randomized response technique (RRT; Warner, 
1965; Fox and Tracy, 1986) and the item count technique (ICT; Droitcour et al., 
1991; Biemer et al., 2005).
Up to date, no population survey in Germany exists that particularly addresses 
the problem of social desirability associated with asking questions concerning 
undeclared work. Thus, the main focus of this dissertation is to analyze and discuss 
the potential of special data collection strategies in the context of undeclared 
work (Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 100). More precisely, we assess whether we 
can reduce underreporting of undeclared work by means of RRT or ICT and thus 
obtain more accurate, i.e., ‘increased,’ prevalence estimates compared to a direct 
questioning approach. Our empirical analyses are based on data collected in two 
German population surveys (see Chapter 2.1).
The goal of this chapter is to outline existing research gaps. We will first discuss 
the different concepts and definitions of ‘shadow economy’ and ‘undeclared work’ 
in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 will provide an overview of how these concepts can be 
measured using macro-level approaches, while Section 1.3 describes individual-
level approaches—particularly focusing on survey-based measures—and the 
challenges associated with collecting data on undeclared work in surveys. This 
chapter concludes with an overview of the identified research gaps and the 
research questions of the dissertation (Section 1.4).
1.1 Concepts: ‘Shadow Economy’ and ‘Undeclared Work’
According to the dual economy approach, the economy can be split into an 
official and an unofficial sector (Schneider and Enste, 2007). The official sector 
comprises all economic activities, that are included in the gross national product. 
The underground economy is that part of the economy that is not included in 
the gross national product. It subsumes those activities that contribute to the 
added economic value in a country, but are hidden from the authorities.1 Despite 
attempts by the EU to standardize what is to be included in the national accounts 
(thus implicitly defining the underground economy), definitions of national 
accounts differ internationally. Also, due to the fact that the underground 
economy comprises “numerous [hidden] economic activities, it is dicult to provide 
1 The terms unofficial economy and underground economy or sector will be used interchangeably throughout the 
text.
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a formal definition” (Schneider and Enste, 2007, p. 6). For a detailed overview see 
Schneider and Enste (2007) or Schneider and Enste (2000).
Similarly to the concepts provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2002, p. 37 ff.), Schneider and Enste (2007, 
p. 11) distinguish four different sectors within the underground economy: the 
household sector, the informal sector, the irregular sector and the criminal 
sector. While the household and the informal sector belong to the so-called 
‘self-sufficient economy,’ the latter two sectors belong to the so-called ‘shadow 
economy.’ The main distinction between both categories is the criterion of legality. 
This distinction according to the criterion of legality is merely one possibility for 
differentiating sectors within the underground economy. The form of transaction 
itself is also often considered (Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 14): While some activities, 
such as neighborhood help or voluntary work, as well as trade of (stolen) goods are 
typically nonmonetary transactions, other activities such as undeclared work can 
be of a purely monetary nature.
‘Do-it-yourself’ activities (Buehn et al., 2009) as one example for the household 
sector, as well as neighborhood help or voluntary activities as one example for the 
informal sector, are by definition legal. They provide an added economic value but 
cannot be captured in the national accounts, because they are not recorded anywhere 
and the precise value is usually not defined. Shadow economic activities, on the other 
hand, are by definition illegal and comprise the irregular and the criminal sector. 
The irregular sector is equivalent to what is commonly understood by undeclared 
work, or shadow economy in the narrower sense. Again, an added economic value 
is created, that is not captured in the national accounts because it is concealed 
from the authorities, for tax or regulatory burdens. This is essentially equivalent to 
what Evers (1987, p. 353) refers to as the informal sector. It is characterized by a 
(comparatively) small-scale market-based production and distribution resulting in 
goods and services that are in principle (economically) legal, but illegally hidden 
activities. Last but not least, the criminal sector, according to Schneider and Enste 
(2007), includes illegal activities such as trade with stolen goods and drugs, fraud or 
smuggling. The difference compared to undeclared work, is that both the production 
itself as well as the produced goods and services are illegal.
Depending on the exact research question and research method, the exact 
definition and distinction of the concepts of shadow economy or undeclared work 
vary. Even though some authors seem to use the same terminology throughout 
their work, the underlying concepts sometimes vary and warrant caution in hasty 
comparisons (Janisch and Brümmerhoff, 2004). Scientists, therefore, often rely on 
one broad, commonly used definition (and operationalization) of shadow economy 
that is based on statistical criteria: It comprises all value added production, 
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economically legal or illegal, that is not captured in the national accounts 
(Schneider and Enste, 2007; Boockmann et al., 2010). Thus, it is not part of the 
estimation of the gross domestic product (GDP). Undeclared work, i.e., shadow 
economy in the narrow definition, would then pertain to all market-based, illegally 
hidden productions of goods and services that are in principle legal.
These statistical or fiscal approaches are less theoretically but rather 
instrumentally motivated. They also seem to provide a direct means to estimate 
the magnitude of undeclared work in Euro, hours and hourly wages at the macro-
level—and thus provide a pragmatic basis for a definition. However, since the 
gross national product implicitly captures parts of shadow economic activities, 
these approaches are often misleading (OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2002; Janisch and Brümmerhoff, 2004, p. 13).
The lack of one precise definition, the imprecise use of the terminology, as 
well as the problematic differentiation of the four sectors, render international 
comparisons very difficult and result in diverging estimates (see Thomas, 1999; 
Schneider et al., 2002; Pedersen, 2003; Renooy et al., 2004; Koch, 2005; Enste 
and Schneider, 2006b). To give one more example: While neighborhood help is 
part of the household sector in Germany, and not part of the shadow economy, 
it is illegal in Denmark. Thus it belongs to the irregular sector (Boockmann et 
al., 2010, p. 14). These legislative and fiscal differences often make it impossible 
to differentiate or compare self-sufficient and shadow economic production at 
the macro-level, since these concepts vary internationally (Jessen et al., 1988; 
Pedersen, 2003).
The focus of the following dissertation is exclusively on undeclared work in 
Germany, i.e., shadow economic activities in the narrow sense. The definition 
of undeclared work in Germany is fairly straightforward: It is based on an act 
that was passed in 2004. This “Law to intensify the fight against black activities 
and accompanying tax evasion” (Feld et al., 2007, p. 1) provides the legal basis 
to combat undeclared work, tax evasion and illegal employment (SchwarzArbG, 
2004). Unlike other countries that often only subsume tax evasion and social 
security fraud under undeclared work, the German framework is more inclusive 
(Boockmann et al., 2010).
Violations regarding handicraft regulations as well as abuse of public 
benefits, due to (motivated) underreporting of income—even if the employment 
itself is reported to the social security authorities—, are within the scope of 
undeclared work (§1 Sec. 1 SchwarzArbG, 2004; Schneider and Enste, 2007, 
p. 11). The German law also includes a negative definition of undeclared work: 
Those activities that are not meant to generate sustainable profits and are 
only marginally paid, are not within the scope of undeclared work (§1 Sec. 3 
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SchwarzArbG, 2004). Thus all neighborhood help or voluntary activities that are 
based on courtesy, i.e., according to the definition above belong to the ‘self-
sufficient economy,’ are excluded.
To summarize: A simple, unified definition of undeclared work, that captures 
all legal aspects, that allows a distinction with respect to the ‘self-sufficient 
economy’ and that is understood by all respondents in a survey, is a challenge. 
Thus we define undeclared work as any productive activity that
 • generates labor income, 
 • is economically legal in the sense that it could be transferred to the official 
sector, 
 • is concealed from the authorities, either to evade taxes and/or social security 
contributions, to undermine legal regulations, such as health standards or 
minimum wages, or administrative burden (Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 15; see 
also Renooy et al., 2004; EC – European Commission, 2007). 
1.2 Measurement of Undeclared Work: Macro-level Approaches
Similar to the discourse regarding the definition of the concepts of shadow economy 
and undeclared work, there is much disagreement on how to measure these 
concepts in order to obtain valid estimates of the magnitude and developments 
over time (Thomas, 1999; Pedersen, 2003; Koch, 2005; Enste and Schneider, 2006b; 
Thießen, 2011). In general, there are two broad classes of measurements: indirect 
(macro-level) and direct methods (individual-level) (Pedersen, 2003; Feld et al., 
2007; Schneider and Enste, 2007). As already indicated, these different methods 
result in very heterogeneous estimates.
Indirect methods are mostly based on macroeconomic indicators. They comprise 
a variety of methods, such as discrepancy approaches, monetary approaches, 
physical input approaches and hidden variable approaches (Boockmann et al., 
2010, p. 63; Renooy et al., 2004; Weiß, 2008). Each method has its strengths and 
weaknesses with respect to capturing certain shadow economic activities. Further, 
each method relies on different assumptions, which is why these methods are 
sometimes also referred to as ‘indicator’ approaches (Schneider and Enste, 2007). 
These methods serve as a point of reference only and are not main focus of this work. 
They demonstrate why we rely on survey data for our analyses. We will thus only 
briefly summarize the main ideas and assumptions. The interested reader is referred 
to Feige (1990) or Schneider and Enste (2000) for more detailed information.
Discrepancy Approaches: Discrepancy approaches make use of the fact that there 
are multiple ways to measure the same construct in an economy. The basic 
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assumption is that that incentives to underreport (labor) income outweigh 
incentives to underreport expenditures (Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 63).
To provide one example, based on the national accounts definition: The 
expenditure measure of the gross national product should be equal to its 
income measure (Janisch and Brümmerhoff, 2004). Using this approach, 
differences that are found between the two measures are then attributed to 
shadow economic activities, i.e., people consuming more than they officially 
should have money for (Feld et al., 2007). Thus, this income gap approach 
provides an estimate for the magnitude and development of shadow economic 
activities. However, the expenditure-side components typically suffer from 
measurement error due to (c)omissions. Purely statistical discrepancies, due 
to problems with data quality are assumed to be stable over time. Therefore, 
“these estimates may be crude and not very reliable” (Schneider and Enste, 
2007, p. 17).
This method, however, allows the derivation of estimates by industrial sector, 
and can easily be extended to a lower level by comparing household incomes 
with household expenditures (microeconomic approach) or differences 
between the official and the actual income rates (see Section 1.3).
Other examples of the discrepancy approaches include a comparison of the 
official and the actual labor force (Enste and Schneider, 2006a). It is typically 
assumed that the labor-force participation is constant and—all other things being 
equal—a decline in labor participation in the official economy is interpreted as 
an indicator for an increase in undeclared work. This approach, however, neglects 
moonlighting, which is understood as engaging in undeclared work while having 
an ‘official’ job.
Monetary Approaches: Monetary approaches, on the other hand are based on 
the assumption that shadow economic activities are settled by paying in cash 
in order to remain untraceable. If—all other things being equal—either the 
ratio of cash flow and economic power changes, or the demand for cash rises 
beyond a level that could be explained by economic growth, a change or rather 
an increase in the size of shadow economic activities can be inferred.
One of the earliest techniques within this framework is based on a comparison 
of the ratio of currency and demand deposits at time t1, with a ratio in a base 
year t0 (Gutmann, 1977). The stock of money is comprised of the components 
currency and demand deposits. It is assumed that there was no shadow 
economic activity in the base year t0. This difference can then be used to 
estimate the growth of currency that is held for illegal purposes, i.e., the size 
of the shadow economy.
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To obtain a more accurate measure of illegal activities, one can use the transaction 
approach developed by Feige (1979). This technique essentially compares the 
‘normal’ and the ‘actual’ development of the cash demand, i.e., the total nominal 
GNP and the official GNP. It makes use of Fisher’s quantity equation (Fisher, 1922), 
again assuming a base year with no shadow economy, as the reference. Further 
assumptions are made with respect to the velocity of money and the (constant) 
relationship of the transactions (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Feld et al., 2007). The 
transaction approach is among the most frequently used techniques, as is the 
currency demand approach (Schneider et al., 2002, p. 27).
The currency demand approach (Kirchgässner, 1983; Tanzi, 1983; Langfeldt, 
1984; Karmann, 1990; Schneider and Enste, 2000) simulates currency demand 
with and without tax variables. These variables include, for example, interest 
rates and per capita income, as well as other indicators relating to undeclared 
work (burden of taxation, regulatory burden, or tax morale). Two estimates of 
currency demand are then derived, and, accounting for the velocity of money, 
the discrepancy of both informs about the magnitude of the shadow economy 
(Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 81). This approach is already a transition to more 
recently developed model-based approaches, that are also partly based on the 
currency demand approach.
Physical Input Approaches: The electricity consumption approach belongs 
to the class of physical input methods. It uses electricity as indicator of 
economic activity. More precisely, the Kaufmann-Kaliberda method (1996) 
assumes “electric-power consumption to be the best physical indicator of 
overall economic activity” (Schneider and Enste, 2007, p. 22). Assuming an 
elasticity of one between GDP and electricity—and again, a base year without 
shadow economy—we can then obtain an estimate of the GDP. Subtracting 
the official GDP from this estimate provides an estimate of the magnitude 
of shadow economic activities (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider et al., 
2002).
A similar approach by Lackó (1998, 1999) models undeclared work as well 
as do-it-yourself activities primarily as a function of household electricity 
consumption. Since it is unknown how kilowatt-hours translate into shadow 
economic production, this relationship has to be estimated as well.
Model-based Approaches: The previously described approaches consider for the 
most part only single indicators, such as electricity, labor supply or currency 
demand, for estimating the size of the shadow economy. Since none of these 
indicators can fully capture the phenomenon, model-based approaches, 
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also known as hidden variable approaches, were developed (Frey and Weck-
Hannemann, 1984; Schneider, 2007). In these approaches, shadow economy is 
understood as a latent or unobserved variable in a measurement model that is 
based on multiple causes and multiple observable indicators.
In the ‘(dynamic) multiple-indicators and multiple-causes’ ([DY]MIMIC) 
approach, the unknown coefficients are derived from statistical theory and 
estimated in a set of structural equations (Breusch, 2005; Schneider, 2007). 
Macroeconomic variables, such as real GDP growth, monetary indicators, such 
as currency demand, and labor market indicators, such as working hours, are 
among the most frequently used indicators for the shadow economy and are 
then linked to causal variables such as tax burden, regulation density and 
many more (Schneider, 2007, 2008; Boockmann et al., 2010; Thießen, 2011; 
Buehn, 2012). Which indicators and causes are included in the model is often 
determined by data availability for the units of analysis in any given period 
(Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 90).
There is a clear trend towards using currency demand or the (DY)MIMIC approaches, 
which more and more replace discrepancy, transaction- and physical input 
approaches. This is the result of various developments: The significance of indicators 
in order to explain shadow economic activities used in these earlier approaches is 
decreasing, results derived with these methods are implausible, data availability with 
respect to other indicators is improving, and last but not least, more sophisticated 
statistical models have been developed (Schneider, 2009).
Turning to the empirical results of two of these methods for Germany, the 
currency demand as well as model-based approaches estimate the size of the 
shadow economy in 2005 at 15.5% to 16.0% of the GDP (Enste and Schneider, 
2006b, 188). This is approximately equivalent to 340 to 350 billion Euro. 
According to the authors, this overall estimate is composed of (and the following 
estimates are derived from survey data): 3.1% undeclared work, 3.1% to 4.6% as 
a “correction factor” for underreporting in surveys; 3.0% to 4.0% material input; 
4.3% to 4.8% of illegal or criminal activities, as well as an additional 1.0% to 
2.0% of activities that are already captured implicitly in the GDP. The estimates 
provided by Feld and Schneider (2010, p. 125) for the year 2006 are essentially 
identical to those of 2005, with one exception, that ‘undeclared work’ and the 
‘correction factor’ are combined.
This is a nice demonstration that both shadow economy and undeclared work, 
in popular parlance often used interchangeably, cannot be used as equivalent to 
one another. What is also obvious from these estimates, is that undeclared work—
including the correction factor—accounts for the largest part—approximately 
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40%—of all shadow economic activities in Germany (Enste and Schneider, 2008, 
p. 113). Contradicting these findings, according to recent results from a study 
conducted by Thießen (2011, p. 200), this share of undeclared work is supposed 
to be much lower, amounting only to 1.3% of the GDP. This finding is particularly 
interesting from an economic policy perspective: The share of labor that could in 
principle be legalized using suitable reforms is much smaller than assumed.
To summarize the main limitations of indirect methods:
 • According to Williams (2010, p. 251), results derived with these indirect 
approaches should be treated with “utmost caution” due to the results being 
largely determined by the underlying assumptions, which shall not be discussed 
any further at this point (see Thomas, 1999; Pedersen, 2003; Koch, 2005, 2008; 
Boockmann et al., 2010). In his study, Thießen (2011), demonstrates how much 
estimates differ depending on the specific approach and the assumptions 
used, explaining the tremendous variation in the observed results (see also 
Koch, 2005).
 • These approaches often do not allow a clear cut differentiation between the 
concepts or the different components of shadow economic activities. Feld et 
al. (2007) note, for example, that the main difference between the last three 
classes of approaches discussed above and the first one, i.e., the income gap 
method, is substantial. While the first approach captures shadow economic 
activities including pure tax evasion, i.e., an inclusion of undeclared income 
from capital, the latter approaches fail to account for this.
 • The most serious limitation, however, is one that all of these approaches have 
in common: They only provide aggregate estimates for the magnitude of the 
shadow economy and undeclared work in a given economy (mostly expressed 
as the share of the GDP). If scientific research is interested in inquiring 
individual incentives to engage in undeclared work, these methods do not 
provide any insights. 
1.3  Measurement of Undeclared Work: Individual-level 
Approaches
So-called direct methods, on the other hand, can help to gather insights at 
the individual level. Furthermore, these methods allow a distinction between 
various shadow economic activities, such as undeclared work (the irregular 
sector) and other illegal activities (criminal sector). Again, several measurement 
approaches are subsumed within direct methods (Schneider and Enste, 2007): 
the use of administrative records, tax auditing, as well as the use of population 
surveys.
IAB-Bibliothek 34824
Introduction
The first individual-level approach derives prevalence estimates based on 
administrative data (e.g., by the German ‘finance control unit’ (Finanzkontrolle 
Schwarzarbeit, FKS)). Conducting analyses based on these records—or using these 
as a sampling frame to conduct surveys—essentially leads to highly selective 
samples that are not representative for the general population (Feld et al., 
2007, p. 8). Using administrative records, information is available only for those 
individuals who have been charged with engaging in undeclared work, which 
would thus “notoriously underestimate the size of hidden populations and the 
extent of deviant activities” (Lee, 1993, p. 45).
Compliance or discrepancy methods, such as tax auditing, typically suffer from 
the same shortcomings regarding selectiveness by auditing only tax payers and 
commonly a non-random sample of these taxpayers. Furthermore, they rely on a 
comparison of actual earnings reported in an audit and income declared for tax 
purposes. Using these methods, however, it remains unclear if respondents will report 
their income from undeclared work as ‘actual earnings’ or not (Pedersen, 2003, p. 21). 
Only if that is the case are the differences meaningful and can be interpreted.
In order to obtain an estimate of the magnitude of undeclared work 
representative of the general population, survey-based measures provide a 
third means of measurement within these individual-level approaches. They are 
widely used and are designed to measure a variety of shadow economic activities 
(Pedersen, 2003; EC – European Commission, 2007).2 Aside from conceptual 
problems mentioned above, another particular challenge of surveys concerning 
undeclared work (as one such underground activity) is the sensitivity of the 
topic. Since we are dealing with a prototype of sensitive questions—this behavior 
is not only socially undesirable, but also illegal—it is plausible to assume that 
respondents will either underreport or conceal their engagement. In the worst 
scenario, respondents are offended and might drop out of the survey and refuse 
further participation (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996, p. 276). Also, if cooperation is 
systematically related to the variable of interest, i.e., only those individuals who 
do not engage in undeclared work decide to participate in the survey, surveys 
will not provide reliable estimates of the size of undeclared work or individual 
motivations.
Systematic survey reports, i.e., underreporting or item nonresponse due to social 
desirability concerns, result in a lower validity of the prevalence estimates (‘social 
desirability bias,’ see Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). Especially if respondents have 
2 Though population or sample surveys only capture some components of shadow economic activities: Typically 
surveys do not account for material input potentially used for undeclared work. Neither do they assess undeclared 
work from companies for companies, but rather only undeclared work by ‘private’ individuals (which might be 
identical to a company).
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confidentiality concerns or are worried about their anonymity, potential social and 
legal consequences might foster systematic answering strategies (Fox and Tracy, 
1986). The more threatening or sensitive a survey question is perceived to be by 
a respondent, the more likely it is that these strategies dominate (Bradburn et al., 
2004; Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a).
The question arises of how to approach these concerns in order to obtain honest 
responses and a valid measurement of undeclared work in general population surveys.
1.3.1 The Response Process and Sensitive Questions
The goal of each survey is to obtain accurate data and estimates. This means 
estimates that are reliable and valid, i.e., “stable over replications and close in value 
to the true value of a statistic” (Groves, 1989, p. 16, see also Biemer and Lyberg, 
2003). The actual accuracy of a survey estimate, however, can be jeopardized 
at various stages of the survey process. Aside from errors of nonobservation 
(e.g., coverage error, sampling error, nonresponse error), measurement error is an 
important source of error especially when dealing with sensitive questions and 
concerns of social desirability or ‘threat’ posed by a question.
In general, nonsampling errors can be be categorized into a systematic 
component (bias) and a random component (variance) that affect survey error 
(Biemer, 2010). Observations are said to be biased if the expected value of the 
errors over response and sampling distributions are unequal to zero (  ), 
e.g., if there is a systematic tendency to misreport. Following the notation in 
Groves (1991) or in Biemer and Lyberg (2003, p. 40), “nonsampling errors are 
systematic if  where .” The observed response can thus be modeled 
as a combination of systematic and random errors, for respondent i. The standard 
framework models the observed response as a combination of the respondent’s 
true score (Xi ), the respondents’ bias (B)—an overall tendency across respondents 
to misreport—and an individual random error component (ei ) (slightly adapted 
from Tourangeau et al. (2000, p. 266)):
Yi = Xi + B + ei
The following chapters focus particularly on the systematic component of 
measurement error, more precisely underreporting, when collecting data on 
sensitive topics such as undeclared work. In general, measurement error can 
arise from various sources (Groves, 1989): the interviewer, the respondent, the 
questionnaire and the mode of data collection. When dealing with sensitive 
questions, the respondent as one main ‘source of error’ is of particular importance. 
In order to understand how respondents approach the task of answering a sensitive 
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question and the potentially resulting inaccuracies (Lee, 1993), it seems advisable 
to briefly describe the response process in general.
One prominent model for the response process is suggested by Tourangeau (1984, 
see also Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988): Respondents first assess the question 
content (comprehension); second, they identify and recall information relevant to 
answering the question (retrieval). On the third stage of this model, respondents 
evaluate their ‘potential answer’ (judgement) before eventually reporting it to the 
interviewer (response). Along any of these stages, multiple errors may occur. While 
most of the problems associated with a survey response, such as forgetting or other 
memory problems, are not particular to sensitive questions, incentives to intentionally 
misreport due to the ‘threatening’ nature of the question, on the other hand, are a 
great concern for the researcher. More generally, it is often assumed that traits that 
are positively valued—such as voting behavior, donations or energy conservation—are 
overreported, while undesirable traits—such as illicit drug use, abortion, social fraud, 
or plagiarism—will be underreported (Groves, 1989; Lee, 1993; Bradburn et al., 2004).
There is a wide range of topics referring to undesirable traits, taboos, illegal 
activities or unsocial opinions that can be considered sensitive in a survey 
interview (see also Tourangeau et al., 2000; Kreuter et al., 2008; Krumpal, 2013). 
But what exactly makes a topic ‘sensitive’ for a respondent (Lee, 1993; Bradburn 
et al., 2004; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007)? 
Using a theoretical approach, the level of ‘threat’ or ‘sensitivity’ of a question as 
perceived by the respondent can be established along three dimensions (Tourangeau 
and Yan, 2007). First, the question content can be perceived as intrusive, e.g., it can 
be about a taboo topic or involves something that the respondent is ashamed of. 
Second, respondents might be concerned about a risk of disclosure, i.e., admitting 
to a certain behavior might entail legal or social sanctions, such as the presence of 
parents during an interview when surveying teenagers about their drinking behavior. 
Third, social desirability concerns might be triggered when a respondent is asked 
to admit to having violated a social norm or possess socially undesirable traits, i.e., 
to avoid social embarrassment and to project a positive self-image (Groves, 1989). 
There are also empirical approaches to establish whether ‘social desirability’ or 
generally ‘sensitivity’ is a problem: Rating-scales, such as asking the respondents 
or other coders (e.g., experts) to evaluate the social desirability are often used, as 
are empirical indicators post-hoc assessing sensitivity by analyzing the amount of 
item nonresponse, response times, or misreporting (Lee, 1993; Groves et al., 2004; 
Tourangeau and Yan, 2007; Krumpal, 2013).
However, one has to keep in mind, that social desirability is subjective. It is heavily 
influenced by characteristics of the item under study and it is typically only an issue if 
a respondent actually has the sensitive trait or behavior (Groves, 1989; Kreuter et al., 
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2008). Furthermore, approaches assessing the amount of item nonresponse might go 
wrong, since sometimes refusing to answer a survey question might reveal more for 
the respondent than ‘simple’ misreporting (Groves et al., 2004, p. 240).
Survey methodologists have suggested a range of guidelines to combat 
measurement error from (item) nonresponse and misreporting (‘under’ as well 
as ‘overreporting’) due to the sensitive nature of a question (for an extensive 
overview see Barton, 1958; Lee, 1993; Bradburn et al., 2004; Tourangeau and Yan, 
2007; Groves et al., 2009; Krumpal, 2013).3 Aside from confidentiality assurances 
(Singer et al., 1995), particular care is to be put in the wording and the question 
format. Strategies to make respondents more at ease when responding to sensitive 
questions include so-called forgiving wording or loading, e.g., depicting the 
sensitive characteristic or behavior as something normal; extending the reference 
period, e.g., asking about past behavior first and then moving to the more recent 
period; embedding the question, e.g., starting with a gentle, general introduction 
to the topic and then moving to specific behaviors or traits; paraphrasing whenever 
possible and avoiding the use of the sensitive terminology; or providing the 
respondent with a response scale that suggests that the behavior is ‘normal,’ thus 
implicitly suggesting a different distribution. However, Bradburn et al. (2004, p. 80) 
argue, that as questions become more threatening to a respondent, respondents 
“are more likely to overstate or understate behavior, even when the best question 
wording is used.” Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that differences in 
wording of sensitive questions have no significant effect on individual responses 
and cannot reduce or eliminate social desirability bias (Krumpal and Näher, 2012).
Another strategy involves the administration of the questions themselves, 
i.e., to guarantee a private data collection setting. Usually, the main distinction 
when studying social desirability effects among different survey modes is whether 
the questions are interviewer- or self-administered (Groves et al., 2004; Schnell, 
2012). Results suggest that the use of a less intrusive interview mode, such as self-
administration, can substantially improve reporting of sensitive information and 
reporting accuracy (Tourangeau et al., 2000; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007; Kreuter 
et al., 2008). Conflicting evidence on self-administered surveys is presented in 
a recent study by Lelkes et al. (2012). The authors provide evidence that while 
reports under completely anonymous conditions sometimes increased reports 
of socially desirable attributes, accuracy was consistently reduced and survey 
satisficing increased. Also, whether or not other people are present during the 
interview changes perceived privacy.
3 The following list of strategies is not comprehensive and only provides examples. Tactics such as the ‘bogus pipeline’ 
will not be further discussed (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007).
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Last but not least, researchers use so-called dejeopardizing methods to elicit 
sensitive information in surveys indirectly. The randomized response technique (RRT; 
Warner, 1965; Fox and Tracy, 1986) and the item count technique (ICT; Droitcour 
et al., 1991; Biemer et al., 2005) are the most prominent and most frequently used 
of these indirect surveying techniques. They aim to reduce respondents’ concerns 
about honestly reporting sensitive information (from respondents who have the 
sensitive trait) by increasing the anonymity of the question-and-answer process. 
The main idea is that nothing regarding the ‘true’ status (mostly of binary nature, 
i.e., ‘Yes’ or ‘No’) of a respondent can be immediately inferred from their answer 
to the survey question.
1.3.2 Measurement of Undeclared Work: Selected German Surveys
As outlined in the previous section, several strategies have been introduced to 
counter systematic misreporting for socially (un)desirable topics (Barton, 1958; 
Lee, 1993; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Bradburn et al., 2004; Tourangeau and Yan, 
2007; Krumpal, 2013). Before introducing our experiments in greater detail, we will 
provide a brief overview of the strategies used in German surveys on undeclared 
work and/or shadow economy and the estimates obtained in these studies (for a 
comprehensive overview see Boockmann et al., 2010). 
Mode of data collection: Most studies on undeclared work (in Germany) are 
conducted in a face-to-face (f2f) mode (Pedersen, 2003; Feld and Larsen, 2005; 
EC – European Commission, 2007; Feld and Larsen, 2008; Feld and Schneider, 
2010), while only few surveys are implemented in a telephone mode (Mummert 
and Schneider, 2001). Feld and Schneider (2010, p. 112) specifically argue, and 
Pedersen (2003) demonstrates, that the f2f mode proved more successful in 
their study compared to a telephone setting, as it provided higher estimates of 
undeclared work. The latter study had originally been designed as a telephone 
survey. The low prevalence estimates in the pretest conducted in a telephone 
mode, however, led the researchers to conclude that there is tremendous 
bias, which caused the mode switch to f2f. Mogensen et al. (1995, as cited 
in Pedersen, 1998, p. 169) report similar difficulties, as well as high drop out 
rates and interviewer effects for their telephone survey in Denmark. A German 
survey of people age 18 and older conducted in 1997 by Lamnek et al. (2000, 
p. 76, 135) combines a f2f mode with a self-completion section for questions 
on undeclared work. However, given increasing survey costs, it is worthwhile to 
assess surveying methods that are viable in the telephone mode.
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Use of definitions: The studies conducted by the Rockwool Foundation (Pedersen, 
2003; Feld and Larsen, 2005) generally provide respondents with a broad 
definition of undeclared work4, while other studies do not provide respondents 
with any definition at all (Schneider et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008). The 
Eurobarometer 2007 uses the same—rather inclusive—definition in all countries 
(EC – European Commission, 2007).5 To decide not to provide any definition or 
to use broad definitions that do not fully match the national context can cause 
confusion among respondents. Furthermore, these diverging practices lead to 
results that are not comparable across and sometimes even within countries.
Operationalizations and Question wording: Only one German study explicitly 
asks respondents if they engage in the ‘shadow economy’ (Schneider, 2008, 
p. 94), as opposed to other studies that typically focus on certain components 
of shadow economy (such as engagement in undeclared work, consumption of 
goods and services provided undeclared, etc.). All of these studies approach the 
problem of social desirability and disclosure differently (for a comprehensive 
overview of strategies in general see Lee, 1993; Bradburn et al., 2004, p. 81). 
While some studies try to decrease perceived item sensitivity by extending the 
reference period from ‘in the previous 12 months’ to ‘have you ever ...’ (Lamnek 
et al., 2000), other studies avoid the use of the sensitive phrase altogether. 
These studies paraphrase and refer to undeclared activities instead of ‘illicit’ 
or ‘black labor’ which would be a more literal translation for the exact German 
term ‘Schwarzarbeit’ (EC – European Commission, 2007). Another strategy, for 
example, is to “embed” the question (Lee, 1993, p. 78): The Eurobarometer, for 
example, initially asks respondents about undeclared work and attitudes in 
‘general,’ before moving to behavior ‘specific’ to the respondent. More precisely, 
it first asks respondents to provide an estimate of the share of the population 
engaged in undeclared activities (in Germany). It then proceeds to asking 
respondents about whether relatives or friends engage in undeclared activities 
(also known as ‘other people’ approach Barton (1958)), before turning to the 
respondents’ own potential engagement (starting with demand and then asking 
about supply) (Williams, 2010, p. 252).
Schneider et al. (2002, p. 44) use the so-called ‘everybody approach’ (Barton, 
1958): Undeclared work is described as something normal, suggesting that it 
4 The definition includes reciprocal favors and in kind payment, also by friends (Feld and Larsen, 2005).
5 “Respondents were asked to report as undeclared work all remunerated activities which are in principle legal, but 
circumvent declarations to tax authorities or social security institutions” (EC – European Commission, 2007, p.  8). 
Illegal activities were not intended to be reported. The Eurobarometer, however, did ask respondents to report 
undeclared work paid for with money as well as in kind.
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is a frequent and socially accepted behavior, making it easier for respondents 
to admit to such.
Merz and Wolff (1993, p. 181) use yet a different strategy, deriving indirectly 
whether respondents engage in undeclared work. When respondents (age 14 
and older) confirm having had a secondary occupation within the last three 
months of the interview, follow up questions regarding costs associated 
with this occupation are asked. The knowledge of whether respondents have 
expenditures or costs associated with this side job, e.g., for material, social 
security contributions, or taxes, then allows researchers to derive implicitly 
whether this job is undeclared. This approach, however, focuses only on 
moonlighting and assumes the primary occupation is legal.
Similar to the estimates derived from macroeconomic approaches discussed above, 
the latest estimates regarding undeclared work in Germany based on survey data 
vary tremendously: The share of respondents admitting to having engaged in 
undeclared work, ranges from 3.0% (age 15 and older) in the Eurobarometer 2007 
(EC – European Commission, 2007, p. 115) to 11.1% and 7.2% of respondents (age 
18 to 74) in the studies conducted by Feld and Larsen in 2005 and 2006 (Feld and 
Schneider, 2010, p. 123).
To summarize the main strategies to tackle misreporting, researchers can 
increase perceived privacy in an interview setting using (Lee, 1993; Groves et 
al., 2004): a more private interview mode (Kreuter et al., 2008) also avoiding 
interviewer and/or bystander effects (Aquilino et al., 2000), confidentiality 
assurances in a sensible measure (Singer et al., 1995), an adapted wording of the 
survey questions or the format of the survey response (Barton, 1958; Tourangeau 
and Smith, 1996), or last but not least, specific survey techniques (Warner, 1965; 
Droitcour et al., 1991) that introduce a probabilistic relationship between the 
survey question and the survey response (e.g. the RRT or the ICT).
While the former strategies have been applied in surveys on undeclared work 
in general population surveys, dejeopardizing techniques have not been used in 
the collection of data. The following sections will briefly introduce the main ideas 
of the RRT and the ICT, their estimators and their limitations since the application 
of these special techniques is the focus of this dissertation.
1.3.3 The Randomized Response Technique
1.3.3.1 The General Idea
The RRT method was originally developed by Warner in 1965 to reduce response 
bias arising from privacy concerns, and has been proposed and implemented 
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in many different variants (Horvitz et al., 1967; Greenberg et al., 1969; Boruch, 
1971; Greenberg et al., 1971; Moors, 1971; Kuk, 1990; Mangat and Singh, 1990; 
Mangat, 1994). The basic idea, common to all RRT variants, is to conceal a 
respondent’s answer by using a randomizing device (e.g., coins, cards, dice, 
spinner), whose outcome is only known to the respondent. For an overview of 
different RRT designs, estimators and applications see Fox and Tracy (1986), 
Umesh and Peterson (1991), Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2005a), Lensvelt-Mulders et 
al. (2005b), or Tourangeau and Yan (2007).
For example, in the so-called forced-response variant of the RRT (Boruch, 
1971) the respondent might be requested to flip three coins without revealing the 
result to the interviewer. The respondent is then instructed to answer ‘Yes’ if the 
outcome is ‘tails’ for all coins (p = 0.125), answer ‘No’ if the outcome is ‘heads’ for 
all coins (p = 0.125), or answer the sensitive question truthfully with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 
if the outcome is mixed (p = 0.75), i.e., ‘tails’ for one of the coins and ‘heads’ for 
the others or vice versa. The essential feature of the RRT is that the connection 
between the observed answer and the sensitive question is only probabilistic. 
Due to this randomization or chance component, no inference can be drawn at 
the individual level regarding the sensitive characteristic: Neither the interviewer 
nor the researcher can infer anything about the true status of any individual 
from his or her response. Since the randomization mechanism—and thus the 
probability distribution and the misclassification—is known by the researcher, 
estimation of the population prevalence of the sensitive characteristic under 
study (Fox and Tracy, 1986) is possible, as are regression analyses analyzing 
randomized response dependent variables (Maddala, 1983, p. 54  ff.).
In general, we do not know anything about the ‘true’ status of a respondent 
and have no means of validating individual responses or the overall prevalence 
estimate. The success of the RRT or more generally these special techniques, 
i.e. if we can elicit more truthful self-reports and observe less misreporting, is 
hence often established in reference to a baseline: typically a standard direct 
questioning condition. Due to lack of validation data, researchers commonly 
rely on this so-called ‘more-is-better’ assumption: These special techniques 
are assumed to outperform direct questioning, if they elicit higher prevalence 
estimates for questions that are assumed to be subject to underreporting (‘more-
is-better’ assumption, for an overview see Umesh and Peterson, 1991; Lensvelt-
Mulders et  al., 2005a; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007).
So far, many surveys applying the RRT have been conducted in a face-to-face 
mode, some in a telephone mode and more recently also in a self-administration 
mode using the web (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007; 
Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a; Coutts and Jann, 2011). Empirical studies indicate 
IAB-Bibliothek 34832
Introduction
that in many cases the RRT yields higher prevalence estimates of a sensitive 
behavior than direct questioning and less biased estimates (‘more-is-better’ 
assumption). Successful experimental studies comparing the RRT to direct self-
reports (in various survey modes) of sensitive or stigmatizing behavior analyze 
topics, such as: illicit drug use (Weissman et al., 1986), social security fraud 
(Van der Heijden et al., 2000), abortion (Lara et al., 2004, 2006), eating disorders 
(Lavender and Anderson, 2009), animal diseases (sheep scab) (Cross et al., 2010), 
dental hygiene (Moshagen et al., 2010), antisemitism (Krumpal, 2012), sexual 
behavior in sub-Saharan Africa (Anglewicz et al., 2013), or the use of cognitive-
enhancing drugs (Dietz et al., 2013). Franke et al. (2013), in their study on the use 
of drugs for cognitive and mood enhancement, found that the RRT outperformed 
anonymous self-reports. However, in other recent experimental studies analyzing 
topics, such as voter turnout (here: ‘less-is-better’ Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a),6 
freeriding, marijuana use or infidelity (Coutts and Jann, 2011), plagiarism (Coutts 
et al., 2011), as well as criminal convictions (Wolter, 2012), the RRT proved less 
successful compared to direct questioning.
Information on the exact implementation of the RRT in this dissertation can 
be found in Chapter 2.1.1.3.2.
1.3.3.2 Estimators
Assuming that the probability distribution of the randomization procedure (here: 
forced-choice RRT design) is known, the population prevalence as well as standard 
errors standard errors (s.e.) and confidence intervals (C.I.) can be estimated as 
follows: The observed sampling distribution of ‘Yes’ responses  is used as an 
estimator for the unknown population parameter . The overall proportion of 
positive responses ( ) is the sum of the proportion of ‘forced’ ‘Yes’ responses 
(p1 = ‘forced’ ‘Yes’ = 0.125; recall: p2 = ‘forced’ ‘No’ = 0.125), and the product of 
the (unknown) population parameter π multiplied by the probability of having to 
respond truthfully (p3 = truthful response = 0.75) in the first place:  = p1 + p3 * π. 
Rearranging this equation yields the population estimate for the prevalence of the 
sensitive characteristic  (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005b):
  (1.1)
An estimate of the sampling variance of  is given as:
6 This study implemented two surveying modes: telephone and web. In neither mode did the RRT provide lower 
prevalence estimates.
33Chapter 1
Measurement of Undeclared Work: Individual-level Approaches
 
 (1.2)
where n is the overall sample size.
Since the misclassification design is known (p1, p2 and p3), we can use a binary 
logistic regression model with an adapted likelihood function. Assuming a 
vector of explanatory variables X , we want to estimate the effect of each variable 
on the sensitive characteristic. Let the observation be y = 1 if the person has 
a sensitive trait, and y = 0 otherwise. The ordinary multiple logistic regression 
model for binary data in the direct questioning condition is then defined as (for 
all subsequent equations see Maddala, 1983, p. 55):
  
(1.3)
where  is a vector of unknown regression parameters. Maximizing the likelihood 
function yields a parameter estimate for :
  
(1.4)
Adapting the likelihood function to account for the misclassification yields:
 
(1.5)
Remember that  and . If we 
assume that the probability —which is the the individual probability of giving 
a positive answer to the sensitive item conditional on a set of covariates Xi —can 
be written as , simplifying and modifying equation 1.5, 
the log-likelihood for randomized response data becomes (Van der Heijden et al., 
2000, p. 259):
 (1.6)
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where ni 1 (ni 0 ) is defined in terms of the total number of respondents for whom 
a ‘Yes’ (‘No’) response is observed in the RRT design. Using an iterative procedure 
(more precisely, the Newton-Raphson updating algorithm), this log likelihood 
can be maximized over the regression parameters  and also yields an estimate 
of the asymptotic covariance matrix of these estimates. The Stata routine ‘rrlogit’ 
(Jann, 2011 following Maddala, 1983) is one possibility to fit a maximum-likelihood 
logistic regression for RRT data (see also Scheers and Dayton, 1988; Van der Heijden 
et al., 2000, p. 259; Van den Hout and van der Heijden, 2002).
Average marginal effects (AME) can then be derived using the Stata command 
‘margins’ (Williams, 2012). Standard errors are calculated using the Delta-Method 
(Oehlert, 1992). Using AME eases interpretation and allows for a comparison across 
models: The AME expresses the average effect of the independent variable x on 
Prob(y = 1) (Mood, 2010, p. 75). In other words, an increase of x  by one unit increases 
the probability of y = 1 by AME (percentage) points (pts) (Best and Wolf, 2012, p. 384).
1.3.3.3 Limitations
One major drawback of the RRT is that—due to the ‘random noise’ component 
introduced to the data (p1 and p2 )—a larger sample size is needed to achieve the 
same level of precision as a comparable direct questioning (Warner, 1965; Fox and 
Tracy, 1986). This is particularly relevant with respect to survey costs which in 
turn directly influences the choice of the survey mode. These additional costs are 
justified only if the RRT increases the amount of truthful self-reports and reduces 
bias significantly.
If respondents understand the RRT procedure and appreciate the induced 
privacy protection (Landsheer et al., 1999), they should be inclined to provide 
more honest answers to sensitive questions than under direct questioning.7 This 
is another limitation inherent to the RRT: Evaluations of the technique typically 
rely on the ‘more-is-better’ assumption.
Another drawback of the RRT is that almost all empirical implementations 
of the RRT focus on binary sensitive variables. Although RRT schemes tailored 
to continuous sensitive characteristics have been proposed in the literature (cf. 
Himmelfarb and Edgell, 1980; Eichhorn and Hayre, 1983; Gjestvang and Singh, 
2007; Peeters et al., 2010), there is little evidence on how these techniques 
perform in practice. Due to its complexity, it can be expected, however, that an 
RRT scheme for continuous variables is even more difficult to implement than 
standard RRT and imposes an additional cognitive burden on the respondents.
7 Some studies report serious problems with RRT, such as a substantial proportion of respondents not under-
standing or not trusting the procedure and providing self-protective ‘No’ answers irrespective of the outcome of 
the randomizing device (see Ho brook and Krosnick, 2010a).
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1.3.4 The Item Count Technique
1.3.4.1 The General Idea
The second prominent technique that will be used throughout the dissertation is 
the item count technique (ICT). The item count technique is also known as the 
‘unmatched count technique’ (Ahart and Sackett, 2004; Dalton et al., 1994), the 
‘block total response’ (Smith et al., 1975; Raghavarao and Federer, 1979), or the 
‘list experiment’ (Kuklinski et al., 1997; Corstange, 2009). Again, the main idea 
is to scramble the individual response in order to protect respondents’ privacy. 
Similar to the RRT, the ICT allows for an estimation of the population prevalence 
of the sensitive characteristic, as well as for regression analyses (Blair and Imai, 
2012).
In the ICT (single-list) design, two subsamples of respondents are generated 
via randomization. One of the subsamples is confronted with a long list of items 
(LL) containing a number of innocuous (non-sensitive) questions plus the sensitive 
question of interest. The other subsample receives a short list (SL) that only 
contains the innocuous questions. For example, the following list of questions 
could be used (Table 1.1):
Table 1.1: The item count technique: single-list design
Item Short List Long List 
Do you use public transportation on more 
than 5 days per week? 
X X 
Are you covered by liability insurance? X X 
Did you grow up in the countryside? X X 
Have you engaged in any undeclared work 
for a private person this year? X 
Respondents in each subsample are simply asked to indicate the number of 
items that apply to them (the total number of ‘Yes’ answers), without answering 
each question individually. Unless a respondent indicates that all or none of the 
items apply, it remains unknown whether the respondent engaged in the sensitive 
behavior or not. The population estimate of the sensitive behavior is then derived 
from difference in means between both subsamples.
One of the main disadvantages of the ICT, however, is its relative inefficiency: 
The variance of the estimator is dependent on the variance of the innocuous 
questions and their number. Droitcour et al. (1991) recommends using three to 
five innocuous items per list in order to achieve sufficient privacy protection. 
IAB-Bibliothek 34836
Introduction
In order to avoid bias from so-called ‘ceiling effects’ (Kuklinski et al., 1997), 
i.e. absolute transparency regarding the sensitive characteristic when all items 
apply to a respondent, the general piece of advice given is the following (Glynn, 
2013, p. 163): Both, high-prevalence and low-prevalence innocuous items should 
be avoided and the number of innocuous items should be sufficiently high. 
These recommendations, however, lead to an increased variance in the number of 
applicable items and to an increased sampling variance of the estimator. In order 
to minimize the risk of ceiling effects, yet, still keep the variance minimal, 
Glynn (2013) suggests that it can be advantageous to choose innocuous items 
that are negatively correlated. Furthermore, in the implementation introduced 
above—the single-list design—only one subsample actually receives the sensitive 
question. Here, the effective sample size is further reduced (divided in half) 
compared to direct questioning, again contributing to an increase in the variance 
of the estimator (Droitcour et al., 1991).
In order to increase the statistical efficiency of the ICT estimator, the so-called 
double-list implementation was suggested (Droitcour et al., 1991). The double-
list version generates two independent item count estimates of the sensitive 
characteristic: Using an additional list of innocuous items, the sensitive item 
will be used in both subsamples. The first subsample will receive the sensitive 
question in the first block (long list 1; LL1), while the second subsample receives 
the short list (short list 1; SL1). For the second list, comprising another set of 
innocuous items, the first subsample will receive only the short list (short list  2; 
SL2), while this time respondents in the second subsample receive the long list 
(long list 2; LL2) including the same sensitive item that was used in LL1 in the 
first subsample.
Table 1.2 schematically sketches the ICT double-list design.
Table 1.2: The item count technique: double-list design
Subsample 1 Subsample 2 
List 1 LL1: SL1 
SL1 & ‘undeclared work’ 
List 2 SL2 LL2: 
SL2 & ‘undeclared work’
Tourangeau and Yan (2007), in their meta-analysis on the ICT report less consistent 
results for the ICT than for the RRT. Again, relying on the ‘more-is-better’ 
assumption, ‘successful’ experimental studies comparing the ICT to direct self-
reports of sensitive or stigmatizing behavior examine topics, such as: unethical 
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employee behavior (Dalton et al., 1994), racial attitudes (‘affirmative action’) 
(Kuklinski et al., 1997), employee theft (Wimbush and Dalton, 1997), risky sexual 
behavior (LaBrie and Earleywine, 2000), hate crime victimization (Rayburn et al., 
2003), shoplifting (Tsuchiya et al., 2007), eating disorders (Lavender and Anderson, 
2009), voter turnout (here: ‘less-is-better’ Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010b),8 or 
freeriding, marijuana use or infidelity (Coutts and Jann, 2011). This success was not 
always replicated. The ICT was less successful in the following studies analyzing 
topics, such as intravenous drug use or receptive anal intercourse (Droitcour et 
al., 1991), engagement in counterproductive behavior (Ahart and Sackett, 2004), 
drug use (Biemer et al., 2005), or plagiarism (Coutts et al., 2011). Tsuchiya and 
Hirai (2010) as well as Glynn (2013) explicitly analyze why the ICT sometimes 
performs so poorly.
Compared to the RRT, the ICT has the advantage that it does not require a 
randomizing device and that the procedure is much easier to administer. Thus, 
only a moderate cognitive burden is imposed on the respondent, likely increasing 
the respondent’s ability and trust to comply with the interview protocol and to 
provide more honest self-reports (Lavender and Anderson, 2009; Coutts and Jann, 
2011). Only few empirical studies exist that compare the performance of the ICT 
relative to that of the RRT: These studies suggest that the ICT outperforms the 
RRT in reducing social desirability bias in survey measures of sensitive attributes 
(see Lavender and Anderson, 2009, mode: paper-and-pencil, population: student 
population; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a, b, mode: telephone, population: 
national sample of American adults; Coutts and Jann, 2011, mode: web, 
population: German “Sozioland” access panel).9 One disadvantage of the ICT is 
its low statistical power. Estimates obtained from the ICT typically have larger 
standard errors than estimates from the RRT based on the same sample size (see 
Coutts and Jann, 2011).
1.3.4.2 Estimators
Droitcour et al. (1991) and Biemer et al. (2005) provide a thorough overview 
regarding the analyses of ICT data which will be briefly presented below. Remember 
that for the single-list design, the mean difference of answers between the 
two subsamples provides an estimate for the population prevalence ICT of the 
sensitive behavior (Droitcour et al., 1991).
8 This result was only found for the telephone mode but could not be confirmed using an online mode, indicating 
that the online mode might be less suscept ble to social-desirability bias.
9 Though Coutts et al. (2011) report in their web-survey that both, the RRT and the ICT performed poorly with respect 
to plagiarism among students.
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ICT  =   – SL ,  (1.7)
where  is the mean estimate in the long list and SL the mean estimate in the 
short list subsample.
Furthermore, as long as the samples are independent, the variance of ICT can be 
estimated as the sum of the sampling variances of the two group means, that is:
Var( ICT )  =  Var(  ) + Var( SL )  (1.8) 
Turning to the double-list estimator, we obtain two independent estimates for the 
population prevalence:
1  =  1 – SL1   (1.9)
and
2  =  2 – SL2  (1.10)
Taking the mean of these estimates yields the overall population estimate 
(Biemer et al., 2005; Coutts et al., 2011):
  (1.11)
The reformulated last equation 1.11 yields for the expression in the first (second) 
bracket the overall sum in the first (second) subsample over the differences of a 
respondents’ long-list and short-list answer.
Compared to the single-list variance estimate, the double-list sampling 
variance estimator is more efficient (Biemer et al., 2005; Coutts et al., 2011):
  (1.12)
For a detailed overview of ICT estimators modeling ICT data as a function of 
covariates, the reader is referred to Blair and Imai (2012) as well as Glynn (2013). 
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The R-package ‘list,’ for example, in its current form only allows for single-list 
implementations of the ICT (Blair and Imai, 2012).
1.3.4.3 Limitations
Remember that one of the main disadvantages of the ICT estimator is its relative 
inefficiency depending on the variance of the innocuous questions and their 
number. Thus, as in the case of RRT, a larger sample size is needed—even if the 
double-list design is used—to achieve the same precision as a comparable direct 
questioning method (Tsuchiya et al., 2007). Similar to the RRT this argument is 
relevant with respect to survey costs and the choice of the survey mode.
While seemingly granting more anonymity compared to the RRT (Lavender and 
Anderson, 2009; Coutts and Jann, 2011), the ICT is susceptible to so-called ‘floor’ 
and ‘ceiling effects’ (Kuklinski et al., 1997): Whenever either no item or all items 
apply to a respondent, anonymity is no longer granted. The researcher can then 
directly make inferences about the sensitive trait. Thus, incentives to misreport 
persist in singular instances even if the innocuous items are chosen following the 
design advice from previous studies summarized in Glynn (2013, p. 163). Another 
limitation particular to the ICT relates to the assumption of ‘no-design-effects’ 
(Tsuchiya and Hirai, 2010; Blair and Imai, 2012). This assumption relates to the 
fact that responses can be influenced by the question format itself, i.e., here the 
sum of applicable items as opposed to a response to the individual items.
Like the RRT, other limitations that also hold for the ICT are the often relied 
upon ‘more-is-better’ assumption and the focus on binary sensitive variables. 
We are not aware of any implementation beyond the collection of binary data for 
the ICT.
1.4 Summary of Research Gaps and Research Questions
The previous section argued that macro-level approaches cannot sufficiently 
differentiate between the shadow economy and undeclared work in particular, 
providing estimates that are too inclusive. Furthermore, these approaches cannot 
provide insights into individual motivations to engage in undeclared work. 
While survey-based approaches allow for that last possibility, they provide a 
lower boundary of prevalence estimates of undeclared work due to potential 
underreporting.
Comparing existing prevalence estimates of survey-based and indirect, macro-
economic approaches, leads us to the assumption that commonly applied 
strategies to ‘dejeopardize’ questions in surveys concerning undeclared work do 
not suffice to eliminate response bias and that the results of existing surveys on 
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undeclared work in Germany are still downwardly biased to an unknown extent. 
None of the existing studies on undeclared work has analyzed the benefits of 
using the randomized response or the item count technique avoid errors from 
(item) nonresponse and misreporting (here: ‘underreporting’) in the context of 
undeclared work in general population surveys (Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 100). 
Studying the RRT and the ICT implemented in a telephone mode, as opposed to 
a face-to-face mode, might prove worthwhile from a practicability point of view 
given the potential cost savings and a potentially increased sense of privacy for the 
respondents (Weissman et al., 1986; Groves, 1989; Schnell, 2012; Krumpal, 2012).
The main question is thus whether the quality of sensitive information 
collected by means of direct questioning in labor market surveys can be improved, 
using the RRT or the ICT. All empirical work in this dissertation is based on data 
collected in two experimental studies (see Chapter 2.1).
The first research question addressed in Chapter 2—‘Measuring and Explaining 
Undeclared Work in Germany’—concerns the performance of these two special 
data collection techniques—the RRT and the ICT—in the specific context of 
undeclared work. The question is whether we can elicit more truthful self-reports of 
undeclared work using the RRT or the ICT compared to direct questioning (‘more-
is-better’ assumption) and obtain higher prevalence estimates. Furthermore, we 
are interested in investigating which factors contribute to the explanation of 
undeclared work (using individual-level survey data). To address this latter research 
question, we briefly introduce a theoretical foundation for the explanation 
of undeclared work and our hypotheses that are to be tested. Using logistic 
regression models, we examine individual characteristics fostering engagement 
in undeclared work using the RRT data.
The second research question, is presented in Chapter 3—‘Item Sum: A Novel 
Technique for Asking Continuous Sensitive Questions’—and addresses the challenge 
that both techniques—the RRT and the ICT—have typically been applied to the 
collection of binary data. We thus developed a technique that is suitable for 
collecting information on sensitive continuous variables in a telephone survey: 
the item sum technique (IST). The IST is a generalization of the item count 
technique for collecting information on sensitive continuous variables. The main 
research question we address in this chapter is whether the IST can outperform 
standard direct questioning. For this evaluation, we collected data on hours 
engaged in undeclared work and earnings from undeclared work. Furthermore, we 
examine whether the IST performs differently in different subgroups, depending 
on differential cognitive abilities.
The third research question addressed in Chapter 4—‘Validating Sensitive 
Questions: A Comparison of Survey and Register Data’—deals with the ‘more-
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is-better’ assumption, which is so often relied upon in the literature on sensitive 
questions (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a). Whether or not these dejeopardizing 
techniques really outperform direct questioning can only be assessed in the 
presence of validation data. By nature, the data collected on undeclared work 
cannot be validated. However, other sensitive labor market information that is 
also known to be underreported can be used for this purpose. One topic that 
satisfies these requirements is the receipt of basic income support, a form of 
means-tested social security payment or welfare (more precisely, unemployment 
benefits II (UB  II)—colloquially also referred to as ‘Hartz IV’). It can be assumed to 
be socially stigmatizing and sensitive and is known to be subject to underreporting 
(Kreuter et al., 2010, 2013).
The RRT study is particularly designed to allow an in-depth analysis of the 
performance of the RRT and to relax the ‘more-is-better’ assumption using 
validation data on ‘welfare benefit receipt.’ We make use of the fact, that our 
samples in the RRT study are drawn from a frame containing additional information 
regarding the receipt of welfare benefit. Stratifying by this indicator, the sample is 
constant with respect to the dependent variable welfare benefit receipt, avoiding 
individual linkage of survey and register data, but nonetheless permitting validation. 
Combining this information from administrative records and survey data on welfare 
receipt, we know the true percentage of respondents who have received transfer 
payments for basic income support, and hence the percentage of people who should 
have reported receipt. This permits us to validate the reported percentage against 
the known true rate for the responding cases and to evaluate underreporting in the 
RRT and the direct questioning condition. Furthermore, this allows us to analyze 
individual-level factors contributing to reporting accuracy—something that is 
impossible with aggregate data relying on the ‘more-is-better’ assumption.
To analyze which technique performs better with respect to the true value 
as well as an assessment of mechanisms that might increase reporting accuracy 
are the central issues addressed in this chapter. Only a small number of validation 
studies evaluating the RRT exist (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a; Wolter, 2012). 
To our knowledge, all of these validation studies have implemented the RRT in a 
face-to-face mode. We thus evaluate the RRT in the context of a telephone mode.
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2  Measuring and Explaining Undeclared Work in Germany
As outlined above, the following chapter will investigate data collection strategies 
that were developed solely for the purpose of asking sensitive questions in 
surveys: the randomized response technique and the item count technique.1 This 
chapter serves two main purposes: a methodological one and a substantive one. 
The methodological purpose is to assess data quality and measurement error with 
respect to undeclared work. The substantive goal is to estimate the amount of 
undeclared work and analyze its determinants.
The contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, there are no 
population surveys in Germany particularly addressing the problem of social 
desirability associated with asking questions concerning undeclared work. Thus, 
one focus of this chapter is to analyze the potential of these special techniques, in 
the context of undeclared work (Boockmann et al., 2010, p. 100). More precisely, 
we assess whether we can reduce underreporting of undeclared work by means 
of RRT or ICT and thus obtain ‘increased,’ i.e., more accurate prevalence estimates 
compared to a direct questioning approach (‘more-is-better’ assumption, see 
Tourangeau and Yan, 2007).
Second, all techniques will be evaluated according to their performance in 
different sub-populations. The RRT study provides us with an opportunity to evaluate 
the functioning of the RRT in two very different subpopulations by oversampling 
recipients of welfare benefit in relation to employees. It is known from prior studies 
that the ‘success’ of the RRT depends on respondents understanding and trusting 
the procedure (for the difficulty of using RRT in populations with limited language 
skills, see Landsheer et al., 1999). Compared with a general population, individuals 
who receive welfare are known to usually have a lower educational background, 
as well as a migrant background (Aldashev and Fitzenberger, 2009). This explains 
why general problems of communication in surveys are more frequent and might 
jeopardize the applicability of the RRT. The RRT study is thus conducted in a setting 
with high external validity particularly with regard to other future telephone 
surveys of low-income populations.
Complementing the uni- and bivariate analyses regarding the prevalence of 
undeclared work (overall and in subpopulations), the third contribution relates to 
a substantive question: Which factors contribute to the explanation of undeclared 
work (using individual-level survey data). Relying on theories concerning undeclared 
work, we will empirically test existing hypotheses. Thus complex relationships 
1 This chapter is based on a paper by Kirchner et al. (2013) and reprinted with mod fications by permission of Lucius & 
Lucius Verlagsgesellschaft mbH.
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between undeclared work and socio-demographic characteristics, opportunity 
and incentive structures, as well as normative attitudes can be analyzed at an 
individual level. These analyses were conducted using logistic regression analyses 
using the Stata routine ‘rrlogit,’ with an adapted likelihood function (Jann, 2011).
The chapter outline is as follows: Section 2.1 describes all relevant study 
specific details. Prevalence estimates are presented in Section 2.2.1, while the 
results of the multivariate regression models—including the theoretical foundation 
and hypotheses to be tested—are presented in Section 2.2.2. The chapter ends 
with a discussion and conclusion of our results (Section 2.3).
2.1 Study Details: The Experiments
Data utilized in this dissertation are drawn from two nation-wide telephone surveys 
that experimentally assigned respondents into the experimental conditions: direct 
questioning, randomized response, and item count.
Aside from differences in the sampling design (see below), the two studies 
differ only in the experimental set-up, i.e., the randomized response and the 
item count technique. Using a split-ballot design in both studies, errors from 
specification, frame, nonresponse as well as errors from data processing can be 
assumed to be constant in both experimental groups and therefore will not be 
discussed any further.
The first survey—the RRT study—was commissioned by the Institute for 
Employment research (IAB) an independent institute of the German Federal 
Employment Agency (FEA), and was carried out by the ForschungsWerk institute 
(Nuremberg) from October 18th to December 10th, 2010. In approximately 
the same period (25.10.2010 to 22.12.2010), the second survey—the ICT study, 
commissioned by the University of Leipzig—was carried out by the Usuma institute 
(Berlin). Overall, a total of 3,211 interviews were completed in the RRT study, and 
a total of 1,603 in the ICT study.2
The following section will provide a general overview of the study designs, 
while the remaining chapters will provide more detailed information, such as 
specific operationalizations, whenever warranted (see Chapter 3 and 4).
2 While in total 1,606 interviews were completed in the ICT study, three interviews turned out to be invalid and could 
not be used for further analyses.
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2.1.1 The RRT Study
2.1.1.1 Sampling and Data Collection
We chose a particular sampling design that would enable us to analyze two 
samples with different incentive and opportunity structures for undeclared work. 
The RRT study is a dual-frame survey, using sampling frames that are maintained 
by the German Federal Employment Agency (IAB Unemployment Benefit II History 
(LHG) V6.03.01 and (XLHG) V01.06.00-201007; IAB Employment Histories (BeH) 
V08.04.00, Nuremberg 2010).
These frames consist of all registered unemployment benefit (II) recipients as 
well as all employed persons who are subject to social security contributions. The 
register includes all employees who are subject to social security contributions, 
that is, all people with income from dependent work in a specific month. Self-
employed and civil servants are not covered because they do not pay social security 
contributions.
The first random sample was drawn from the FEA registers of basic income 
support recipients. It consists of people aged 18 to 64 who were known to have 
received basic income support in June 2010 (a form of means-tested—essentially 
welfare—benefits called ‘Unemployment Benefit II’ paid up to the age of 64, 
henceforth referred to as UB II or benefit recipients sample). The second random 
sample was drawn from the register of employees maintained by the FEA. It consists 
of people aged 18 to 70 who were employed in December 2009 (henceforth referred 
to as employee sample). For both samples the latest available registers were used. 
Nonetheless, employment status or UB II eligibility may have changed by the date 
of the interview. That is, a part of the respondents in the employee sample or the 
benefit recipient sample was no longer employed or receiving benefits when being 
interviewed.
The FEA registers only contain telephone numbers for about forty percent 
of the employees and ninety percent of benefit recipients (landline and mobile 
phone numbers). Furthermore, it is known from past surveys that some of these 
numbers are out of date. We therefore tried to complete the numbers using 
public telephone directories. Nonetheless, 31.8% of the employee sample and 
8.3% of the benefit recipient sample remained without telephone number. During 
fieldwork, 17.5% of the phone numbers in the employee sample and 17.2% of the 
phone numbers in the benefit recipient sample turned out to be invalid and could 
not be replaced by a working phone number from the public directories. Among 
those who could be contacted, about 26% agreed to participate in the survey. 
However, due to the large proportion of missing or invalid phone numbers, the 
overall response rates were 16.3% and 18.8% in the two samples respectively 
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(RR1 according to AAPOR 2011).3 Table 2.1 provides an overview of the sample 
sizes and response rates.
Every selected individual received a personalized advance letter, inviting them 
to participate in the labor market survey “Living and Working in Germany.” Each 
advance letter contained a toll free number, as well as a link to a homepage 
to access in case of further questions. Furthermore, individuals were informed 
about the topic of the survey (labor market developments), survey sponsorship, 
data privacy and the voluntary nature of participation. However, neither the 
main substantive topic (undeclared work and welfare receipt) nor the conduct of 
methods experiments were mentioned in the advance letter.
Table 2.1: RRT study: sample sizes and response rates
Employees Benefit recipients Total
Gross sample 9,996 8,999 18,995
Net sample (with phone number) 6,820 8,250 15,070
Invalid phone number 1,196 1,422 2,618
Non-contact 813 1,564 2,377
Refusal 3,094 3,173 6,267
Ineligible (deceased, moved abroad, outside
age range, speaks no German)
104 493 597
Interview completed 1,613 1,598 3,211
Response Rate (AAPOR RR1) 16.3% 18.8% 17.5%
2.1.1.2 Experimental Design
In both samples—employees and benefit recipients—about one third of the 
respondents in the gross sample was randomly assigned to direct questioning 
(DQ; n = 1,145), and the remaining two-thirds to the randomized response 
technique (RRT; n = 2,066). Prior to fieldwork, regression analyses were conducted 
showing that randomization into experimental groups within subsamples worked 
appropriately and that sample composition did not differ significantly. Unit 
nonresponse affected both experimental conditions equally. Table 2.2 provides an 
overview of the assignments to the experimental conditions.
3 Overall, 275 respondents completed the interview only partially (subsumed under ‘refusal’ in Table 2.1), i.e., all 
respondents who started the experimental section. Out of those 275, 124 dropped out prior to the experimental 
condition, while the majority of the remaining participants dropped out upon entering the experimental 
condition (n = 95), and 22 when confronted with questions regarding undeclared work. 34 participants dropped 
out after the experimental condition.
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Table 2.2: RRT study: experimental conditions
Study 
Assigned  
Condition 
N 
Realized  
Condition 
N 
RRT study 
DQ 1,145 DQ 1,145
RRT 2,066 RRT 1,792
DQ_RRT 274 
The unequal assignment to the experimental conditions was necessary to achieve 
approximately the same level of statistical precision in the RRT condition (Warner, 
1965; Cohen, 1988). The loss of statistical efficiency in the RRT condition is due to 
the additional random noise component.
Some of the respondents originally assigned to the RRT refused the application 
of the randomized response technique and were subsequently asked to respond 
to the relevant survey questions directly (DQ_RRT; n = 274). Out of those 
274  respondents (13.3% of the original RRT sample), 201 reported that they ‘were 
not in the mood for RRT’ and 73 reported that they ‘did not have coins at hand.’ 
While it can be shown in analyses not presented here that respondents in the 
direct questioning and the randomized response split do not differ significantly in 
substantive variables, further tests for the ‘non-compliers’ or ‘defiers’ show that 
these groups significantly differ in some respects from the RRT compliers (see 
Section 2.1.3). Thus all further analyses will be conducted separately. Section 2.1.3 
provides some information regarding the final sample composition.
2.1.1.3 Questionnaire
2.1.1.3.1 General Information
Respondents in both studies—the RRT study and the ICT study—received identical 
questionnaires, differing only in the experimental sections. Both surveys used 
the same set-ups with respect to: assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, 
introduction to the topic, definitions (undeclared work) and further explanations, 
if needed.
The questionnaire initially collected information concerning individual 
employment histories and labor market issues. Following this section, the 
experiments were implemented collecting data using either standard direct 
questioning methods or the randomized response technique.
Within the experimental section, respondents first received a question 
regarding welfare benefit receipt. This question concerning receipt of 
unemployment benefit II (yes/no) was asked prior to the questions regarding 
undeclared work (yes/no). The item sum technique (asking follow-up questions on 
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hours engaged in undeclared work and income from undeclared work) succeeded 
the RRT section. For the exact wording of the introductions to each experimental 
condition, see Appendix A.1 (RRT) and A.2 (IST).
Following the experiments, the questionnaire concluded with a section asking 
about attitudes towards undeclared work and labor market participation as well 
as socio-demographic characteristics, such as age or education. These additional 
data are used to form the explanatory variables in subsequent analyses. Average 
questionnaire completion time was 18.1 minutes.
In the course of questionnaire development, 31 cognitive paper-and-pencil 
interviews were conducted to identify substantive and methodological problems 
(e.g., with respect to RRT, or IST instructions). After adjusting the questionnaire 
accordingly, a second pretest (n = 63) was fielded by the data collection institute 
to test the instruments as well as all relevant filters and randomizations.
Interviewers in the RRT and the ICT study received identical, study-specific 
training. Furthermore, they received additional training in order to successfully 
learn how to implement the experiments and reply to respondent questions or 
concerns in a standardized way.
2.1.1.3.2 The RRT Implementation
Following the logic outlined in Section 1.3.3, we opted to minimize two respondent 
hazards in our specific RRT-design: Neither a positive (‘Yes’) nor a negative (‘No’) 
answer should risk suspicion. We decided to implement a symmetric forced-
response RRT variant (Boruch, 1971). According to a study conducted by Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. (2005b) the forced choice implementation of the RRT has the highest 
statistical efficiency among different RRT designs and is usually best understood 
(Landsheer et al., 1999; De Schrijver, 2012). In this RRT variant, neither a positive 
nor a negative response reveals anything about the true status of the respondent.
More precisely, depending on the outcome of a randomization device, 
respondents are instructed to reply according to a set of rules: They are asked to 
either give a truthful answer to the sensitive question, i.e., ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ a forced 
‘Yes,’ or a forced ‘No’—irrespective of their true status. As a rule of thumb Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. (2005b) suggest that the probability of providing a forced ‘Yes’ 
should be approximately the same as the expected prevalence of the sensitive 
item under investigation while the probability to tell the truth should be between 
0.7 and 0.8. Since the main item under study was ‘undeclared work,’ with an 
assumed prevalence of about 10% to 12%, we chose the probabilities of a forced 
‘Yes’/‘No’ and ‘the truth’ accordingly.
In our study, respondents in the RRT condition were asked first to gather 
paper and pencil in order to note the rules. Respondents were then asked to flip 
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three coins prior to each question in the RRT section. Due to the telephone mode, 
privacy with respect to the outcome of the coin flip was easily provided. Should 
a respondent nonetheless accidentally reveal the outcome, interviewers were 
trained to ask respondents to flip the coin again without revealing the outcome. 
The exact rules implemented to provide an answer were the following:
“Please, always reply ‘No’ if the outcome of the coins is heads only. If the 
outcome of the coin flip is all tails, always reply ‘Yes,’ irrespective of the true 
answer. Only if the outcome of the coin flip is mixed, i.e., heads and tails, answer 
truthfully with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the respective question.”
Remember that only the respondent is aware of the outcome of the coin flip 
and that p1 = ‘forced’ ‘Yes’ = 0.125, p2 = ‘forced’ ‘No’ = 0.125, and p3 = truthful 
response = 0.75. The exact instructions used in the questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix A.1 (translated from German).
The study conducted by Landsheer and colleagues (1999) further shows that 
a thorough understanding of the method is crucial in order for respondents to 
actually provide truthful, i.e., potentially socially undesirable, answers. Thus, 
to ensure respondent understanding of the technique, a minimum of one ‘test’ 
example—in which the true answer had been reported by the respondent earlier 
in the questionnaire—was provided to everyone in this experimental condition so 
as to familiarize the respondents with the RRT. If this ‘test example’ was answered 
incorrectly, or the interviewer was under the impression that the technique had 
not been fully understood, another standardized example was provided to the 
respondent. Only when full understanding of the rules had been assured did the 
main RRT section begin.
2.1.2 The ICT Study
2.1.2.1 Sampling and Data Collection
The ICT study is a based on a general population sample, more precisely, an ADM 
telephone sample “Easy Sample” (see Häder and Gabler, 1998). We randomly 
selected German landline numbers, proportional to the population size and 
regionally stratified by communities. Using random digit dialing (RDD), we also 
covered individuals whose telephone numbers are not published in telephone books 
or online. We randomly selected respondents aged 18 to 70 within households, 
using a ‘Kish Selection Grid’ (adapted from Kish, 1965, p. 399).
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Overall 1,606 interviews were completed and the overall response rate was 15.2% 
(RR1 according to AAPOR 2011).4 Unlike in the RRT study, we did not encounter any 
interview break-offs in the ICT study. Table 2.3 provides a more detailed overview 
of the sample size and the response rate.
Table 2.3: ICT study: sample sizes and response rates
General Population Sample in %
Gross sample 28,128
Ineligible phone numbers 17,533
Net sample of phone numbers 10,595 100.0
Unknown eligibility 7,447 70.3
Non-contact 362 3.4
Refusal 908 8.6
Other (speaks no German) 272 2.6
Interview completed 1,606 15.2
Response Rate (AAPOR RR1) 15.2
Of 10,595 telephone numbers, approximately 70% were of unknown eligibility. 3.4% 
of eligible households could not be contacted, while 8.6% refused participation 
or did not have sufficient knowledge of the German language (2.6%). Due to the 
sampling and data collection using RDD, selected individuals in the ICT study did 
not receive an advance letter announcing the study.
2.1.2.2 Experimental Design & ICT Implementation
Facing the tradeoff of privacy protection and statistical efficiency (see 
Chapter  1.3.4), we implemented the double-list ICT using three innocuous items 
(see also Ahart and Sackett, 2004; Coutts and Jann, 2011).
Respondents were randomly assigned to either the control condition—direct 
questioning—or the treatment condition—item count. Table 2.4 provides an 
overview of the assignment to the experimental conditions.
4 Due to rounding, the total adds up to 100.1%.
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Table 2.4: ICT study: experimental conditions
Study 
Assigned  
Condition 
N 
Realized  
Condition 
N 
ICT study 
DQ 500 DQ 500
ICT 1 550 ICT 1 550 
ICT 2 553 ICT 2 553
Following the same logic as in the RRT study, we also assigned respondents 
unequally to either condition in order to increase statistical power in the ICT 
condition. This resulted in 500 complete interviews in the direct questioning 
condition as well as 550 completes in ICT 1, and 553 in ICT 2 (remember that two 
subsamples are necessary for the ICT, thus ICT  1 and ICT 2). Due to the double-
list implementation of the ICT, this yields a total of 1,103 respondents in the ICT 
condition. Turning to the ‘assigned’ and the ‘realized’ columns, we see that we did 
not encounter any problems regarding respondents refusing the application of ICT 
and breaking randomization. Section 2.1.3 provides more information regarding the 
final sample composition.
2.1.2.3 Questionnaire: General Information
As mentioned above, respondents in both studies—the RRT study and the ICT study—
received identical questionnaires, differing only in the experimental sections. 
Following an initial section concerning labor market biographies, we implemented 
the experiments and collected data using standard direct questioning or the item 
count technique.
The ICT experimental section only contained questions relating to undeclared 
work (yes/no). For the exact wordings of the introduction and the lists in the 
ICT conditions, please see Appendix A.3. Following our experiments, the interview 
concluded with fewer, but identical, questions as the RRT study. Average 
questionnaire completion time was 14.1 minutes in the ICT study.
In the course of questionnaire development, 31 cognitive paper-and-
pencil interviews were conducted to identify substantive and methodological 
problems (e.g., with respect to ICT instructions). After adjusting the questionnaire 
accordingly, a second pretest (n = 42) was fielded by the data collection institute 
to test the instruments and all relevant randomizations.
2.1.3 Sample Composition
Table 2.5 provides an overview of the sample composition of both studies. We 
conducted χ2 and two-sided t-tests to assess group differences, a summary of 
these results will be reported in the text.
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sample only 20% of the respondents report having an upper secondary degree 
(see also Aldashev and Fitzenberger, 2009). The same pattern emerges for migrant 
background, i.e., benefit recipients having a higher share (approx. 35%), while the 
employee sample and the ICT sample do not differ.
2.1.4 Undeclared Work: The Dependent Variables
In accordance with the existing research practice (Pedersen, 2003; Feld and Larsen, 
2005; EC – European Commission, 2007; Schneider and Enste, 2007; Williams, 
2009; Boockmann et al., 2010), respondents received a definition of undeclared 
work just prior to the beginning of that section in the RRT and ICT survey. Both 
surveys used the following introduction and definition (translated from German):
“We would now like to ask you a few questions regarding your experience with 
undeclared work.
By undeclared work we mean any paid labor that is hidden from (tax) authorities, 
e.g., to avoid paying social security contributions or taxes. Criminal activities, 
such as drugtrafficking, are NOT included in the definition of undeclared work.”
Following this introduction, respondents were then asked to answer specific items 
relating to undeclared work. Both surveys differentiated between undeclared work 
for a private individual and undeclared work for a company (see EC – European 
Commission, 2007; Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Boockmann et al., 2010). Table 2.6 provides 
information regarding the exact wordings, sample sizes in each condition, as well 
as item nonresponse.
Table 2.6:  Wording of the items measuring undeclared work, sample sizes and item nonresponse 
(translated from German) 
Item Operationalization Study 
Valid  
Responses 
Item  
Nonresponse
N 
Person 
Have you engaged in any 
undeclared work for a 
private person this year? 
RRT 
DQ: 1,142 
RRT: 1,790 
DQ_RRT: 272 
3 
2 
2 
1,145 
1,792 
274 
ICT 
DQ: 498 
ICT: 1,103 
2 
0 
500 
1,103 
Company 
Have you engaged in 
any undeclared work 
this year for a company, 
which paid you without 
reporting your income to 
the authorities? 
RRT 
DQ: 1,142 
RRT: 1,789 
DQ_RRT: 273 
3 
3 
1 
1,145 
1,792 
274 
ICT 
DQ: 497 
ICT: 1,103 
3 
0 
500 
1,103 
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higher compared to the direct questioning conditions in either study. Only for 
the benefit recipients sample in the RRT study are results as expected, with the 
RRT eliciting more (truthful) reports of undeclared work (DQ: 3 29%; RRT: 4.07%). 
Estimates in the employee sample of the RRT study, as well as estimates in the 
ICT study are even lower in comparison to the traditional direct questioning (RRT 
study: 1.77% vs. 1.22%; ICT study: 3.41% vs. 0.26%). Neither differences between 
experimental and control groups are statistically significant in either study.5 Those 
respondents who refused the application of the RRT do not differ significantly from 
the respondents in the corresponding RRT condition (employees: 1.09%; benefit 
recipients: 2.22%).
Overall, Figure 2.1 also reveals that respondents in the benefit recipients sample 
of the RRT study report slightly higher levels of undeclared work for a private 
person, compared to respondents in the employee sample. Taking all evidence 
into account, estimates obtained for the general population in the ICT study fall 
within the range of the former two estimates. Further, Figure 2.1 shows that the 
95% confidence intervals are much broader in the ICT condition compared to 
those in the RRT condition. While there is evidence that ICT estimates are more 
inefficient compared to RRT estimates (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a, b; Coutts 
and Jann, 2011), in our study it is primarily due to the smaller sample size in the 
ICT condition.
Figure 2.2 again presents prevalence estimates (in %) and the corresponding 
95% confidence intervals, for all experimental conditions, however, for the item 
‘undeclared work for a company.’ As in Figure 2.1, respondents in the benefit 
recipient sample of the RRT study display higher prevalence rates in the RRT 
condition compared to direct questioning (DQ: 1.56%; RRT: 5.98%). This finding 
is significant at the 1% level. In the employee sample, differences in the RRT and 
direct question condition are nonsignificant: Again, contrary to our expectations 
the prevalence estimates obtained in the RRT condition are even lower compared 
to direct questioning (DQ: 0.53%; RRT: -0.86%). While it is not only lower, the 
prevalence estimate in the RRT condition is even negative (though nonsignificantly 
different from zero). Turning to the ICT study, Figure 2.2 shows that the prevalence 
estimates obtained via ICT are significantly higher at the 5% level compared to 
direct questioning (DQ: 1.21%; ICT: 6.41%). For this item, those respondents who 
refused the application of the RRT differ (significantly) from the respondents in 
the corresponding RRT condition and are more similar to those of the DQ condition 
(employees: 1.09%; benefit recipients: 0.55%).
5 Empirical significance levels (p-values) are based on two-sided z-tests (RRT) using the rrlogit routine, as well as 
t-test for differences in mean estimates (ICT).
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‘unwitting’ tax evasion (e.g., concealing of capital income) or a more deliberate, 
organized form of tax evasion (combined with abuse of authority or fraudulent 
counterfeit) (Zoll, 2011, 2012). If conducted in a professional or organized form, 
the possible sentence increases from a minimum of one year of imprisonment to a 
maximum of 10 years (§370a Abgabenordnung; see also Feld et al., 2007). Another 
potential explanation in that regard might be the fact that undeclared work for 
private persons or households is socially much more accepted, less often concealed 
and more often only prosecuted as a regulatory offense, compared to undeclared 
work for a company, i.e., in the ‘official economy’ (Pfau-Effinger, 2009, p. 89).
Second, for respondents in the benefit recipient sample, yet another concern 
adds to perceived item sensitivity: Not only are benefit recipients prosecuted for 
engaging in undeclared work if discovered (§9 SchwarzArbG, 2004), but also for 
social security fraud (§263 StGB). This offense can lead to up to five years of 
imprisonment or a penalty (Zoll, 2011, 2012). Thus it is reasonable to assume that 
the items measuring undeclared work are perceived as even more sensitive for 
benefit recipients.
In accordance with other studies (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a) that 
argue that these special techniques perform better, the more sensitive an item 
is perceived to be by respondents, our results are as expected: These special 
techniques outperform direct questioning 1) in the benefit recipients sample 
compared to the employees and 2) for the item ‘undeclared work for a company’ 
compared to ‘undeclared work for a private person.’
However, we are not solely interested in the relative comparisons of the 
different data collection techniques. We are also interested in how our prevalence 
estimates relate to those of other studies. To ensure comparability, it is sensible to 
limit our comparison to the most recent German studies. Since those studies do not 
differentiate between undeclared work for a private person and for a company, we 
have to aggregate our estimates to obtain an ‘overall prevalence’ of undeclared work. 
Furthermore, studies that qualify for this comparison should have approximately 
the same reference periods and a similar population. Two studies, with reference 
periods of one year, surveying the German general population, meet these criteria: 
the Eurobarometer, referring to a population aged 15 and older (Williams, 2009) and 
the study by Feld and Larsen (2008) with a population aged 18 to 74.
Estimating an overall prevalence, i.e., combining individual reports for the two 
kinds of undeclared work, direct questioning yields 1.9% in the employee sample, 
3.8% in the benefit recipient sample, and 4.2% in the ICT general population 
survey. The matching estimates in the experimental conditions have to be derived 
from the indirect data: For the employee sample, the RRT estimate is at least 
1.2%, while the same estimate for the benefit recipient sample is approximately 
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9.9%. The ICT estimates have a lower bound of at least 6.4% undeclared work.6 
Adjusting for the fact that both studies, the RRT and the ICT study, were fielded 
in the months of October and November 2010, the overall estimate for 2010 will 
likely be even higher than our actual estimates. The Eurobarometer estimates 
the prevalence of undeclared work for the year of 2007 at 3% (EC – European 
Commission, 2007, p. 19; Williams, 2010, p. 254); an estimate that closely relates 
to what we observe in our direct questioning conditions. The estimated prevalence 
in the study conducted by Feld and Larsen (2008) is 7.2% (in 2006).
2.2.2 Who Engages in Undeclared Work?
This section addresses the second research question, analyzing individual 
characteristics that foster engagement in undeclared work and the main 
motivations of respondents to do so. Drawing on existing theories explaining 
engagement in undeclared work, we will empirically test these hypotheses with 
our data. Given the lower statistical power of the ICT study, and the lack of 
available data analysis routines to analyze ICT double-list data, we will conduct 
all subsequent analyses using solely data from the RRT study. The R package “list: 
Statistical Methods for the Item Count Technique and List Experiment” is only 
available for the analysis of single-list ICT variants (Blair and Imai, 2012).
Before we do so, we will briefly review some theories of undeclared work and 
tax evasion/honesty and present the hypotheses to be tested. The hypotheses are 
usually derived from behavioral theories, e.g., using the framework of rational choice 
theory and subjective expected utility theory of the income-reporting decision 
(Becker, 1968; Voss and Abraham, 2000; Mehlkop and Becker, 2004; Eifler, 2009).
2.2.2.1 Theoretical Foundations and Hypotheses
One of the very first theoretical approaches explaining deviant behavior regarding 
paying taxes is the standard model of tax avoidance and tax evasion (Allingham 
and Sandmo, 1972). It particularly focuses on the influence of tax rates. The 
authors also investigate the impact of the probability of a tax audit, i.e., of being 
detected (the model assumes that this probability is known to the individuals), and 
the influence of the degree of punishment if individuals are discovered.
Bordignon (1993, p. 345), however, criticises that: 1) this standard deterrence 
model cannot account for the empirically observed ‘compliance’: The share of 
6 The overall prevalence rates in the control groups can be obtained by simply adding the single estimates and 
subtracting the intersection (to obtain the set union). For the RRT we obtain an overall estimate according to the 
conditional probabilities (however, we did censor the negative prevalence estimate to the lower bound of zero). For 
the ICT, we rely on those (higher) estimates of the second item only, since an overall estimate cannot be computed.
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individuals abiding by the laws and regulations regarding reporting of income is too 
high and cannot be explained with the standard model. 2) Some of the hypothesized 
relationships, e.g., that the level of evaded taxes is negatively related to the tax 
rate, are implausible and are not supported by empirical findings (Yitzhaki, 1974; 
Andreoni et al., 1998). 3) Last but not least, the standard model does not withstand 
an empirical test using either survey data or experiments (Dell’Anno, 2009).
Thus, over the past decades, these initial models were extended, allowing more 
integrated approaches and realistic assumptions. Extensions of the model incorporate 
characteristics of the specific legal tax code, enforcements and regulations (Yitzhaki, 
1974). Also, assumptions that do not hold, such as ‘complete’ information regarding 
the probability of tax audits were relaxed. Another development (see Andreoni et al., 
1998) relates to the inclusion of ‘soft factors,’ such as social norms and nonmonetary 
costs that arise from social stigma and loss of reputation (Benjamini and Maital, 
1985), tax morale, moral obligations and intrinsic motivations to comply with norms 
(Gordon, 1989; Myles and Naylor, 1996), fairness considerations with respect to the 
tax burden as well as the satisfaction with the manner in which taxes are spent 
(Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976; Bordignon, 1993).
Accounting for individual restrictions and opportunity structures (cf. also 
Renooy, 1990), these integrated approaches provide the starting point for an 
explanation of deviant behavior. Dell’Anno (2009) essentially integrates two 
major directions of research: the perceived risk of detection by individuals and 
(subjective) expected utility from behavioral economics, as well as individual tax 
morale, defined as intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. If individuals are caught 
cheating on taxes, psychological costs due to stigma and loss of reputation arise 
that have to be included in the model (see also Gordon, 1989). A thorough review 
of the theoretical developments can be found in Cowell (1990) as well as Andreoni 
et al. (1998).7
Based on these arguments, we draw upon classical and more recent behavioral 
theories to explain delinquent behavior such as undeclared work (Becker, 1968; 
Voss and Abraham, 2000; Mehlkop and Becker, 2004; Schneider and Enste, 
2007). According to these theories, the individual definition of a situation and 
the subsequent behavior, are influenced by an individual’s prospect of success 
and the expected utility given ‘success.’ Furthermore, the anticipated probability 
of being detected engaging in criminal behavior, as well as the associated costs 
given detection contribute to this subjective evaluation. Other equally important 
7 Similar to Dell’Anno (2009, p. 993), we apply these theories of tax avoidance and tax evasion to undeclared work. 
It can be reasonably assumed that we are dealing with similar types of individuals engaging in shadow economic 
activities and that the same arguments apply in both instances. Further theoretical approaches can be found in 
Renooy (1990), Hessing et al. (1993), Lamnek et al. (2000), Mummert and Schneider (2001), Wenzel (2004), Feld and 
Larsen (2005), as well as Schneider and Enste (2007, p. 54  ff.).
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factors include prevailing social norms in an individual’s environment and external 
restrictions, such as time and budget restrictions (Mehlkop, 2011).
From this rational choice perspective, we thus assume that a variety of factors 
contribute to the explanation of engagement in undeclared work (participation 
decision), namely: utility from undeclared work, i.e., expected monetary gains and 
perceived costs of undeclared work, opportunity structures as well as norms and 
values, i.e., general approval or disapproval of undeclared work.
Monetary gains that an individual receives from undeclared work depend on 
the potential ‘additional’ income (Tanzi and Shome, 1993, p. 811). Two mechanisms 
are plausible in order to generate this additional income: First, undeclared work 
can substitute official employment. An individual working undeclared then saves 
taxes and social security contributions and thus generates more income (provided 
that she does not receive social security benefits which would offset this additional 
income). Since these social security contributions would, in theory, benefit the 
individual herself, we will instead focus on the marginal tax rate. For employed 
individuals this ranges—depending on the annual income—from 0% (income below 
€8,000) to 42% (above €52,500). These gains from substitution are even more 
pronounced for recipients of welfare benefits (UB II). Any additional income (if 
declared) is deduced: Above the basic exempt amount of €100, the marginal benefit 
‘deduction’ or ‘withdrawal’ rate (i.e., the amount that will be credited against the 
benefits) ranges between 80% and 90% of each additional Euro that is earned by an 
individual on a monthly basis.8 Our data does not allow the derivation of an accurate 
measure of the marginal tax rate or the marginal ‘deduction’ rate, thus the sample 
status9 in combination with the gross labor income will be used a proxy for gains by 
substitution. We hypothesize that individuals receiving unemployment benefits II, 
as well as individuals with a high labor income (Andreoni et al., 1998) will be more 
likely to engage in undeclared work, all other things being equal.
Another ‘gain’ from undeclared work is by means of classical ‘moonlighting,’ 
i.e., additional income from a complementary side job. This scenario is plausible 
if the preferred scope of work (amount of hours worked) cannot be achieved in 
the official labor market. Sometimes regulations, such as general agreements on 
pay grades (Rahmentarifvertrag), restrict individual preferences by limiting the 
number of working hours, or even force individuals to work part-time. The preferred 
8 At the time of the survey unemployment benefit II recipients were allowed to keep 20% of their additional 
income between €101 to €800 and 10% of each Euro earned above €801 to a maximum of €1,500. 
9 The survey contains another randomized response variable indicating current or past receipt of benefits. Thus, we 
rely on the sample indicator as a proxy (see Chapter 4). Given that respondents in the benefit recipient sample 
were known to have received benefits just prior to the main data collection, and further, that the benefit receipt 
among the respondents in the employee sample during the data collection period is as low as 3.8%, we assume 
that this proxy can be used.
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number of working hours per week in relation to the actual number of hours worked 
by individuals is used as an indicator to capture this effect. We hypothesize that 
individuals who are (externally) constrained in their preferred number of working 
hours, will be more likely to engage in undeclared work, all other things being equal.
Monetary costs on the other hand are a combination of the two factors ‘perceived 
risk of detection’ and the ‘expected penalty’ given detection (see Andreoni et al., 1998; 
Pedersen, 2003; Feld and Larsen, 2005). Formally, the expected value of these costs 
is derived by multiplying both factors. We hypothesize that the higher the expected 
value of this product for a given offense, the lower the probability of engagement 
in undeclared work, all other things being equal. This proxy was generated using 
the following information: First, respondents were asked to estimate how many out 
of 100 individuals who work undeclared, would be discovered by the authorities. 
Second, respondents were given a hypothetical situation of an individual engaging 
in undeclared work (for six months, full-time, earning overall €12,000 with charges 
being pressed against this person). We asked respondents to provide an estimate for 
the monetary penalty that the hypothetical individual would be facing (we explicitly 
excluded back duties in our example).
Until now, the focus of our explanation to engage in undeclared work has been 
exclusively on the individual’s decision to supply labor. However, the decision to 
participate in undeclared work also depends on the demand. Opportunity structures, 
such as type of job and how well an individual is connected or integrated, are 
thus essential for the explanation of undeclared work. Previous studies show, for 
example, that those types of employment that are more ‘independent,’ such as self-
employment, lead to a higher propensity to engage in undeclared work (Andreoni 
et al., 1998; Feld and Larsen, 2005; Williams, 2009). Our measure of occupation, 
or rather a proxy for independence and opportunities either on the current or the 
previous job, relies on the occupational status adapted from the Erikson, Goldthorpe 
and Portocarero social class scheme (EGP; Erikson et al., 1979). Another aspect that 
influences opportunities to engage in undeclared work is individual integration 
and networks. While individuals who are socially integrated have more social 
obligations, and thus potentially less time to engage in undeclared work, they also 
have more opportunities and an exchange of information for doing so (Granovetter, 
1974; Wolff, 1991; Williams, 2010). To capture these effects, we collected data on 
the amount of support a respondent would have in finding a job. This is measured 
as the number of people in one’s network willing to provide this support resource. 
Another indicator for integration is active membership in an organization or 
club. We hypothesize that respondents who are more socially integrated, or have 
occupations that are characterized by more independence and opportunities, have 
a higher propensity to engage in undeclared work.
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Finally, normative considerations such as informal normative expectations or 
internalized social norms are relevant in explaining deviant behavior such as 
engagement in undeclared work (Gordon, 1989; Tanzi and Shome, 1993; Cullis 
and Lewis, 1997; Andreoni et al., 1998; Falk, 2003; Feld and Larsen, 2005; Cialdini, 
2007). On the one hand, if respondents (as well as their friends or acquaintances) 
disapprove of undeclared work, they will be less likely to rationally consider the 
potential tradeoff between official and undeclared work and the potential utility 
of engaging in undeclared work. Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 846), for example, argue 
for the “human need for consistent self-representation” and if honesty norms are 
internalized, for an individual tendency for norm-congruent behavior. Having said 
that, psychological costs due to noncompliance to one’s own moral standards 
can be incorporated into the model. On the other hand, compliance with these 
internalized moral standards can be countered or weakened by “social information” 
(Cialdini, 2007, p. 264). This could be the case if an individual’s social network 
mostly approves of undeclared work—or rather if the individual anticipates approval 
(“injunctive social norm”)—, or if undeclared work is perceived as a common 
behavior that is accepted as something ‘normal’ (“descriptive social norm”).
(Social) norms regarding undeclared work and values transmitted in one’s social 
networks (societal norms of behavior) are captured using several indicators:  1) an 
estimate of the prevalence of undeclared work among one’s friends and acquaintances, 
and 2) an index measuring attitudes towards undeclared work. This additive index is 
composed of seven attitudinal questions related to tax morality, perceived regulation 
density, or intolerance of undeclared work. Response formats for each of the seven 
items were identical using a 4-point rating scale (if necessary, recoded for the analyses 
to express positive attitudes).10 High values on our scale indicate a positive, approving 
attitude towards undeclared work. We hypothesize that the higher the expressed 
approval of or the higher the share of undeclared work in one’s own network, the 
higher the individual propensity to engage in undeclared work.
A detailed overview of all relevant operationalizations can be found in the 
Appendix A.5. 
To summarize all hypotheses to be tested:
1. Individuals receiving welfare benefits, earning a high labor income as well as 
individuals who are limited in their preferred number of working hours have a 
higher individual propensity to work undeclared. (Utility Hypothesis)
2. Individuals with a higher perceived risk of detection and higher expected penalties 
have a lower individual propensity to work undeclared. (Cost Hypothesis)
10  Comparing sum scores with factor scores (derived using maximum likelihood estimation) shows a high correlation 
(r = 0.95; irrespective of whether we listwise delete observations with missing values or use imputation techniques). 
Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.56 for the seven items.
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3. Individuals who are socially more integrated (network resources for finding a 
job or active membership in an organization), or who are more independent 
in their occupation have a higher individual propensity to work undeclared. 
(Opportunity Hypothesis)
4. Individuals who express approval towards undeclared work, or who report a higher 
perceived share of undeclared work among their friends and acquaintances have 
a higher individual propensity to work undeclared. (Norm Hypothesis)
Furthermore, all models control for demographic characteristics such as gender, age, 
formal training (highest degree), migrant background and region of residence (East/
West) (see Wolff, 1991; Merz and Wolff, 1993; Andreoni et al., 1998; Mummert and 
Schneider, 2001; Schneider and Enste, 2007; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010).11
2.2.2.2 Empirical Evidence
All subsequent analyses to empirically test our hypotheses were conducted using 
logistic regression models (using rrlogit Jann, 2011 with a modified likelihood 
function, see Maddala, 1983). In order to address the second research question, two 
models will be estimated: Model 1) modeling undeclared work for a private person, 
as well as model 2) modeling undeclared work for a company, each as a function of 
the covariates introduced above. In order to relax assumptions regarding the exact 
nature of the relationships and given the relatively low power of the RRT estimator, 
we categorized most independent variables into three or four disjunct categories, 
each using empirical terciles or quartiles.12 Further, to increase statistical power, we 
pooled data from both samples, i.e., the employee and the benefit recipient sample. 
Due to the low overall prevalence, we refrained from adjusting our models to include 
survey weights and did not model any interaction effects13.
In order to deal with item nonresponse in the independent variables, we have 
generally imputed missing values using the hotdeck method (Mander and Clayton, 
1999) with the exception of the ‘attitudes towards undeclared work’ index. For this 
index, each missing value (on an item level) was imputed using a mean imputation. 
Hotdeck imputation methods replace missing data with an randomly selected 
11 Including controls seems appropriate given noncompliance to the randomization.
12 Using alternative thresholds for categorizations does not alter our substantive conclusions.
13 Including interaction terms would allow us to relax the assumption that the parameter estimates are identical 
under the DQ and the RRT condition. Running two separate models for each experimental condition to 
investigate differential relationships largely supports these assumptions, see Appendix A.7); yet also reveals some 
estimation problems: In the ‘DQ company model’ three covariate patterns (se f-employed, manual supervisor and 
skilled manual, tertiary degree) predict the outcome variable perfectly. This problem of separation is essentially 
a problem of sample size (Zorn, 2005, p. 161). Several strategies to deal with this problem exist (Zorn, 2005, 
p. 161 f.). 1) Omitting these covariate patterns. 2) Supplementing the data with ‘art ficial’ data. 3) Using exact 
logistic regression. Applying the first, most commonly used strategy—omission—, results are displayed in Table A.5 
of Appendix A.7).
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observed record of complete data. We formed adjustment cells based on theoretical 
considerations regarding association of auxiliary variables with each missing 
variable to be imputed as well as the mechanism fostering item nonresponse 
(Little and Vartivarian, 2005). More precisely, item-nonresponse was affecting 
items as follows: item ‘perceived risk of detection’ 4.3%; ‘expected penalty’ 10.0%; 
‘prevalence of undeclared work in one’s network’ 5.7%; ‘networks job search’ 4.7%; 
for all remaining variables it was lower than 2.7%. Sensitivity analyses replicating 
the analyses using listwise deletion, support our main conclusions.14 
Table 2.7 displays average marginal effects (AME) based on derivatives resulting 
from our two logistic regression models (Stata version 12.1, rrlogit, Jann, 2011) 
and the 95% confidence intervals (Long, 1997; Allison, 1999; Bartus, 2005; Mood, 
2010). Empirical significance levels (p-values) are based on two-sided z-tests.
According to the utility hypothesis, we expect to see an increased probability 
of undeclared working by individuals with either a high marginal tax or benefit 
‘deduction’ rate, as well as those individuals who are constrained in their amount 
of working hours. While individuals who cannot realize their preferred working 
hours in the official economy are more likely to engage in undeclared work 
compared to individuals perceiving it as adequate in both models, effects are 
modest and statistically nonsignificant.
Regarding the marginal tax and benefit ‘deduction’ rates, we observe that the 
direction of the effects is as predicted. In both models, benefit recipients with an 
income above €800 (90% deduction rate) are on average most likely to engage 
in undeclared work, while those with an income of €800 or less (80% deduction 
rate) have the second highest probability. Merely the results of employees with 
a high income (higher marginal tax rates) and those with a lower income (lower 
marginal tax rates) across models are not consistent with our prediction.
Testing all possible contrasts of our combined utility indicator (sample and 
income)15, for the first model (private person), only the differences between 
benefit recipients with an income above €800 compared to employees with an 
income up to €800 (4.0%pts, p = 0.05) or of €800 and above (3.4%pts, p = 0.02) 
are statistically significant.
14 Results displaying these models can be found in Appendix A.6. The main effects are essentially the same and only 
slight differences between the models can be observed: While the AME of the items ‘high risk perception’ (-3.4%pts, 
p = 0.11), ‘manual supervisor and skilled manual workers’ (2.4%pts, p = 0.15) as well as ‘organizational membership’ 
(1.9%pts, p = 0.10) are almost identical compared to the model based on imputed values, these effects are 
statistically nonsignificant under this model.
15 Our analyses include mainly categorical variables. Table 2.7 only displays results for both models with respect to 
one reference category. However, we replicated our models using all poss ble contrasts. AME’s for these contrasts 
are not displayed, but can easily be obtained from Table 2.7 using subtraction. We will refer to these AME’s and the 
p-values in the text only, f they are statistically sign ficant. Due to rounding, reported AME’s can d ffer up to 0.001 
from those derived from Table 2.7 by subtraction.
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Overall, we find only weak empirical evidence for our utility hypothesis: The only 
statistically significant differences are found between benefit recipients and 
employees.
The cost hypothesis states that individuals with a higher risk perception 
(perceived risk of detection and perceived penalty) are less prone to work 
undeclared compared to those with a lower risk perception. While this hypothesis 
is supported by our first model (private person)—individuals with a high perceived 
risk (> €2,500) are, on average, less likely to engage in undeclared work compared 
to individuals with a very low (€0–€120: -2.9%pts, p = 0.09) or a low risk 
perception (€121–€600: -3.6%pts, p = 0.04)—we do not observe the same effect 
in our second model (company). All AME’s in the second model are approximately 
zero.
According to the opportunity hypothesis, we expect to see that more 
‘independent’ occupations as well as larger networks and integration will foster 
engagement in undeclared work. Our results suggest that manual supervisors and 
skilled manual workers are on average more likely to engage in undeclared work for 
a private person than individuals who are semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers 
(2.5%pts, p = 0.06). A similar result holds when comparing them with individuals 
who have never been employed before (4.2%pts, p = 0.03) as well as with routine 
non-manual workers (3.1%pts, p = 0.04). Due to the low statistical power, even 
average marginal effects that are well beyond zero—e.g., for self-employed 
compared to semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers (2.0%pts, p = 0.37)—are 
statistically nonsignificant. Our first model shows that, on average, larger labor-
market-related networks—with at least one person compared to knowing nobody 
to help with the job search (>3.1%pts, p ≤ 0.04)—as well as active membership in 
an organization (1.8%pts, p = 0.06) foster engagement in undeclared work. None 
of these effects within the opportunity hypothesis can be replicated in the second 
model (company), i.e., none of the expected effects are statistically significant.
Our results strongly support the norm hypothesis: a low perceived prevalence of 
undeclared work in one’s network (≥ 1%: 5.5%pts, p ≤ 0.01), as well as an approving 
attitude towards undeclared work (score 20–28: 4.7%pts, p < 0.01), increases the 
probability to engage in undeclared work for a private person. The last relationship 
does not only hold in comparison to the reference category: An approving attitude 
(score 20-28) also increases the average probability of engaging in undeclared 
work with reference to both middle categories (score 15–16: 3.9%pts, p < 0.01; 
score 17–19: 2.5%pts, p = 0.02). The same can be said about perceived prevalence: 
Those individuals with a high perceived prevalence (≥ 11%) are on average more 
likely to engage in undeclared work compared to those who suspect a lower share 
(1-3%: 2.4%pts, p = 0.07).
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These empirical results for the norm hypothesis can also be supported with our 
second model: Individuals who suspect a large share of undeclared workers in 
their networks (≥ 11%) are significantly more likely themselves to engage in 
undeclared work compared to individuals who have a perceived prevalence of zero 
(4.5%pts, p < 0.01). Again, this effect is significant also with respect to the two 
middle categories (1-3%: 3.4%pts, p = 0.01; 4–10%: 3.1%pts, p = 0.01).
Regarding the control variables, our models show that there are no gender 
differences in the first model, while women on average have a significantly lower 
probability of engaging in undeclared work for a company (AME = -1.9%pts, 
p = 0.07). Compared to individuals aged 35 to 49, younger respondents (34 and 
younger) as well as older respondents (aged 50 and older) do not differ significantly 
in model 1, while individuals aged 34 and younger significantly more likely engage 
in undeclared work for a company compared to the reference category (≤ 34: 
3.0%pts, p = 0.01; ≥ 50: -6.8%pts, p = 0.02). Furthermore, individuals with a 
tertiary degree are on average significantly less likely to engage in undeclared work 
for a private person, compared to individuals with some form of formal training 
(-6.4%pts, p = 0.04) or individuals who have no degree or are students (-6.9%pts, 
p = 0.04). The type of degree does not make a difference for undeclared work for a 
company. Other controls such as migrant background or place of residence do not 
exert a significant influence in either model.
The methods effect is as expected in both models (model 1: 2.4%pts, p = 0.03; 
model 2: 4.7%pts, p < 0.01). Controlling for other covariates and pooled across 
both samples, respondents in the RRT condition are significantly more likely to 
report engagement in undeclared work for a private person or for a company 
compared to respondents in the DQ condition. This effect is slightly larger in the 
second model compared to the first model. Respondents not complying with the 
RRT request are more similar to respondents in the DQ condition with respect to 
reporting of engagement in undeclared work in both models. These differences are 
not significant.
Summing up the results for our second research question: We find more 
empirical support for our hypotheses regarding the explanation of undeclared 
work for a private person and less for a company. This could be due to the lower 
overall prevalence in the second model, which leads to smaller AMEs and in turn 
to less statistical power to detect effects. Nonetheless, the direction of the effects 
is predominantly the same across both models. Especially our expectations with 
respect to the opportunity and norm hypotheses were supported by our data and 
are significantly related to undeclared work for a private individual, as well as for 
a company.
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2.3 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter had two main goals: a methodological one and a substantive one. 
Methodologically, we were interested in whether we can obtain more accurate 
self-reports—by those respondents engaged in undeclared work—of undeclared 
work in large scale population surveys on the telephone. Given the associated 
problems due to the sensitive nature of the questions, we used special data 
collection techniques, that scramble the individual response process and 
increase anonymity. Substantively, we were interested in investigating individual 
motivations and opportunity structures fostering engagement in undeclared work.
The first central result is that neither the randomized response, nor the item 
count technique outperform standard direct questioning. In two out of six tests 
we saw the expected result, i.e., the RRT or the ICT producing significantly (on 
the 5%-level) higher prevalence estimates compared to direct questioning. In 
the remaining four tests we did not find any significant effects. Our results are 
in accordance with the literature (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a), showing that 
these techniques perform the better the more sensitive the item is potentially 
perceived to be by a respondent (higher expected penalties, i.e., undeclared work 
for a company or the benefit recipients sample).
Furthermore, Coutts and Jann (2011) argue that we can never know for sure 
if respondents actually picked up a coin and/or responded according to the (RRT) 
instructions. Our negative prevalence estimate in one of the RRT conditions does 
suggest that not all respondents complied with the instructions. At this point, 
we can only speculate about the potential reasons for noncompliance. Taking 
all evidence into account and analyzing complete and partial interviews, a total 
of 369 respondents refused the application of the RRT (15.8% of complete and 
partial interviews). This high noncompliance rate as well as increased costs due 
to a more complex and longer data collection process, an increased respondent 
burden (interview time and cognitive demands), more intensive interviewer 
training and the necessity of a much larger sample in order to achieve the same 
level of statistical precision warrant against the quick use of these techniques (in 
a telephone survey).
A closer look at the data of the ICT study also reveals so-called ‘ceiling-effects’ 
(Glynn, 2013): Whenever all items, the sensitive and the nonsensitive item, apply 
to a respondent, no anonymity is granted anymore. Thus, careful designing of 
the survey instrument (i.e., the innocuous questions) and even more extensive 
pretesting seem advisable. Recent studies argue that the ICT outperforms the 
RRT for obvious reasons, despite the ICT being even somewhat less efficient 
statistically (Corstange, 2009; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a, b; Coutts and Jann, 
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2011). While respondents in the RRT sometimes believe in some kind of trick, do 
not understand the rules or consciously ‘cheat,’ the ICT seems easier to administer, 
more convincing and more applicable in large scale surveys. Further, since the 
ICT does not require a lengthy introduction or a randomization device, and thus 
imposes less cognitive burden on the respondent, researchers see a solution for 
the problem of social desirability in this technique (Coutts and Jann, 2011; Glynn, 
2013). However, looking at our results, we cannot support these hypotheses.
The second central result is that despite these methodological challenges and 
a low statistical power of the RRT estimator, we are able to investigate individual 
factors fostering undeclared work using logistic regression analyses for our RRT 
data. The perceived share of undeclared work in one’s own network proved to be one 
robust explanatory factor in our substantive models explaining undeclared work 
(norm hypothesis). Other factors contributing to the understanding of engagement 
in undeclared work that were found to be statistically significant include: receipt 
of benefit (as a proxy for monetary gains from undeclared work), the number of 
people potentially helping with the job search, active organizational membership, 
as well as acceptance and approval of undeclared work. Those are all arguments 
within the utility and opportunity hypotheses framework. Furthermore, younger 
respondents (aged 34 and younger) are more likely to engage in undeclared work 
compared to those aged 35 and older. We cannot replicate differences between 
East and West Germany (Mummert and Schneider, 2001)16 or between genders 
(Boockmann et al., 2010; Enste, 2012).
The main methodological conclusion of this chapter is, thus, that neither the 
RRT nor the ICT consistently outperform direct questioning. The main substantive 
conclusion is that we find particular evidence for the norm hypothesis in our 
models explaining undeclared work. These results are particularly relevant due 
to the cost implications for future studies: The increased costs in the RRT study 
and the ICT study—all other things being equal—are due to a larger sample size 
in the experimental conditions, longer interview times, statistically more complex 
analyses, and more intensive interviewer training. Given our empirical evidence, 
additional costs of an RRT or ICT data collection for undeclared work are not 
justified.
16 Which seems plaus ble given that the study was conducted in 2010.
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3  Item Sum: A Novel Technique for Asking Continuous 
Sensitive Questions
While the previous chapter focused exclusively on the collection of information 
relating to binary sensitive characteristics, the following chapter introduces 
a novel method to collect data on continuous sensitive information based on 
the item count technique: We call it the ‘item sum technique’ (IST).1 Recall from 
Chapter 1.3.4 that the main idea of ICT is to provide a subsample of respondents 
with a ‘short list’ of innocuous items, and another subsample of respondents with 
a ‘long list’ of items, containing a number of innocuous questions plus the sensitive 
question of interest. Respondents are then asked to indicate the number of items 
that apply to them (i.e., the total number of ‘Yes’ answers), without answering 
each question individually.
Compared to direct questioning, the ICT provides a higher degree of privacy 
protection and is thus assumed to yield more reliable self-reports. This expectation 
has been confirmed in several experimental studies comparing the ICT to direct 
self-reports. In the majority of these studies on topics such as employee theft 
(Wimbush and Dalton, 1997), risky sexual behavior (LaBrie and Earleywine, 2000), 
hate crime victimization (Rayburn et al., 2003), or shoplifting (Tsuchiya et al., 
2007), the ICT yielded higher prevalence estimates for the sensitive behavior than 
direct questioning did (for an overview see Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010b).
Compared to other dejeopardizing techniques, such as the randomized response 
technique (RRT Warner, 1965), the ICT has the advantage that it does not require 
a randomizing device and that the procedure is much easier to administer. Thus, 
only a moderate cognitive burden is imposed on the respondent, likely increasing 
the respondent’s ability to comply with the interview protocol and to provide more 
honest self-reports. Recent empirical studies indicate that the ICT outperforms the 
RRT in reducing social desirability bias in survey measures of sensitive attributes 
(see Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a, b). To our knowledge, the ICT has only been 
applied to dichotomous items so far. We therefore present a generalization of the 
ICT that can be used to measure continuous sensitive characteristics—the IST—and 
report the results of an empirical application of the new method.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, we 
describe our new technique. Section 3.2 briefly describes our empirical study in 
which we applied the new technique. Section 3.3 presents the results of the study 
and in Section 3.4, we draw conclusions and discuss limitations.
1 This chapter is based on a paper by Trappmann et al. (2014) and reprinted with modifications by permission of 
American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), the American Statistical Association (ASA) and Oxford 
University Press.
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3.1 The Item Sum Technique
The item sum technique (IST) works as follows: Analogously to the ICT, two 
random subsamples are generated, whose respondents either receive a long list of 
questions (LL) or a short list of questions (SL). The long list contains the sensitive 
question plus at least one innocuous question, the short list only contains the 
innocuous question(s). The respondents are then asked to report the sum of the 
answers to the questions in their list. While, in theory, there is no restriction 
on the number of innocuous questions, it is desirable to keep the lists as short 
as possible. The variance of the sum of the answers usually increases with the 
number of individual questions, which reduces the statistical efficiency of the 
procedure. Furthermore, the cognitive demand of adding the answers together 
is increased with each additional item. We therefore suggest using just one 
innocuous question. Other than in the ICT where the non-sensitive items are 
binary, a single innocuous question with many possible values should be enough 
to make privacy protection credible in the IST.
Both the sensitive and the innocuous questions should be continuous, and 
preferably (but not necessarily) measured on the same scale (e.g., hours or 
monetary units). Respondents in the first subsample are asked to report the sum 
of the answers to both questions; respondents in the second subsample provide a 
direct answer to the innocuous question. For example, to estimate the extent of 
undeclared work, the following questions could be used:
Table 3.1: An example: the item sum technique
Item Short List Long List 
How many hours did you spend watching TV last 
week? 
X X 
How many hours do you usually spend in 
undeclared work per week? X 
Because respondents in the LL subgroup only report the sum of hours from both 
items, the extent of undeclared work remains unknown at the individual level. 
Assuming that respondents appreciate this privacy protection, the procedure can 
therefore be expected to elicit more honest answers to the sensitive question than 
direct questioning.
To estimate the amount of undeclared work from the IST data, we can simply 
compute the mean difference of answers between the two subsamples. Let Y be 
the observed answer, S be the sensitive variable (e.g., hours of undeclared work), 
and C be the non-sensitive variable (e.g., hours of watching TV). In the long-list 
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sample, we observe Y = S + C, while in the short-list sample we observe Y = C. 
Hence, as long as the two samples are unbiased, we can estimate the expected 
value of S, μ, as the mean difference of Y between the long-list sample and the 
short-list sample, that is
where  is the mean for the long-list sample and likewise,  the mean for 
the short-list sample. Furthermore, as long as the samples are independent, the 
variance of  can be estimated as the sum of the sampling variances of the two 
group means, that is
where standard formulas are used for the variances on the right hand side. Methods 
for estimating regression models for IST data are outlined in Appendix B.1.
3.2 Experimental Design
We implemented the new technique in the nation-wide RRT study on undeclared 
work in Germany that was briefly outlined in Chapter 2.1. In both samples, the 
‘employee’ and the ‘benefit recipient’ sample, respondents who were originally 
assigned to the randomized response condition were automatically assigned to the 
IST condition, while respondents assigned to direct questioning (DQ) continued in 
the DQ condition. Within the IST condition, half of the respondents were assigned 
to the short-list IST group, and the other half to the long-list IST group (i.e., 
overall all respondents who were in the RRT condition). Some of the respondents 
originally assigned to the IST groups, however, opted out of being questioned 
using a special technique and were then given the survey with direct questioning. 
To be precise, respondents were given the option to switch to direct questioning 
after refusing to answer an RRT question measuring the prevalence of undeclared 
work (as a binary variable) earlier in the survey. They were given this option in 
order to prevent item nonresponse or even interview break-offs. In the subsequent 
IST experiment measuring the extent of undeclared work (as a metric variable), 
these ‘non-compliers’ or ‘defiers’ were kept in the direct questioning condition so 
as not to confront them with a second privacy preserving technique.
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the number of respondents in each experimental 
group and the number of respondents from the IST groups who opted for direct 
questioning. Chi-squared tests and two-sided t-tests (assuming unequal variances) 
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indicate that the ‘defiers’ (those who opted for direct questioning) do not differ 
significantly from the ‘compliers’ (those who stayed with the IST) with respect to: 
gender (χ2 = 0.60, p = 0.44), their attitudes towards undeclared work (t = -1.32, 
p = 0.19), the presumed prevalence of undeclared work among friends (t = 0.44, 
p = 0.65), and the perceived risk of being caught and sanctioned conducting 
undeclared work (t = 1.00, p = 0.32).2 Defiers, however, are more likely to receive 
benefits than compliers (χ2  = 33.20, p < 0.01). Because the defiers might also 
differ from compliers with respect to other, possibly unobserved, characteristics 
we have to be careful about how to treat them in the data analysis that follows.
Table 3.2: Number of respondents per experimental condition
Employees Benefit recipients Total
Direct questioning (DQ) 565 580 1,145
Short-list IST group
Remained with IST
Opted for DQ
496
38
460
90
956
128
Long-list IST group
Remained with IST
Opted for DQ
459
55
377
91
836
146
Total 1,613 1,598 3,211
In the DQ condition, respondents received a filter question asking whether they 
engaged in undeclared work in the past year (preceded by a confirmation that 
responses will be handled confidentially). Depending on the answer to the filter 
question, respondents were then led to questions about the weekly hours of 
undeclared work and the monthly income from undeclared work. For respondents 
who answered ‘No’ to the filter question in DQ mode, the two variables were set 
to zero.
Within the IST condition, the first group received two long lists (LL). Each of 
the long lists contained a sensitive question and an innocuous question. In the 
first list, the question about weekly hours of undeclared work was paired with a 
question about the number of hours the respondent watched TV last week; in the 
second list, the question about monthly earnings from undeclared work was paired 
with a question about the monthly costs for housing (both in Euro). Respondents 
were then asked to report the sum of the two answers for each list. Prior to the 
experimental section, respondents in the long list condition received a minimum 
of one ‘training list’ example—using information that we were able to validate 
2 We focus on those covariates assumed to affect both noncompliance and the amount of undeclared work.
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3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Comparing Item Sum and Direct Questioning
This section provides an analysis of the item sum data from the CATI survey. The 
goal is to model how the reported amount of undeclared work depends on the 
data collection method (IST compared to direct questioning) and the labor market 
status (benefit recipient vs. employee sample).
Table 3.4 reports the estimated mean hours of and earnings from undeclared 
work for both samples across experimental conditions. The results are based on 
the realized assignment to either direct questioning (DQ) or the IST and, hence, 
ignore the fact that some respondents were initially assigned to a different mode.
Table 3.4:  Mean estimates of hours of undeclared work per week and monthly earnings from 
undeclared work depending on questioning mode and sample (standard errors in 
parentheses)
Hours of Undeclared Work Earnings from Undeclared Work 
Employees 
Benefit  
recipients 
Employees 
Benefit  
recipients 
Direct Questioning (DQ) 0.07 0.14 1.8 3.4 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.7) (1.2) 
Item Sum technique (IST) 0.85 -0.17 113.8 83.4 
(0.70) (1.06) (40.1) (27.4) 
Direct questioning leads to an estimate of 0.07 hours of undeclared work per week 
for employees and 0.14 hours for benefit recipients. Using IST, the estimate for 
employees rises to 0.85 hours, while a negative estimate of -0.17 hours results for 
benefit recipients.3 For mean earnings from undeclared work, we get a DQ estimate 
of €1.8 per month for employees and €3.4 per month for benefit recipients. If 
using the IST, the estimates rise substantially to €113.8 and €83.4 per month 
respectively.
In Table 3.5, the differences between the estimates from direct questioning and 
the IST are shown (for a regression presentation see Appendix B.2). The first row 
(‘naive estimate’) contains the differences between the raw estimates as reported 
in Table 3.4. For hours of undeclared work, the effect of the questioning method 
(IST) does not appear to be significant (with a p-value of 0.26 in the employee 
3 A negative value for the number of hours of undeclared work does not make sense, of course. However, note that 
the estimate is not significantly d fferent from zero.
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sample and 0.77 in the benefits recipient sample respectively). For earnings from 
undeclared work, however, the IST yielded significantly higher estimates than 
direct questioning in both samples (p < 0.01).
Table 3.5: Differences between direct questioning and the IST (standard errors in parentheses)
Hours of Undeclared Work Earnings from Undeclared Work 
Employees 
Benefit  
recipients 
Employees 
Benefit  
recipients 
Naive Estimate 0.78 -0.31 112.0* 80.0* 
(0.70) (1.06) (40.1) (27.5) 
ITT Estimate 0.70 -0.32 99.7* 62.5* 
(0.63) (0.89) (35.4) (22.0) 
IV Estimate 0.78 -0.40 111.9* 77.9* 
(0.70) (1.04) (41.3) (27.8) 
Standard errors for the ITT and IV estimates were obtained by the bootstrap method (1000 replications, stratified 
by assigned experimental condition). For estimation methods, see Appendix B.1 
* p < 0.01 (two-sided t-tests) 
A comparison of the naive estimates might provide biased estimates of the effects 
of the questioning method because the group of respondents who opted out of 
the IST may be selective. One approach to deal with such treatment assignment 
noncompliance in randomized experiments is to compute the so-called intention-
to-treat effect (ITT; see e.g. Hollis and Campbell, 1999; Newell, 1992): Instead 
of measuring the effect of actually receiving the treatment, the effect of being 
assigned to the treatment is estimated. The ITT is a conservative estimate for the 
causal treatment effect. That is, because only a fraction of the assigned treatment 
group is actually treated, the ITT is a weighted average of the true treatment 
effect and a zero effect. Hence, other than the naive approach, the ITT protects 
from possible overestimation of the causal effect of the treatment.
ITT estimates of the effect of the questioning method can be found in the 
second row of Table 3.5 (although the ITT principle is conceptually simple, its 
application is somewhat involved in our situation; see Appendix B.1 for details). 
For hours of undeclared work, the ITT estimates of the effect of the IST are almost 
identical to the naive estimates, supporting our earlier finding that in both samples 
the IST did not yield significantly higher estimates than direct questioning. For the 
reported earnings from undeclared work, however, the ITT estimates are smaller 
than the naive estimates. Yet, the effects are still significant at the 1% level. 
Hence, if we also employ the conservative ITT approach, we find that the IST had 
a substantial effect on the reported earnings in both samples.
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As indicated above, treatment effects may be underestimated by the ITT procedure. 
We can improve on the ITT by using an instrumental variables (IV) approach, 
in which the realized treatment is instrumented by the assigned treatment. If 
a treatment effect is homogeneous (i.e., the same for everyone), then such an 
approach yields a consistent estimate of the causal effect. Alternatively, in the 
case of a heterogeneous treatment effect, the so-called local average treatment 
effect (LATE) is estimated (Angrist et al., 1996). This is the average treatment 
effect for the subpopulation of those who actually received treatment.
The last row of Table 3.5 displays the IV estimates of the effect of the IST on 
response behavior for our data (for methods, again see Appendix B.1). As can be 
seen, the results from the IV procedure are almost identical to those from the naive 
comparison of the direct questioning estimates and the IST estimates. Hence, we 
conclude that noncompliance with the treatment assignment did not substantially 
bias the data, so that the findings based on the naive estimates appear valid.
To summarize, irrespective of the employed estimation method, we find that in 
three out of four independent comparisons, the IST yielded larger estimates than 
direct questioning. In two out of these three cases, the difference is statistically 
significant (see Appendix B.2 for an equivalent representation in regression form).
3.3.2 Does it Work for Everybody? Differential Item Sum Effects
The differences reported in Table 3.5 are average effects over the respondents 
in our experimental groups and assume homogeneous treatment effects. 
The performance of the IST, however, might depend on cognitive skills of the 
respondents. Therefore, using the regression technique outlined in Appendix B.1, 
we evaluated whether the treatment effects vary not only by sample status, but 
also by age and education. Due to a lack of better data, we use age and education 
as proxies for cognitive skills: The models include binary indicator variables for 
respondents aged ‘58 or older’ (vs. 57 and younger) and for respondents with 
‘no or the lowest secondary school leaving certificate’ (vs. intermediate or upper 
secondary school leaving certificate). Including an interaction of each indicator 
variable with the IST treatment allows us to estimate differential IST effects for 
these groups. The following section will focus exclusively on these differential 
effects and only to a lesser extent on the main effects.
In Table 3.6, we estimate two regression models predicting weekly hours of 
undeclared work and monthly earnings from undeclared work as a function of 
these covariates. Due to the small differences between estimation techniques, we 
only present ‘Naive’ and ‘IV’ estimates for these regressions.
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Turning to the central indicators of interest, the main effect of ‘IST’ is an estimate 
of the difference in mean reported hours (or earnings, respectively) between the 
IST mode and the DQ mode in the employee sample. The ‘constant’ term provides 
an estimate of those respondents in the direct questioning condition, who are in 
the employee sample, below the age of 58 and with a high educational degree. The 
interaction terms indicate whether the IST effect in the benefit recipient sample 
(as well as age ≥ 58 or lower educational background, respectively) is different 
from the IST effect in the employee sample (as well as ≤ 57 or higher educational 
background, respectively).
We are only interested in the functioning of the IST. Thus, we do not discuss 
any substantive findings, such as the main effects or the overall levels of ‘hours 
of undeclared work’ or ‘earnings from undeclared work’ in each subgroup. Our 
empirical results with respect to the differential IST effects in the models displayed 
in Table 3.6, show that:
 • The main IST effect (‘IST’)—i.e., in the employee sample, below the age of 58, 
and with a high level of formal education—is positive for both the reported 
number of weekly hours of undeclared work and the monthly earnings 
from undeclared work. That is, employees below the age of 58, and with a 
higher educational background, reported more undeclared working hours (an 
additional 0.61 hours, SE = 0.78, p = 0.43) and more undeclared income (an 
additional €102.28), if interviewed by the IST compared to direct questioning. 
However, the effect is significant only for earnings (SE = 42.40, p ≤ 0.02).
The results obtained using IV estimation yield similar results (hours: 0.61, 
SE = 0.79, p = 0.44; income: 102.11, SE = 40.02, p = 0.01).
 • The IST effects tend to be smaller in the benefit recipients sample compared 
to the employee sample (interaction effect). These differences in the IST 
effects between employees and benefit recipients are not significant, 
however. Turning to the overall effect, for hours of undeclared work, the point 
estimate for the overall IST effect is even negative among benefit recipients 
(0.61 – 1.13 = -0.53, SE = 1.04, p = 0.62). In the benefit recipient sample, the IST 
effect for monthly earnings is positive and significant (102.28 – 42.96 = 59.33, 
SE = 31.86, p = 0.06).
The results obtained using IV estimation yield similar results (hours: 
0.61–1.22 = -0.62, SE = 1.08, p = 0.57; income: 102.11 – 45.03 = 57.09, 
SE = 31.67, p = 0.07).
 • The IST effect between age groups is not significantly different (interaction 
effect). However, the overall IST effects tend to be larger for respondents aged 
58 and older compared to those aged 57 and younger for hours of undeclared 
work (0.61 + 1.28 = 1.89, SE = 1.90, p = 0.32), while they tend to be smaller for 
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income from undeclared work (102.28 – 34.67 = 67.61, SE = 68.14, p = 0.32). 
However, while the overall point estimate of the IST effect is positive for both 
items for respondents aged 58 and older, it is not statistically significant from 
zero, due to the comparatively low number of respondents in the upper age 
group (and thus lower statistical power to detect group differences).
The results obtained using IV estimation yield similar results (hours: 
0.61 + 1 29 = 1.89, SE = 1.95, p = 0.33; income: 102.11 – 34.73 = 67.38, SE = 68 33, 
p = 0.32).
 • Regarding education, we observe a similar pattern to that of benefit receipt: 
The interaction effect itself is nonsignificant, indicating that there is no 
differential IST effect. The overall point estimate of the IST effect tends to 
be smaller for respondents with a lower educational background for hours of 
undeclared work (0.61 – 0.14 = 0.47, SE = 1.55, p = 0.76). Among respondents 
with a lower educational background, the IST effect for monthly earnings is 
positive and significant (102.28 + 67.01 = 169.29, SE = 66.41, p = 0.01).
The results obtained using IV estimation yield similar results (hours: 
0.61 –  0.14 = 0.47, SE = 1.56, p = 0.76; income: 102.11  +  67.48 = 169.59, 
SE = 69.07, p = 0.01).
To sum up, when looking at the results for the regression estimates, we do not 
find systematic evidence for a differential effect of IST between groups varying in 
cognitive skills.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a new method, the item sum technique (IST), for 
the measurement of continuous sensitive characteristics. Compared to alternative 
methods, such as continuous RRT schemes (cf. Himmelfarb and Edgell, 1980; 
Eichhorn and Hayre, 1983; Gjestvang and Singh, 2007), the IST has several 
advantages: (1) a randomizing device is not required; (2) the cognitive effort 
demanded from respondents is relatively low; (3) implementation is easily possible 
in both interviewer- and self-administered interviews. The experimental evidence 
of our empirical study suggests that the IST is a promising data collection 
technique. It yielded significantly higher estimates of earnings from undeclared 
work than direct questioning in both the employee sample and the benefit 
recipient sample. For hours of undeclared work, estimates from the IST were also 
higher than from direct questioning in one of the two samples, although not 
significantly so. Furthermore, there was no evidence of significant interaction 
effects, i.e., differential item sum effects. Survey researchers aiming at measuring 
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sensitive behaviors on an ordered or continuous scale could therefore benefit from 
using the IST. Nonetheless, our study can only be regarded as a first step in the 
development and evaluation of the new technique.
One issue of our study is that a considerable share of respondents did not remain 
in the treatment condition they were initially assigned to, thus compromising the 
randomization of experimental groups. Using intention-to-treat and instrumental 
variables strategies, however, we believe that we convincingly demonstrated 
that our findings are robust regardless of this problem. A more serious concern 
is that, in the direct questioning condition, the continuous sensitive questions 
were preceded by a filter question on whether any undeclared work had been 
carried out at all, while no such filter question was present in the item sum 
condition.4 Evidence suggests that filtering a continuous question may lead 
to underestimation of the quantity of interest. For example, in a study on crime 
victimization, Knäuper (1998) found that direct questioning estimates were twice as 
high compared to estimates obtained from a filtered question. Such biases are most 
likely due to differential interpretations of a construct depending on question format 
in cases where the construct is not clearly defined. In our IST study, however, an 
explicit definition of undeclared work was given directly before the relevant questions 
were asked (see Chapter 2.1.4). Furthermore, for earnings from undeclared work, our 
IST estimates are much higher than the direct questioning estimates (factor 63 in the 
employee sample; factor 25 in the benefit recipients sample; see Table 3.4). Thus, we 
do not believe that the filtering could explain the differences observed in our study.
An interesting finding is that the IST was only successful for one of the two 
questions. For earnings from undeclared work, the IST impressively outperformed 
direct questioning, but no significant differences were found for the question on the 
number of hours of undeclared work. We do not believe that this null-result is due to 
a lack of statistical power. First, relative differences as observed for earnings (which 
one would expect if working hours and earnings are proportional) would have been 
easily detected given the power of the study.5 Second, the effect is absent in both 
samples, the employee sample and the benefit recipient sample, which makes us 
believe that the pattern is systematic. A candidate explanation may lie in the choice 
of innocuous items. While the item on housing costs appears unproblematic, the 
question on the number of hours a respondent watched TV, which was paired with 
4 The IST experiment descr bed in our article was preceded by an experiment using direct questioning versus RRT 
to estimate the prevalence of undeclared work. Respondents from the direct questioning group skipped the 
subsequent continuous questions f they answered that they did not carry out any undeclared work. In contrast, 
all respondents from the RRT group were directed to the continuous questions (and randomized into either the 
short list or long list of the IST), since filtering based on RRT answers is not poss ble.
5 Results from a simulation based on the characteristics of our data indicate that the power to detect such a 
d fference at the 5% level would have been about 97% (not shown).
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the question on hours of undeclared work, might not have been an optimal choice. 
On the one hand, there is evidence that answers to this question strongly depend on 
question format (Schwarz et al., 1985). On the other hand, the question on watching 
TV might be considered sensitive by some respondents. In this case, respondents 
would tend to underreport their TV consumption if asked directly, which would 
positively bias our IST estimate of hours of undeclared work. Yet, the opposite is 
what we observe empirically. Perhaps a better explanation might be that there were 
learning effects. The item sum technique may not have worked well for the first 
item (hours of undeclared work), because respondents were not used to the unusual 
questioning format. However, after getting acquainted with it, the new technique 
may have worked better for the second item (earnings from undeclared work). 
We can only speculate whether this explains the differing findings. In any case, 
however, we can suggest including suitable training questions when employing 
novel questioning techniques such as the IST in a survey.
As illustrated by the above qualifications, further experimental research 
is needed to fully understand the mechanisms at work when respondents are 
confronted with sensitive questions in the item sum format. Obtaining unbiased 
estimates for sensitive variables by the IST rests on a number of assumptions. In 
the following, we outline how an implementation of the IST that maximizes the 
credibility of these assumptions might look like and develop ideas about how the 
validity of the assumptions could be evaluated (see Blair and Imai, 2012 or Glynn, 
2013 for similar discussions in the context of the item count technique).
First, it is necessary to assume that the respondents comply with the design. 
Therefore, careful cognitive pretests are necessary to make sure that respondents 
fully understand the procedure. In addition, measures could be implemented to 
minimize nonresponse or noncompliance with the IST (for an overview see De 
Leeuw et al., 2003, p. 154 f.). These could, for example, include interviewer probing 
after an initial ‘do not know’ response.
Second, it is crucial that the answers to the non-sensitive item are independent 
of the question format, that is, that the answers do not depend on whether they are 
given directly or serve as a summand in the item sum format (‘no-design-effect,’ 
see Blair and Imai (2012)). It is important, therefore, that the innocuous item is 
truly non-sensitive and not affected by social desirability bias itself. Furthermore, 
the summation task should be made as easy and convenient as possible. Although 
adding two numbers might appear simple, the ability to perform such a task 
error-free is likely to depend on cognitive capabilities.6 Even if most respondents 
6 We assume that the task is easier for respondents if the items are on the same scale. Also, the items should be 
disjoint to prevent confusion over whether the overlap must be subtracted from the sum or not.
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exhibit sufficient cognitive skills to correctly add the items, they might engage in 
satisficing (approximating the sum), most likely leading to rounding errors (see 
Tourangeau et al., 2000 for an overview on rounding). Such ‘heaping’ might bias 
the results if the net effect of rounding is different between the short list and 
the long list, for example due to differing distributions of the true values around 
focal rounding points. In order to reduce summation as well as rounding errors 
in our telephone survey, we asked respondents to write down the answers to the 
individual items before adding them up. This is obviously not to be recommended 
in face-to-face settings.
The ‘no-design-effect’ assumption can be evaluated, for instance, by administering 
a survey in which one experimental group is asked to answer two separate non-
sensitive questions and the other group is asked to report the sum of the two 
questions. If the ‘no-design-effect’ assumption holds, the results in the two groups 
should be the same (for the ICT see Tsuchiya et al., 2007; Tsuchiya and Hirai, 2010).
Third, careful power analyses are necessary to determine sufficient sample 
sizes. For this purpose, it is helpful if the distribution of the innocuous item is 
known in the survey population and at least crude ideas about the distribution of 
the sensitive item and its covariance with the innocuous item exist. The variance 
of the innocuous item plays a crucial role in the trade-off between privacy 
protection and statistical efficiency.7 If the variance is too small, then it does 
not sufficiently protect the privacy of respondents; if it is too large, then the 
estimation becomes inefficient.8 In addition, the covariance between the items 
also matters: A negative covariance between the non-sensitive item and the 
sensitive item reduces the total variance and therefore increases efficiency (cf. 
advice by Glynn, 2013 for ICT designs).9 More research that experiments with 
7 Furthermore, for ease of statistical modeling, it is convenient if the innocuous item has a distr bution that is 
approximately normal.
8 Another prerequisite for sufficient privacy protection is that the sum of the two items does not exceed the 
poss ble maximum value of the innocuous item. The innocuous items used in our study seem unproblematic in 
this regard. Monthly housing costs have no upper limit and follow a skewed distribution so that extreme outliers 
are rare but cred ble. Watching TV has a theoretical upper limit of 168 hours per week, but the sum of undeclared 
work and watching TV will not reach this limit (at least if they are disjoint) because both have to fit into the overall 
time budget of a person.
9 We conducted some preliminary simulations to evaluate the bias-variance trade-off for the IST compared to direct 
questioning (not shown). Assuming that the standard deviation of the innocuous variable is about five times the 
standard deviation of the sensitive variable (which roughly corresponds to our data for the second item) and given 
a fixed sample size of 500 observations for both questioning techniques, the IST has a lower mean squared error 
(MSE) than direct questioning, f the direct questioning results are biased by ha f a standard deviation of the sensitive 
variable or more. If the sample size for the IST is doubled (as in our case), then the MSE of the IST is smaller than 
the MSE of direct questioning, if the bias is about 30 percent of a standard deviation or more. Of course, the 
variance of the innocuous variable has a strong effect on these results. For example, f both variables have the 
same variance, then the bias can be as low as 10 percent of a standard deviation before the MSE of the IST exceeds 
the MSE of direct questioning (given a fixed sample size of 500 for both questioning techniques). The correlation 
between the sensitive variable and the innocuous variable has substantial effects only f the variances of the two 
variables are similar. We conclude that, as long as the relative variance of the innocuous variable is not too large, 
the IST provides estimates that are superior to direct questioning even if social desirability bias is only moderate.
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these issues to find an optimal trade-off between perceived privacy protection 
and statistical efficiency is needed. For example, a promising approach might be to 
use non-sensitive items whose variance (or covariance with the sensitive item) is 
subjectively overestimated by survey respondents (cf. Diekmann, 2012, for RRT). A 
different strategy for a more efficient estimation might be to select non-sensitive 
items that can be predicted with high accuracy from other variables collected 
in the same survey. In order to increase statistical power, future studies could 
also consider the use of a double-list design (similar to the double-list variant of 
the ICT where both groups receive a long list and a short list with varying non-
sensitive items; see Droitcour et al. (1991); Biemer et al. (2005) requiring a smaller 
sample size to achieve a given level of statistical power.
Finally, an ideal study to evaluate the IST would not rely on the ‘more-is-
better’ assumption but instead would use validation data with known true scores 
for the sensitive variable. Opportunities for validation studies are notoriously 
difficult to find, and data protection issues arise if individual-level data from 
different sources are linked without the informed consent of the respondents. In 
the past, validation studies for dejeopardizing techniques have successfully made 
use of register samples that were constant with respect to the dependent variable, 
avoiding individual linkage of survey and register data (compare the validation 
studies for RRT reviewed in Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2005a)). This strategy might be 
permissible from a data protection perspective in the case of continuous sensitive 
items as well. However, samples created in this way would be very specific as 
everyone in the study would have the exact same true value for the continuous 
item of interest. This might raise questions about the generalizability of such 
results. Another approach might be to conduct validation studies in which the 
distribution of the sensitive item among respondents is known, but the data are 
not linked at the individual level (for similar approaches in a different context see 
Kreuter et al. (2010); Sakshaug and Kreuter (2012)). In such studies, at least an 
overall evaluation of the validity of the IST would be possible.
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4  Validating Sensitive Questions: A Comparison of Survey 
and Register Data
Usually, the RRT and other dejeopardizing techniques are considered successful 
if they produce higher prevalence estimates than traditional direct questioning 
in surveys for items that are expected to be subject to underreporting (‘more-
is-better’ assumption e.g., Weissman et al., 1986; Lara et al., 2004, 2006 for an 
overview of studies relying on this assumption, see Umesh and Peterson, 1991; 
Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a).1 The previous chapters evaluated different 
dejeopardizing techniques relying on this ‘more-is-better’ assumption comparing 
aggregate estimates. Whether the ‘more-is-better’ assumption is in fact correct 
can only be evaluated against additional information regarding the actual status 
of the respondent. Validation studies serve this purpose comparing (aggregated) 
survey reports with (aggregate) auxiliary data. Though the most powerful 
validation can be achieved if the ‘true’ value of a respondent is known at the 
individual level and can be compared to the survey report. Using individual-level 
validation data provides another possibility, namely to analyze motivations that 
contribute to misreporting. This would not be possible using aggregate data and 
relying on the ‘more-is-better’ assumption.
Due to the particular design of the RRT study, we can empirically evaluate 
the performance of the RRT using validation data, however, due to the challenges 
outlined previously, not for our main item of interest (undeclared work). Another 
item in the context of labor market surveys that qualifies for this purpose is the 
receipt of welfare benefits: We can plausibly assume this to be sensitive information 
that is underreported in surveys, while at the same time, validation data is 
available at the individual level. In general, surveys which collect data on welfare 
and unemployment receipt often find that these variables regarding sensitive 
labor market information are underreported. The known extent of underreporting 
of receipt of basic income support, a form of social security payment, in German 
surveys ranges between 9 and 17 percentage points depending on the exact 
population under study (Kreuter et al., 2010, 2013).
Accurate information regarding the types and extent of receipt of these 
payments is essential for policy decisions. If the failure to report welfare receipt 
is systematically different for certain social groups of respondents, resulting 
statistics such as regression coefficients likely suffer from considerable bias 
(Hausman, 2001). Hence, any substantive findings with respect to the dynamics of 
receipt, such as individual characteristics leading into benefit receipt, are likely to 
1 This chapter is based on a manuscript by Kirchner (2013).
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be invalid. Insights into the mechanisms of misreporting and possible remedies are 
therefore of great importance for researchers using such data, since it will prevent 
them from drawing wrong inferences, and ultimately for policy makers, as they 
will be able to make better informed decisions.
While unintentional misreporting, e.g., due to recall error, is certainly an 
issue in the reporting of social security receipt (Manzoni et al., 2010; Kreuter 
et  al., 2013), particular attention should be devoted to intentional misreporting. 
Respondents are likely to conceal sensitive information due to fear of legal and/
or extralegal sanctioning, which in turn, has a negative effect on the validity of 
the data and prevalence estimates (Lee, 1993). Further, estimates of parameters 
such as proportions, averages as relationships between variables will be biased 
(Hausman, 2001).
In order to explore whether the RRT method is a successful means of improving 
the quality of data regarding the receipt of basic income support, we rely on data 
from the RRT study outlined in Chapter 2.1. Due to the specific study design (using 
administrative record data), we know the true percentage of respondents who 
have received transfer payments for basic income support and thus the percent 
who should have reported receipt. Thus, we can validate the reported percentage 
against the known true rate for the responding cases hence assessing the bias of 
the estimates. Such administrative record data is quite rare in the literature on 
sensitive questions (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a; Wolter, 2012), and provides a 
unique opportunity to evaluate the RRT compared to traditional direct questioning 
without having to rely on the ‘more-is-better’ assumption.
The study contributes in several ways to the existing research on the RRT 
and response bias: To the best of our knowledge, the performance of the RRT 
in a telephone survey has never been validated (especially not with respect 
to the receipt of basic income support). All existing RRT validation studies 
were implemented in a face-to-face, but never in a telephone setting (cf. 
also Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a; Wolter, 2012, p. 108). The choice of a 
telephone mode, however, might be perceived as more private by respondents, 
thus leading to more honest answers. While collecting data by means of the 
RRT has many advantages, RRT procedures also suffer from considerable 
disadvantages compared to direct questioning: For one, a larger sample size is 
needed to achieve the same statistical power (Warner 1965); second, interview 
duration increases due to an explanation of the application of the procedure, 
while third, the cognitive burden placed on respondents is higher. Examining 
the functioning of a telephone implementation of the RRT might prove useful, 
given that it is more cost efficient compared to face-to-face surveys. We thus 
follow the recommendation by Lamb and Stem (1978, p. 617) that “each time 
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the [RRT] method is changed or used in a different setting, further evaluation 
is appropriate.” Furthermore, we contribute by investigating which individual-
level factors influence accurate reporting and whether these mechanisms differ 
across experimental conditions.
To summarize, this chapter addresses two research questions. First, whether 
item specific response bias in surveys can be reduced when the randomized response 
technique is applied with respect to a) the true value in the administrative data 
and b) direct questioning (DQ) in the survey data. And second, which subgroups 
are especially affected by response error.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1 we discuss 
the challenge of asking sensitive questions. Section 4.2 describes the empirical 
study and the available data. Section 4.3 lays out the method of analysis, while 
Section 4.4 presents the results of the experiment. In Section 4.5, we draw some 
final conclusions and discuss the limitations of the study.
4.1 Background
Remember that the level of ‘threat’ or ‘sensitivity’ of a question as perceived by 
the respondent can be established by three theoretical criteria (Tourangeau and 
Yan, 2007): intrusiveness, risk of disclosure as well as social desirability.
Several of these theoretical dimensions apply to the receipt of basic income 
support (UB II)2: People can apply for welfare benefits in Germany either if they have 
been unemployed long-term or if they cannot make a living from their current job 
(if the resulting income is below a certain threshold). Respondents receiving basic 
income support may not wish to report this information in a survey: Admitting to 
the interviewer that they either have not been able to find a job over a longer period, 
that they live in poverty or that they do not earn enough to support their families can 
be quite embarrassing. The concept of ‘injunctive social norms’ (Cialdini, 2007), i.e., 
one’s perception or expectation of what most others approve or disapprove of, plays 
a vital role in this context. Negative beliefs and prejudice about welfare recipients 
in the United States and Great Britain comprise anything from not being motivated 
enough to find a job, uninterested in self-improvement, dishonesty, to laziness and 
dependence (Bullock, 2006, p. 2060). The receipt of basic income support in Germany 
is associated with similar prejudice and can thus be defined as socially undesirable, 
2 Since the so called Hartz Reforms in the German social security system in 2005, people are entitled to welfare 
benefits called ‘Unemployment Benefit II’ if they are between 15 and 64 years of age, capable of working, and if 
the household they live in—or more precisely, benefit community—does not have sufficient income to secure a 
livelihood. Thus, the receipt of UB II does not depend on the current employment status, but depends on the 
criterion of sufficient income. More detailed information on the receipt of basic income support can be found in 
Appendix C.2.
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in terms of the commonly perceived norm, and perceived as potentially negatively 
stigmatizing, causing embarrassment when admitting to such. Also, Rasinski and 
colleagues’ (1999, p. 479) study shows that normative role expectations significantly 
contribute to underreporting (of abortions). More precisely, the greatest associated 
risk that respondents identified were interviewer disapproval and embarrassment 
when answering ‘threatening’ questions.
To avoid errors from (item) nonresponse and misreporting (‘under-’ as well as 
‘overreporting’) due to the sensitive nature of a question, survey methodologists 
have suggested a range of guidelines with respect to the design of a questionnaire 
(for an extensive overview see Lee, 1993; Bradburn et al., 2004; Tourangeau and 
Yan, 2007). One of these strategies is the RRT (Warner, 1965), as described in 
Chapter 1.3.3 to elicit information on sensitive questions. Remember that the 
main idea of all RRT variants is to establish a probabilistic relationship between 
the survey response of an individual and the sensitive trait, e.g., by means of 
a randomization device with a known probability distribution (e.g., coins, cards, 
dice, spinner) (Fox and Tracy, 1986).
In the most recent meta-analysis (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a), a total 
of six individual-level RRT validation studies and 32 comparative RRT studies 
without validation data were investigated (for an overview of validation studies, 
see Appendix  C.1). The RRT produced some response error, however, lower than a 
comparable standard face-to-face questioning: For the validation studies under 
investigation, in the RRT, the mean response was underreported by 38 percent, 
while in the face-to-face condition, mean underreporting was 42 percent. One 
of these validation studies, conducted by van der Heijden and colleagues (2000, 
see also Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2006)), tested two different implementations of 
the RRT against standard face-to-face questioning. Results suggest that both RRT 
versions yield significantly lower response error with respect to social security fraud. 
Other experimental studies without validation data (based on the ‘more-is-better’ 
assumption) also showed that the RRT increased validity of the estimates by eliciting 
more truthful responses (to name a few: Weissman et al., 1986; Lara et al., 2004, 
2006).
In general, the RRT seems to elicit more honest answers and reduce social 
desirability bias, especially when dealing with more sensitive questions (Fidler and 
Kleinknecht, 1977; Landsheer et al., 1999, p. 2; Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a). 
The pioneering study by Locander and colleagues (1976) using individual-level 
validation data show for example, that the response error for RRT is (significantly) 
lower compared to that of direct questioning in three out of five instances. While 
the trend—i.e., the RRT eliciting higher prevalence estimates—is as expected in 
most validation studies, some studies also find no effects (Lamb and Stem, 1978; 
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Wolter, 2012). Furthermore, some RRT validation studies provide mixed or contrary 
evidence (Locander et al., 1976; Tracy and Fox, 1981) as do other experimental 
studies that do not use validation data (Umesh and Peterson, 1991; Holbrook and 
Krosnick, 2010a; Coutts and Jann, 2011; Coutts et al., 2011).
Given the largely positive empirical evidence, the following chapter addresses 
the question, of whether accurate data on basic income support can be collected 
using the RRT in the context of large-scale labor market surveys and how much 
bias, if any, still remains with this method of data collection.
4.2 Data and Methods
In order to assess the amount of misreporting of the receipt of transfer payments 
in survey reports, we draw on data from the RRT survey (outlined in Chapter  2.1). 
Due to the particular sampling design, we can—in addition to these survey 
data—draw upon supplementary information available on the sampling frame 
(administrative data). The combination of both data sources allows us to address 
the research questions stated above. The next section provides an overview of the 
survey data, the administrative data and the combined data.
4.2.1 The Survey Data
For the purpose of this chapter, we focus exclusively on the data collected on 
welfare benefit receipt, which will be used to form the dependent variable.
4.2.1.1 Sampling and Data Collection
The survey is a dual-frame survey that permits validation of the survey reports 
as well as a comparison of benefit recipients and employed persons. Remember 
that both samples were drawn from the registers of the Federal Employment 
Agency according to the following criteria: The first sample, the benefit 
recipients sample (UB II), consists of persons who were known to have received 
basic income support in June 2010—information that we will later on use to 
validate the survey reports. In order to be part of the population for the second 
sample, the employee sample, the requirement was employment in December 
2009.
4.2.1.2 Measurement of the Dependent Variable
Several measures were taken in order to reduce potential error sources in the 
survey measure of welfare receipt, such as recall error, and to decrease sensitivity 
(Tourangeau et al., 2000; Groves et al., 2009; Manzoni et al., 2010). We decided 
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to implement two different operationalizations: For the UB II sample—known to 
have received benefits in June 2010—we asked participants to report ‘benefit 
receipt ever’3. In the employed sample, we asked participants to report receipt in 
‘September 2010’4.
While these different operationalizations ensure that we can validate 
(aggregate) responses, another criterion was to keep the questions as simple as 
possible in order to ensure understanding and correct recall. To ease recall in the 
employed sample (and allow validation), the question relates to a defined period 
of receipt just prior to data collection. Further, all question formats were kept as 
similar as possible to commonly used questions in labor market surveys (cf. the 
PASS study as described by Trappmann et al., 2010).
4.2.1.3 Independent Variables and Operationalizations
A range of indicators explaining underreporting of UB II will be analyzed in the 
scope of the second research question. Existing empirical evidence shows that 
underreporting of UB II is more frequent among males, among people aged 25 
and younger as well as those between 40 and 57 (Kreuter et al., 2013). The 
authors also found a significant effect of household size and years of schooling. 
Those respondents with a higher education and those living in a larger household 
underreported more frequently. Household size in that particular instance is not 
to be taken literally: It is rather an indicator capturing a higher propensity to 
conduct the interview with someone less knowledgeable about the receipt of UB  II 
and thus response error should be larger. Kreuter et al. (2010, 2013) also show 
that respondents who are more reluctant to participate in a survey are slightly 
more likely to underreport benefit receipt. The authors attribute this effect to a 
lower motivation of these respondents, while controlling for sample composition 
and recall error due to a longer recall period. Both studies mentioned above only 
applied direct questioning techniques.
Drawing on main insights from these studies, as well as on behavioral 
theories and the response process (Tourangeau, 1984; Tourangeau and Rasinski, 
1988), we will consider variables that capture subjective costs, risks and utilities 
that are associated with accurate reporting of UB II. Further, those measures 
that capture understanding and application of the RRT as well as paradata will 
be assessed, containing relevant information regarding the survey process.5 In 
theory, we assume that we will see the following significant (negative) effects 
3 “Did you ever receive unemployment benefits II?” – Y/N. (note: translated from German).
4 “Did you receive unemployment benefits II in September 2010?” – Y/N. (note: translated from German).
5 Collected as a byproduct of the survey data collection (Couper, 1998; Kreuter, 2013).
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in the model of the direct questioning split, namely, for characteristics that are 
associated with higher subjective reporting costs. These costs are subjectively 
higher, if receipt of UB II is perceived as particularly sensitive, e.g., when a 
respondent has a higher education. If the RRT reduces perceived reporting costs 
associated with item sensitivity in a particular subgroup, we would expect this 
effect to vanish in the RRT model. According to the work of Böckenholt and 
van der Heijden (2007) the RRT works especially well if the RRT instructions 
are clearly understood and the cognitive burden is kept as low as possible. The 
authors also stress the importance of personal benefits and social influences, 
e.g., a person’s expected benefits of noncompliance, which would be captured 
by the first set of indicators. Therefore, additional factors regarding the RRT and 
the survey process will be analyzed.
Table 4.1 presents an overview of all independent variables. Factors contributing 
to perceived item sensitivity, and hence associated reporting costs, comprise: 
employment status, occupational status, and a respondent’s willingness to provide 
socially undesirable answers. Further, the reluctance of the respondents to answer 
sensitive questions is operationalized with an indicator variable, measuring item 
nonresponse for the item household income. Equally important is a measure of how 
common the receipt of UB II is in a respondent’s environment. Admitting to receiving 
UB II would be perceived as being less of a norm violation and reported more 
accurately. Ideally, this indicator would be measured at the neighborhood level, which 
is not possible in this particular case due to data privacy issues. Thus, an indicator 
recipient rate at the more aggregate municipal level is included in the models.
A second set of factors relates to the survey process and to the application 
of the RRT by the respondents. The first indicator captures whether a respondent 
refused to cooperate in the RRT condition (DQ_RRT) and was then surveyed in 
the direct questioning mode. In order to capture understanding of the RRT, two 
proxy indicators are used (Landsheer et al. 1999): First, interviewers were asked 
to rate the language skills (German) of a respondent immediately following the 
telephone interview. A second indicator pertaining to the understanding of the 
RRT instructions is educational attainment (formal training). Response latency, 
i.e., the speed at which a respondent answers, is used as a measure for response 
quality.
All models control for gender (0 male, 1 female), age (below 25, 25-40, 41-57, 
58 and above), and if a respondent lives in East Germany (0 West Germany, 1 East 
Germany) or in a single person household (0 multi-member household, 1 single 
person household). Including these controls seems appropriate given noncompliance 
to the randomization as well as the assumed differential underlying mechanisms in 
both experimental groups.
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4.2.2 Register Data
The analysis to address both research questions uses register data based on 
social security reports and reports from the FEA itself as gold standard. This 
supplementary administrative data from the sampling frame contains various 
receipt related information (e.g., type of benefit), and employment related 
information (e.g., type of employment and income for all sample units). Data 
on employment is reported by the employers on a yearly basis for all employees 
subject to social security contributions (compulsory notification scheme). 
Civil servants or self-employed persons are thus excluded, while marginally 
employed and part-time workers are included. Aside from information on the 
employment status, FEA obtains records of received unemployment benefits, 
job search and participation in active labor market programs. Information 
regarding basic income receipt is a by-product of the FEA activities, i.e., process 
data based on the information provided by the applicants themselves. Both the 
employee records, as well as the basic income receipt records, are collected on 
an individual-, spell-based level and are kept in the registers at the Institute for 
Employment Research.
For the analyses, only one indicator in the administrative data is of relevance: 
whether an individual received UB II. As a general rule, all data relevant to 
payments and claims (taxes, pensions, unemployment benefits etc.), i.e., the 
primary use of the social security system, are known to be of very good data 
quality (Jacobebbinghaus and Seth, 2007). The analyses thus rest on the crucial 
assumption that we can capture the true value of our respondents with these 
data. The UB II receipt indicator is known to be both accurate and complete and 
can serve as gold standard.
4.2.3 The Linked Data
There are some limitations to this validation study, since we did not ask 
respondents for consent to link their survey data to the administrative data and 
cannot link the two data sources.
However, due to the sampling plan, we do know that each individual in the 
UB II sample should by default respond with ‘Yes’ to the ‘benefit receipt ever’ 
question. Overreporting is not possible by definition. With the true aggregate 
prevalence being 100 percent, we can create an indicator variable on the 
individual person level that captures whether an individual reported accurately 
even without linkage of the two data sources. This measure of reporting accuracy 
is a simple dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the survey report matches 
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the true value in the administrative records, and 0 if the survey report is ‘No,’ i.e., 
a mismatch between the survey data and the administrative records.7
For the employed sample, the missing linkage consent question slightly 
complicates the analyses. In theory, the individual-level data on UB II receipt in 
September 2010 is available for all respondents on the frame. However, again, we 
are not allowed to link the survey data to the respective administrative records 
for reasons of data privacy. Thus, nothing is known at the individual level for 
these respondents with respect to their ‘true’ UB II status. It is therefore not 
possible to construct a variable indicating reporting accuracy at an individual 
level for this sample. However, we are allowed to link paradata regarding survey 
participation to the administrative data on the sampling frame. Linking this survey 
response indicator (0 nonrespondent, 1 respondent) to the administrative data, it 
is possible to derive and compare aggregate measures for respondents. According 
to the administrative data, the true aggregate prevalence of ‘benefit receipt in 
September 2010’ for all respondents of the employed sample is 3.8%. In this 
subsample of the survey, overreporting could theoretically be an issue. However, 
it seems unreasonable to assume that respondents, aside from overreporting due 
to satisficing or acquiescence, would (consciously) overreport UB II receipt for the 
reasons mentioned above.
4.3 Statistical Analyses
To assess the impact of measurement error from the two alternative techniques 
of data collection, we calculate the response bias. The bias of a statistic is simply 
the difference between the statistic’s expectation and the true population value. 
The estimator of the response bias (Bj ) in the respective experimental condition j 
is thus (adapted from Biemer, 2010, p. 49):
Bj = y
–
j, svy – y
–
j, adm ,  (4.1)
which is the difference of the means of accurate reporting in the sample survey 
measurements (y–j, svy ) and the gold standard measurements (y
–
j, adm ). This approach 
will then allow for a comparison of the overall response bias of the RRT and the 
DQ in both subsamples.
7 We observe item nonresponse for four respondents (out of 3,211) across all experimental conditions. Those cases 
with no survey information on receipt of benefits are excluded from the analyses.
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The following assumptions are critical for the subsequent analyses of response 
error and interpretations. First, for the purpose of this chapter, we assume that 
there is no measurement error in the administrative data. Second, with respect 
to the idea of resampling and thus sampling variance of the administrative data: 
If we randomly sample from the distribution of UB II recipients, we would by 
definition always observe a true prevalence of 100 percent. While this assumption 
of zero sampling variance in the administrative data is reasonable for the UB II 
sample, it is not entirely true for the employed sample. Nonetheless, for reasons 
discussed below, we will make this assumption. Based on this assumption, an 
unpaired t-test (unequal variances) to test whether the mean survey reports 
differ from the mean administrative values will yield correct standard errors of 
estimates of differences, since the covariance term is by assumption zero. Also, 
since both experimental splits are randomly assigned and independent, the means 
are assumed to be uncorrelated, yielding correct t-statistics for the significance 
tests of estimates of differences between experimental groups in an unpaired 
t-test. Third, we assume that there is no overreporting of welfare benefit receipt. 
If, again, we were to resample from the respective population, the estimate of 
the mean prevalence in the survey data then actually captures the propensity to 
report UB II receipt accurately [0, 1] while the absolute response bias is a measure 
of the propensity to misreport taking on values between -1 and 0. The magnitude 
of the response bias is also dependent on the absolute prevalence of receipt 
of UB II. However, calculating the relative response bias i.e., depending on the 
occurrence of the prevalence in the administrative data, is not meaningful since 
‘absolute’ occurrence of misreporting is the measure of interest. This issue is only 
relevant for the employed sample, since in the UB II sample, relative and absolute 
bias are identical. The mechanisms that cause underreporting also differ in the 
experimental groups: While in the DQ condition we have ‘pure’ underreporting, 
in RRT we also have ‘noncompliance.’ Thus, calculating a relative bias in the 
employed sample is not sensible. Second, if the questions were the same across 
subsamples, conditioning on the true value (y–j, adm ), should yield the same point 
estimate of the relative response bias in both samples. The estimated confidence 
intervals in the employed sample should then be larger in comparison to those of 
the UB II sample due to the lower precision. In analyses not presented here, we 
can show that the relative response bias is larger in the employed sample, as are 
the confidence intervals.
After analyzing the overall bias (research question 1), in a next step we 
estimate logistic regression models of accurate reporting as a function of individual 
characteristics (research question 2). In both experimental conditions, the dependent 
variable Yji represents an individual’s response behavior (0 – underreporting; 1 – 
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accurate reporting). If the assumptions of privacy protection in the RRT condition 
hold, significant predictors of underreporting related to perceived item sensitivity 
in the direct model should then become nonsignificant in the RRT model or, put 
differently, should be (significantly) positively related to accurate reporting. While 
for the direct condition a logistic model of compliance is appropriate, for the RRT 
split we will again use the rrlogit routine in Stata (version  12.1) with an adapted 
likelihood function that accounts for the additional noise introduced by the RRT 
procedure (Jann, 2011, see also Chapter 1.3.3).
4.4 Empirical Results
Before we address the initial research questions, we need to establish whether 
the receipt of basic income support has been significantly underreported in our 
experiment, and if we can replicate the findings of other studies (Kreuter et al., 
2010, 2013). Since the exact questions asked in the survey differ across the two 
subsamples, response bias estimates are not comparable across subsamples and 
should only be interpreted separately.
Table 4.2 shows the estimated prevalence in percent for direct questioning across 
both subsamples, as well as the resulting estimate of the absolute magnitude of the 
response bias (%pts). The estimated response bias pointing in the expected direction 
is boldfaced, indicating a statistically significant amount of underreporting.
Table 4.2:  Estimated proportions in percent and absolute response bias in percentage  
points for DQ
Sample Type j y
–
j, svy
[95% C.I.]
y–j, adm
Bj
[95% C.I.]
n
UB II DQ 0.870
[0.843;0.898]
1.000 -0.130
[-0.157;-0.102]
579
Employed DQ 0.021
[0.009;0.033]
0.030 -0.009 
[-0.021;0.003]
564
As expected, we find underreporting of receipt of benefit in the DQ condition: 
For the UB II sample, we do observe a significantly lower report of UB II receipt 
by 13.0  percentage points, indicating substantive misreporting. While receipt of 
benefits is also underreported by 0.9 percentage points in the employed sample, it is 
not statistically significant. In absolute terms, the bias is larger in the UB II sample, 
however, in relative terms, i.e., standardized on the value of true prevalence, it is much 
larger in the employed sample (29.3% compared to 13.0%). However, as discussed 
in the previous section, differences are expected due to the less difficult question of 
replying to receipt ‘ever,’ in the UB II sample, and ‘September’ in the employed sample.
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4.4.1 Reduction of Response Bias by Means of RRT?
We expect to see a statistically nonsignificant divergence of the survey data 
estimates from the gold standard if the RRT alleviates bias due to item sensitivity 
(assuming the RRT is understood and trusted). Table 4.3 is equivalent to Table 4.2, 
however, additionally reports the estimates for all RRT experimental conditions.
Table 4.3:  Estimated proportions in percent and absolute response bias in percentage points for 
DQ and RRT
Sample Type j y
–
j, svy
[95% C.I.]
y–j, adm
Bj
[95% C.I.]
n
UB II
DQ 0.870
[0.843;0.898]
1.000 -0.130
[-0.157;-0.102]
579
RRT 0.854
[0.816;0.892]
1.000 -0.146
[-0.184;-0.108]
836
DQ_RRT 0.906
[0.862;0.949]
1.000 -0.094
[-0.138;-0.051]
180
Employed
DQ 0.021
[0.009;0.033]
0.030 -0.009 
[-0.021;0.003]
564
RRT 0.004
[-0.025;0.032]
0.042 -0.038 
[-0.067;-0.010]
955
DQ_RRT 0.043
[0.001;0.085]
0.042 -0.001 
[-0.041;0.043]
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Contrary to the initial expectations, the response bias in the RRT condition 
differs significantly from zero: In the UB II sample receipt of welfare benefits 
is underreported by 14.6 percentage points and, in the employed sample, by 
3.8  percentage points. As for the DQ condition, the relative bias is larger in the 
employee sample (91.3%) compared to the UB II sample (14.6%). Respondents who 
refused to apply the RRT are the ones who show the lowest levels of underreporting 
in both subsamples and thus seem to be the more accurate respondents (9.4%pts 
and 0.1%pts; also in relative terms: 9.4% and 2.4%).
We also expected to see that the RRT estimates are less biased compared to 
those in the DQ condition (though not necessarily significantly so). What can 
easily be seen in Table 4.3 is that the estimates of response bias in both RRT 
conditions are even larger compared to those in the direct questioning conditions.
Results of the one-sided t-test of the differences of the mean estimates of 
response biases across experimental groups (BDQ – BRRT , by subsample) are displayed 
in Table 4.4. If the response bias in the RRT condition were to be smaller compared 
to that in the DQ condition, we would expect to see a negative difference.
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Table 4.4: Differential response bias of RRT compared to DQ
Sample Type BDQ BRRT
BDQ – BRRT
[95% C.I.]
t-statistic
UB II -0.130 -0.146 0.016
[-0.031;0.064]
0.68
Employed -0.009 -0.038 0.030 
[-0.001;0.060]
1.89
While the difference of both response bias estimates in the UB II sample is 
statistically nonsignificant (p = 0.25), the response bias is 1.13 times higher in the 
RRT condition compared to the DQ condition. In the employed sample, the RRT 
performs even worse: The response bias is 4.35 times higher in the RRT condition 
compared to direct questioning and this result is statistically significant (p = 0.03).
To summarize some of the results for our initial research question: 1) Our 
particular implementation of the RRT cannot reduce bias in the estimated 
prevalence of basic income support in Germany, while 2) RRT performs significantly 
worse if the item under investigation is of a low prevalence rate, as in the case of 
our employed sample.
We can only speculate about the reasons for the poor performance of the 
RRT in our particular study. One reason might be that the initial assumption that 
unemployment benefit receipt is sensitive is not true. In that case, we would not 
expect to see the RRT producing estimates closer to the truth compared to direct 
questioning. The second argument might be that respondents do not apply the 
randomization procedure correctly, i.e., that either they do not flip coins at all 
or they do not adhere to the RRT instructions. In the first instance, this could 
mean that a face-to-face implementation, with an interviewer supervising the 
randomization procedure, could perform better (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a). 
The second issue is trust in the method: Despite understanding the method, it 
is also crucial that respondents trust the privacy protection provided by the RRT 
(Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a; Coutts and Jann, 2011). While we can assume 
that unintentional noncompliance to the rules should not occur if the method 
is understood, i.e., respondents accidentally providing a wrong answer, trust is 
essential. ‘Innocent’ respondents might consciously decide to edit their answer 
and ignore the researchers’ instructions: I.e., they might say ‘No,’ even if they 
should have said ‘Yes’ according to the randomization device,8 if they lack trust 
in the method. Or, if prompted to answer truthfully, respondents might edit 
their answer and report a ‘No’ (even if the truth is ‘Yes’), if they do not trust the 
method. These so-called ‘cheaters’ or ‘non-compliers’ lead to the fact that there 
8 They refuse to provide a false positive answer when prompted to answer ‘Yes.’
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is still underreporting in the RRT (see also Clark and Desharnais, 1998; Boeije and 
Lensvelt-Mulders, 2002). A third reason could be the mode of data collection via 
telephone itself. Respondents might find it easier to ‘cheat’ on the phone than in 
a face-to-face mode.
This result is particularly relevant for future studies due to the cost implications: 
The increased costs in the RRT condition are due to—all other things being equal—a 
larger sample size, longer interview times, statistically more complex analyses, 
more intensive interviewer training and, most important, a higher respondent 
burden. Given our empirical evidence, additional costs of an RRT data collection 
for welfare receipt are not justified. Thus, in terms of bias versus efficiency, our 
results clearly favor direct questioning to collect data on welfare benefit receipt 
in Germany.
4.4.2 Is Response Bias Subgroup Specific?
The results so far indicate a tremendous amount of misreporting, contrary to 
the expectations in both experimental conditions. So far, this study has only 
considered bivariate comparisons between experimental groups.
The following section will now take a closer look at how misreporting differs 
between subgroups while controlling for a differential sample composition across 
both experimental conditions. Since individual-level data is available only for the 
UB II sample, further analyses are limited to this sample and inferences can only be 
drawn with respect to this specific population.9 The following analysis investigates 
the mechanisms leading to response error across both experimental conditions 
in order to find out if the RRT performs differently in special subgroups. The 
dependent variable, ‘accurate reporting,’ will be modeled as a function of several 
individual characteristics for respondents in the UB II sample separately for each 
experimental split. In order to account for potential nonlinear relationships, all 
variables enter the regression equation categorically.
Table 4.5 displays the average marginal effects (AME) from logistic regression 
models (Stata version 12.1, rrlogit, Jann, 2011), modeling accurate reporting as a 
function of the indicators mentioned above. The AME is the average of discrete or 
partial changes over all observations and yields a straightforward interpretation 
of estimation results and allows comparison between models (Bartus, 2005; 
Mood, 2010). Subsequently, we will only report the AMEs providing an immediate 
interpretation of effect size.
9  Even if individual-level data were available for the employed sample, due to the low prevalence (close to zero) of 
receipt of UB II in that split, the statistical power to meaningfully detect group differences would be too low.
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Two models are estimated: Model 1 analyzes accurate reporting in the direct 
questioning condition and serves as a baseline for examining reporting accuracy. 
Model 2 replicates the same model in the RRT condition. We expect to see more 
accurate reporting in the RRT condition, especially for those variables related to 
perceived item sensitivity. Thus, all (negative) effects that we find in the direct 
split related to item sensitivity should become more positively related (or at least 
nonsignificant) to accurate reporting. This second model also presents insights 
regarding the question of which variables related to the survey process provide 
more accurate responses. The subsequent analyses will be organized along these 
expectations.
Focusing on the results of Model 1 in Table 4.5, those variables related to 
perceived item sensitivity are of particular interest. Unconditional on other 
covariates, as expected, respondents with no current employment are on average 
11.8%pts more likely than respondents with an income of 400 Euro and above to 
report receipt of UB II. Marginally employed respondents do not differ systematically 
from the reference category. Regarding occupational status, we expect those 
respondents with a high (present or past) status to report receipt of UB II less 
often than the other categories. Contrary to our initial expectations, respondents 
with a high ISEI have a slight tendency to report more accurately compared to 
the reference category (no job), while those respondents with a low or medium 
status report receipt significantly more frequently (6.9%pts) than those who have 
never held a job before. Regarding the difference between respondents with a high 
ISEI and those with a low or medium ISEI, we observe no significant difference. 
The item ‘previous socially undesirable answer’ regarding tax honesty significantly 
explains accurate reporting, but in a surprising way: Respondents with an honest, 
i.e., more lenient, attitude towards tax dishonesty are on average 4.5%pts more 
likely to underreport the receipt of basic income support than those respondents 
displaying a less lenient attitude towards tax honesty. At first, this finding seems 
much at odds with what we would expect to see, i.e., behaving socially undesirably 
in one instance would result in a higher propensity to admit another undesirable 
characteristic. One potential explanation could be that given that ‘tax dishonesty’ is 
acceptable, misreporting on other characteristics is considered acceptable as well. 
Reluctance, i.e., item nonresponse with respect to household income contributes 
significantly to the explanation of underreporting of UB II (11 3%pts). Regarding 
the share of UB II recipients at the municipality level, we do not see any significant 
effect, supporting our hypothesis regarding the wrong level of measurement.
Those characteristics relating to the survey process contribute less to the 
explanation of accurate reporting. Poor language skills are the only significant 
influence and contribute to underreporting of UB II (5.7%pts). With respect to 
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the controls, we observe that young respondents, aged 24 and below significantly 
underreport receipt (13.7%pts). In line with our expectations, the indicator ‘single 
person household’ significantly improves reporting accuracy (9.2%pts). Both 
results support the argument that proxy reports with less knowledgeable persons 
on receipt of UB II are less accurate, since younger respondents are more likely to 
still live with their parents who apply for UB II for the entire household.
Turning our attention to Model 2—the RRT model—the results are strikingly 
similar, both in direction and magnitude. Contrary to what we would expect, 
those variables relating to perceived item sensitivity exert approximately the same 
influence as in the first model with one exception: previous socially undesirable 
response. Those respondents in the RRT condition now report on average 15.8% 
more accurately. This difference between both models is statistically significant, 
indicating that the RRT reduces social desirability concerns for those respondents. 
Given this evidence, the above explanation for this finding seems implausible. A 
different explanation might solve the puzzle: In Germany, tax dishonesty is largely 
associated with undeclared work/income. Given that UB II is based on accurate 
reporting of all forms of income and misreporting of income to the authorities is 
heavily pursued, these results are internally consistent.
To summarize, contrary to our expectation, the RRT does not elicit more 
accurate reports for those respondents for whom reports of UB II are especially 
sensitive, with the exception of one indicator. This indicates that the same 
misreporting mechanisms are at work in both experimental conditions.
Similar to Model 1, those characteristics relating to the survey process and 
the application of the RRT overall contribute less to the explanation of accurate 
reporting. Those respondents who refused the application of the RRT report more 
accurately than those respondents in the RRT condition (4.9%pts). We have 
anecdotal evidence from interviewer observations that those respondents either 
distrust the RRT or claim that they ‘have nothing to hide’ and want to be questioned 
directly. This effect is thus as we expect: These respondents should express lower 
levels of misreporting compared to the RRT condition. The effect size of lack of 
language skills is negative and roughly the same as in model 1, however, just fails 
to be statistically significant (p = 0.101). We assume that respondents who do 
not accurately understand what is asked of them in either condition (particularly 
so in the RRT) will not trust the method and therefore report (a ‘self-protective’) 
‘No’ (Coutts and Jann, 2011). Thus, the result is as expected for both models. 
Remember that while a tertiary degree contributes to accurate reporting (2.8%pts) 
in Model  1, in Model 2 this effect is larger in comparison to Model 1, but not 
compared to the reference category (7.5%pts). Due to the small number of people 
holding a tertiary degree, confidence intervals are rather large for this estimate. 
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Further regression analyses were conducted but are not presented here: They 
account for the fact that if language skills are poor, neither educational degree 
will make a difference in the reporting accuracy. Assuming good language skills 
(essentially an interaction), our results show an even larger effect of university 
degree in Model 2. This suggests that the RRT reduces underreporting for these 
respondents: However, it remains unclear whether this effect is due to a better 
understanding of the RRT compared to the reference category (Poor German Skills 
and No Tertiary Degree) or the RRT guaranteeing anonymity and reducing item 
sensitivity for the more highly educated group. Response latency, i.e., the speed at 
which a respondent answers, is used as a measure for response quality. Surveying 
in the RRT condition by definition takes longer than a comparable direct question, 
since respondents have to follow the RRT protocol. In theory, irrespective of the 
experimental condition, a longer answering process could indicate more editing of 
the true response and thus a poorer data quality (Holtgraves, 2004). On the other 
hand, it could also be associated with higher quality information and processing 
in the RRT condition (Wolter 2012). Results for response latency exhibit no clear 
pattern across models and are nonsignificant: In Model 2, a slower response 
indicates on average more reporting accuracy (4.2%pts, 0.4%pts underreporting 
for fast reporters; this difference is statistically nonsignificant), while in Model  1, 
we observe both fast and slow responders to be more accurate compared to the 
reference category (3.8%pts and 1.1%pts).
With respect to the controls, we observe effects similar to those of Model 1, 
with the exception of women reporting on average more accurately in Model 2 
(4.9%pts).
To summarize our results, we can replicate results from previous studies in 
Model 1, i.e., especially for characteristics relating to item sensitivity (employment 
status, occupational status, socially undesirable response, reluctance) and 
structural characteristics (age, single person household) (Kreuter et al., 2013). 
Contrary to our expectations, the RRT cannot resolve social desirability concerns 
for these items; as expected, structural influences persist. Our expectations 
regarding the survey process and the application of the RRT cannot be confirmed 
with our results. Overall, the poorer model fit in the second model indicates that 
some other mechanisms are at work that cannot be accounted for by our data.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our initial research question addressed the performance of the RRT for the 
estimation of welfare receipt compared to direct questioning. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the RRT does not reduce underreporting in the data collection on 
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welfare benefit receipt in a telephone survey. Our results show that it performs 
even worse in the employee sample, where the overall prevalence is close to zero. 
Thus, we conclude that the additional burden imposed on the respondent and the 
additional costs emerging from the data collection via RRT are not justified.
Insights into who underreports receipt of UB II were the main focus of the 
second research question. Inferences are limited to the population of UB II 
recipients in Germany only. We find significantly more accurate reporting across 
both methods for respondents who perceive reporting of UB II as less of a norm 
violation, i.e., respondents who are not employed (compared to those employed) 
or have a low or medium occupational status (compared to those who have never 
held a job before and those with a high status (RRT model only)). Respondents 
who admit to tax dishonesty report more accurately in the RRT model, however, 
less accurately in the DQ model, as do respondents who are unwilling to provide 
information on other items such as income. Thus, we can conclude that there is a 
tendency for underreporting whenever receipt of welfare benefits is perceived as 
more sensitive in both models.
If the RRT were to resolve the concerns of social desirability, we would expect 
to see differential effects or different mechanisms at work, across both methods 
for those items capturing sensitivity. Our results do not support this argument, 
since differences between models are statistically significant in one instance only: 
for those respondents previously having given a socially undesirable response. 
Furthermore, we expect that those items fostering understanding of the RRT 
increase reporting accuracy. While most effects point in the expected direction, 
they are statistically nonsignificant.
Overall, our findings regarding the poor performance of the RRT seem to be 
at odds with prior studies reporting a success of the RRT compared to direct 
questioning (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a). We can only speculate about 
the potential reasons for the failure of the RRT in our study. One argument 
discussed above relates to the potential lack of sensitivity of the item under 
study. If underreporting were not be caused by perceived sensitivity, then the 
RRT would not be expected to decrease bias. However, studies regarding the 
perception of welfare receipt would not support this argument (Bullock, 2006). 
Other arguments explaining the poor performance of the RRT, relate to ‘cheating’ 
and ‘noncompliance.’ For one, it remains unclear while on the telephone whether 
respondents really implement the randomization procedure (Holbrook and 
Krosnick, 2010a). In that instance a face-to-face mode would be more appropriate. 
A second concern is that respondents ‘forced’ by the randomization device to 
provide a false positive answer might decide not to comply with the RRT rules 
and reply ‘No’ instead of ‘Yes’ (Coutts and Jann, 2011). This concern cannot be 
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ruled out even in the f2f mode. This can be particularly problematic if the overall 
prevalence is close to zero, as is the case for one of our samples. This result is not 
surprising if we assume a fixed amount of ‘non-compliers’ in both samples: In 
relation to those complying to the RRT rules, the share of non-compliers would be 
much smaller in a high prevalence sample admitting to the sensitive item. Thus, in 
that instance, the ‘true’ effect of the RRT, i.e., had everybody complied, would only 
be slightly downward biased. If the same amount of noncompliance occurred in 
a low prevalence sample, this ratio would change drastically, introducing a larger 
distortion, potentially causing even negative prevalence estimates. This is exactly 
the result that we observe in our study.
The question remains, why we observe this amount of underreporting in 
absolute terms. To explain the overall deviance from the true values, it helps to have 
more background information on the nature of welfare support itself: Some forms 
of support subsumed under UB II are never directly received by the respondent and 
might not be experienced as such. To give an example, respondents sometimes only 
receive UB II in the form of housing assistance. This transfer payment is sometimes 
remitted directly to the landlord by the federal employment agency. Furthermore, 
while young adults (24 and younger) living in a benefit community officially 
receive UB II, they might not perceive themselves as recipients, since officially the 
money could be transferred to their parents. For these respondents we would not 
expect to see a difference between direct questioning and RRT, since this error is 
mostly due to encoding errors, as well as errors of question interpretation, and 
not due to item sensitivity. Thus, a certain amount of underreporting of welfare 
benefit receipt could always be expected.
To conclude, the evidence in our study supports the notion that the RRT 
performs particularly well in certain populations: those respondents with good 
language skills, those more highly educated, and those who take enough time to 
respond in the RRT condition, i.e., the correct application of the randomization 
process being observed in some way (note that many of the most successful RRT 
applications in the literature work with student populations). With populations 
with a lower educational background, the results can be very different. When 
the population of interest covers many individuals with poorer language skills, 
or a lower educational background, other techniques, such as the crosswise 
or triangular technique (Yu et al., 2008), might be a preferable method. These 
methods do not require a randomization device, are less of a cognitive burden for 
respondents, are easier to implement on the telephone and might thus perform 
better.
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The main question of this dissertation was whether we can elicit more truthful 
reports to sensitive labor market questions using so-called ‘dejeopardizing’ 
data collection techniques. We implemented the most prominent examples in 
two experimental surveys conducted in 2010, namely, the randomized response 
technique and the item count technique and compared each with standard direct 
questioning. Furthermore, to facilitate data collection for continuous sensitive 
information, we developed and applied the item sum technique.
The findings with respect to the RRT and the ICT are rather enlightening: 
Our empirical evidence is at best mixed. While the magnitude of estimates of 
undeclared work and unemployment benefits in our studies is comparable to those 
obtained in other surveys, neither the RRT nor the ICT consistently outperforms 
standard methods such as direct questioning and consistently reduces response 
bias (‘more-is-better’ assumption as well as using validation data). To state it even 
more clearly, in some instances both techniques even perform (significantly) worse 
compared to direct questioning.
These results, i.e., the lack of improvement in data quality for data collected 
on undeclared work and receipt of welfare benefits, are relevant for future studies 
due to the involved survey costs when implementing these special techniques. On 
the one hand, increased monetary costs in the RRT study and the ICT study are 
mostly due to—all other things being equal—the necessity of larger sample sizes 
to achieve the same level of statistical precision in the experimental conditions. 
Furthermore, longer interview times, more complex interviewer training and, last 
but not least, statistically more complex analyses contribute to higher overall 
costs. Not forgetting the additional cognitive burden imposed on the respondents 
and potential bias due to respondents refusing the application of these techniques 
(see the non-compliers in our RRT study). On the other hand, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the RRT was very well received by many respondents and interviewers 
in terms of novelty or innovation and motivation. Taking all evidence into account, 
the additional respondent burden and the additional monetary costs of an RRT or 
ICT data collection do not seem justified in the context of undeclared work and 
welfare benefit receipt.
Evidence regarding the newly developed item sum experiments, however, 
shows that the IST is a rather promising data collection technique for continuous 
sensitive variables. For both items under study, the IST yielded higher, and thus 
presumably more valid, estimates in three out of four instances. However, this 
effect was significant only for earnings from undeclared work. Survey researchers 
aiming at measuring sensitive behaviors at an ordinal or continuous scale could 
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benefit from using the IST. In contrast to other techniques, such as continuous RRT 
schemes, no randomizing device is necessary, respondent burden can be assumed 
to be lower, the IST can be easily conducted over the phone and by implementing 
a double-list design increased survey costs could be kept in check.
5.1 Contribution
Reverting to the initially presented research questions, the main findings of this 
dissertation comprise several aspects:
For the first research question—i.e., prevalence of undeclared work comparing 
DQ, RRT, ICT as well as substantive analyses—presented in Chapter 2 we could 
demonstrate that in comparison to direct questioning techniques concerning 
undeclared work (‘more-is-better’ assumption), the RRT provided slightly lower 
prevalence estimates in our employee sample, while RRT prevalence estimates 
for undeclared work in our benefit recipients sample were higher (though 
nonsignificant in one out of two instances). While this result is not in favor of 
the RRT in general, it also does not suggest that the RRT performs worse in our 
‘more difficult’ target population of benefit recipients. On the contrary, we have 
empirical evidence that the RRT (as well as the ICT) elicits more accurate reports 
of undeclared work (‘more-is-better’ assumption), the more sensitive the item is 
perceived to be, i.e., when higher penalties can be expected. This would explain the 
findings for ‘undeclared work for a company’ or for benefit recipients who could 
be charged with social security fraud when admitting to conduct undeclared work. 
These results are in accordance with the literature suggesting a better performance 
with increasing sensitivity of the topic (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a; Tourangeau 
and Yan, 2007).
Similar to the findings for the RRT, the evidence regarding the ICT is mixed: 
The ICT only elicits more accurate responses for the item ‘undeclared work for a 
company.’ This leads us to the overall conclusion that neither the RRT nor the ICT 
consistently outperforms direct questioning.
Recent studies suggest that the ICT outperforms the RRT in bias reduction, 
however, at the same time show that the ICT is somewhat less efficient statistically 
(Corstange, 2009; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a, b; Coutts and Jann, 2011): While 
respondents in the RRT sometimes believe in some kind of trick, do not understand 
the rules or consciously ‘cheat,’ the ICT seems easier to administer, more convincing 
and more applicable in large scale surveys. Further, since the ICT does not require 
a lengthy introduction or a randomization device—and thus imposes less cognitive 
burden on the respondent—researchers see a solution for the problem of social 
desirability in this technique (Coutts and Jann, 2011; Glynn, 2013). Due to the 
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use of different samples (and data collection agencies) in both studies, however, 
the results of the RRT and the ICT studies are, strictly speaking, not comparable. 
Daring a very careful comparison—by assuming the employee sample and the 
general population sample to be sufficiently similar—our results do not support 
these hypotheses: Compared to the RRT, the ICT prevalence estimates are lower for 
the item ‘undeclared work for a private person’ and higher for the item ‘undeclared 
work for a company.’
Our substantive contributions concern insights into who engages in undeclared 
work and who underreports welfare benefit receipt using logistic regression models. 
Regarding engagement into undeclared work, we pooled both RRT samples. In 
the analyses of ‘undeclared work for a private person’ or ‘for a company,’ the 
perceived share of undeclared work in one’s own network proved to be a robust 
explanatory factor in our substantive models (norm hypothesis). Other factors 
contributing to the explanation for engaging in undeclared work that were found 
to be statistically significant were: receipt of benefit (as a proxy for monetary 
gains from undeclared work), the number of people potentially helping with the 
job search, active organizational membership, as well as acceptance and approval 
of undeclared work. Those are all arguments within the utility and opportunity 
hypotheses framework. Furthermore, respondents aged 34 and younger are more 
likely to engage in undeclared work compared to those aged 35 and older. The 
main substantive conclusion is that we find particular evidence for the norm 
hypothesis in our models explaining undeclared work as well as a significant RRT 
effect (though mostly driven by the UB II sample).
Our second research question addressed in Chapter 3 concerned the 
development and presentation of a new data collection method to improve 
data collection for continuous sensitive information—the item sum technique 
(IST). This new technique yielded significantly higher estimates of earnings from 
undeclared work than direct questioning in both the employee sample and the 
benefit recipients sample. Relying on the ‘more-is-better’ assumption, this leads 
us to conclude that we obtain more accurate reports from respondents engaged 
in undeclared work. While the IST effect was significant for earnings from 
undeclared work for both samples, IST estimates regarding hours of undeclared 
work were more ambiguous: Though higher in the employee sample, estimates 
in the benefit recipient sample were lower compared to direct questioning. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of significant interaction effects, i.e., 
differential item sum effects, demonstrating that the technique seems to work 
equally well for respondents with differing cognitive abilities.
The third research question embedded in the RRT study was devoted to the 
opportunity to assess the RRT without having to rely on the ‘more-is-better’ 
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assumption. Chapter 4 analyzed the performance of the RRT for the estimation 
of welfare receipt compared to direct questioning. Again, our empirical evidence 
illustrates that the RRT does not reduce underreporting. Our results show that 
the RRT performs significantly worse than direct questioning in the employed 
sample, where the overall prevalence is close to zero. Only the direct questioning 
technique contained the true value obtained from administrative data. For 
the benefit recipients, the poorer performance of the RRT compared to direct 
questioning was nonsignificant. However, neither the RRT nor direct questioning 
contained the true value for this sample.
In order to assess who underreports the receipt of welfare benefits, we ran 
two separate logistic regressions (direct questioning and RRT), modeling accuracy 
of the reports of welfare benefit receipt as a function of different covariates. 
Inferences for this item are limited to the population of UB II recipients in 
Germany. In the models, we focused particularly on explanatory factors related 
to the perceived item sensitivity, as well as those factors related to the survey 
process and the application of the RRT itself. Reporting accuracy is significantly 
higher in both models for respondents for whom it can be reasonably argued that 
they perceive reporting of UB II as less of a norm violation. Remembering the 
model of the response process, we would expect to see differential effects across 
both methods for those items capturing sensitivity if the RRT were to resolve 
these concerns of social desirability. Our results do not support this argument. 
Further, we expect that those items fostering understanding of the RRT would 
contribute to an increased reporting accuracy. While most effects point in the 
expected direction, they are statistically nonsignificant.
5.2 Limitations
Overall, our findings confirm the results of more recent studies reporting mixed 
results of the RRT and ICT compared to direct questioning (Biemer et al., 2005; 
Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a; Coutts and Jann, 2011; Wolter, 2012); the prior 
success of the RRT and positive evidence for the ICT cannot be replicated (Lensvelt-
Mulders et al., 2005a; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). Our findings are, however, 
subject to certain limitations.
Remember that one limitation that affects all surveys on undeclared work 
equally is that these mostly capture undeclared work conducted for and by private 
individuals. Undeclared work conducted by a company for a company is seldom 
captured. Thus, even if all bias due to social desirability were to be removed, these 
estimates of the magnitude of undeclared work obtained in surveys can still be 
considered a lower bound.
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First, due to the particular design and data availability (administrative records), 
in-depth and substantive analyses were only conducted within the RRT study and 
are limited to the benefit recipient subsample. Generalizations to the general 
population can only be made with respect to the overall performance of the RRT, 
assuming that the employee sample is sufficiently similar. No such limitations 
exist for the ICT study. Furthermore, we cannot disentangle whether the ‘failure’ 
of the RRT or the ICT is due our specific design or whether the RRT and the ICT 
do not work in general for the collection of data on undeclared work and welfare 
benefit receipt. The underlying argument being that it could be perceived as easier 
to cheat on the phone. However, since the main goal was to evaluate the use of 
the RRT in the large scale telephone surveys with this particular sampling, this 
leaves the overall conclusions unaltered.
Second, an ideal study for evaluating the RRT, ICT or IST would not rely on the 
‘more-is-better’ assumption but would instead use validation data with known 
true scores for the sensitive variables. Opportunities for validation studies are 
very difficult to find, and data protection issues arise if individual-level data from 
different sources are linked without the informed consent of the respondents. Due 
to the nature of undeclared work, we were not able to validate these individual 
survey reports directly, but had to rely on the ‘more-is-better’ assumption for 
evaluating the RRT, the ICT and the IST. While this is certainly a major limitation, 
this assumption is often used in the literature.
We also have evidence, that there is noncompliance in the RRT condition 
despite a careful introduction and explanation to the respondents. Our negative 
prevalence estimate in the RRT employee sample for undeclared work suggests 
that not all respondents complied with the instructions. Due to lack of additional 
data, we can only speculate about the potential reasons for noncompliance. For 
one, it remains unclear on the telephone whether respondents really implement 
the randomization procedure (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010a). In this instance, a 
face-to-face mode would seem more sensible. A second concern, however, could 
also not be entirely ruled out in the face-to-face mode: Respondents ‘forced’ by 
the randomization device to provide a false positive answer might decide not to 
comply with the RRT rules and reply ‘No’ instead of ‘Yes’ (Coutts and Jann, 2011). 
This can be particularly problematic if the overall prevalence is close to zero, as is 
the case for undeclared work or welfare benefit receipt in the employed sample. 
If we assume a fixed total amount of noncompliance in both samples, the share 
of non-compliers would be comparatively small in a high prevalence sample in 
relation to those complying to the RRT rules. Thus, the ‘true’ effect of the RRT 
had everybody complied, would be only marginally attenuated. If the same total 
amount of noncompliance occurred in a low prevalence sample, this ratio would 
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change drastically, introducing a larger bias, potentially causing even negative 
prevalence estimates. This is exactly the result we observe in our study.
Taking all evidence into account and analyzing complete and partial interviews, 
a total of 369 respondents refused the application of the RRT (15.8% of complete 
and partial interviews). This considerable share of respondents who did not remain 
in initially assigned condition thus compromised the randomization of experimental 
groups. All of the RRT analyses control for this fact. Using intention-to-treat and 
instrumental variables strategies in the IST-study, for example, we believe that we 
convincingly demonstrated that our findings are robust despite this problem.
We did not encounter similar problems in the ICT study, nonetheless, a 
closer look at the data of the ICT study also reveals problems, such as ‘ceiling 
effects’ (Glynn, 2013). Ceiling effects occur whenever all items, the sensitive 
and the nonsensitive items, apply to a respondent. In this instance, anonymity 
is not granted any longer. Furthermore, for both, the ICT as well as the IST, it 
is crucial that the answers to the non-sensitive items are independent of the 
question format, that is, that the answers do not depend on whether they are 
given directly or serve as a ‘filler’ item in the item count/sum format (assumption 
of ‘no-design-effect,’ see Tsuchiya and Hirai (2010); Blair and Imai (2012)). Thus, 
careful designing of the survey instrument (i.e., the innocuous questions) and even 
more extensive pretesting seem advisable.
Third, regarding the results of consistently higher response bias for reporting 
of welfare benefits in the RRT condition, another potential concern—aside from 
noncompliance to the instructions—is related to the perceived item sensitivity. 
While undeclared work is sensitive in all theoretical dimensions we discussed, 
welfare benefit might be considered as less sensitive than we assumed. If 
underreporting is not caused by perceived sensitivity but is due to other 
mechanisms, then the RRT would not decrease bias. The alternative hypothesis 
regarding the amount of underreporting in absolute terms involves structural 
arguments relating to the understanding and the interpretation of the question 
itself. Some forms of transfer payments subsumed under UB II are never actually 
received by the respondent. To give an example, respondents sometimes only 
receive UB II in the form of housing assistance. This transfer payment can then be 
remitted directly to the landlord by the federal employment agency. Further, while 
young adults living in a benefit community with their parents officially receive 
UB II, they might not view themselves as recipients, but only their parents. While 
interviewers were alerted to probe if there were indications for this problem, we 
find evidence for this argument in our analyses. Since this error is mostly due to 
errors of encoding, as well as errors of question interpretation and not due to item 
sensitivity, we would not expect to see a difference between direct questioning 
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and RRT for these respondents. Thus, a certain total amount of underreporting of 
welfare benefit receipt could always be expected.
Fourth, while survey researchers aiming at measuring sensitive behaviors on a 
continuous scale could benefit from using the new IST technique, this study is only 
a first step in the development and evaluation of the IST. Considering ‘significance’ 
as the main criterion, our analyses show that the IST was particularly successful 
for only one of the two items, i.e., the second item ‘earnings,’ while the effect is 
absent in both samples for the other item, i.e., the first item ‘hours.’ We believe 
that this effect is systematic, and that potential learning effects might explain 
the difference in the findings. Despite one ‘training’ example prior to the IST, we 
therefore suggest including several suitable training questions when employing 
novel questioning techniques such as the IST in a survey.
Another major limitation of the IST is that the continuous sensitive questions 
were preceded by a filter question on whether any undeclared work was carried out 
at all in the direct questioning condition, while due to the nature of the IST no such 
filter question is necessary in the item sum condition. We know from prior studies 
that ‘filtering’ might downwardly bias the estimates in the direct questioning 
condition. Given our design and the effect sizes, however, it seems unreasonable to 
assume that these differences could be solely a result due to filtering.
5.3 Implications for Future Research
As illustrated by the above qualifications, further experimental research is needed 
to fully understand the mechanisms at work when respondents are confronted 
with sensitive questions, especially in the newly developed IST. Furthermore, future 
research on sensitive questions could evaluate other dejeopardizing techniques 
that can be implemented on the phone. This is highly relevant when dealing with 
large population surveys or special populations like ours, especially in the future 
when even more restrictive budgets to conduct surveys can be expected. When 
the population of interest covers many individuals with poorer language skills or a 
lower educational background, other, more recently developed techniques to reduce 
response bias, such as the crosswise or triangular technique (Yu et al., 2008), might 
be a preferable method. These methods do not require a randomization device, are 
less of a cognitive burden for respondents, easier to implement on the telephone 
and could thus perform better than the RRT or the ICT (Coutts et al., 2011).
Furthermore, if (individual-level) auxiliary data are available, future research 
on sensitive questions could aim at making estimates obtained with these special 
techniques more efficient. Irrespective of which method is used, larger sample 
sizes are typically needed to achieve the same level of precision as comparable 
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direct questioning. In order to be more efficient or to even allow estimates that 
are aggregated at a lower level such as by industry or state for undeclared work 
or welfare benefit receipt—thus, yielding even smaller sample sizes—the ideas of 
small area estimation could prove fruitful (Fay and Herriot, 1979; Battese et al., 
1988; for an overview see Ghosh and Rao, 1994). Borrowing strength from larger 
areas using auxiliary data could then lead to a reduction in variance.
So far, we are also not aware of any studies using data generated by means of 
special techniques—RRT, ICT or in that vein IST or crosswise data—as explanatory 
variables. Existing studies typically explore these variables as dependent 
variables. However, if—unlike in our study—these techniques successfully reduce 
bias, accounting for variables, such as undeclared work, to potentially correct 
predictions of income and entire distributions seems advisable. Programs, such 
as the R-package SIMEX are useful in this case (Carroll et al., 1996; Lederer and 
Küchenhoff, 2006), though one would have to be careful with respect to the 
endogenous relationship of income and undeclared work.
Last but not least, substantively, more research is needed to assess what 
respondents understand by undeclared work. While this affects the differential 
effect of direct questioning technique and our special techniques to a lesser extent, 
it affects the total amount. Despite using ‘standard’ definitions and questions, 
we also conducted cognitive pretests. Due to these, respondents were asked to 
classify three examples of different ‘tasks’ as declared or undeclared work at the 
end of the main survey. The examples for (un)declared work were to a large extent 
misclassified (as declared work; false negative), suggesting that the respondents 
had either meanwhile forgotten the definition or had decided to ignore it. In our 
data this share of false negatives is estimated at 11.8% in the DQ condition, at 
11.9% in the RRT condition and at 17.2% in the RRT non-complier condition, 
while the share of false positives is estimated at 39.0% DQ, at 42.6% RRT and at 
46.0% DQ_RRT. Supervising many of the survey interviews, anecdotal evidence 
supports the notion that respondents differentiate as to what exactly constitutes 
undeclared work according to frequency and regularity, amount of income and 
purpose, i.e., what the money was needed for. It was clearly not considered as a 
binary choice (Yes/No), and therefore should be measured on a more appropriate 
scale. More qualitative research combined with factorial survey design could help 
to explore these notions in depth and help to improve the questionnaire items. 
Further research is also needed with respect to welfare benefit receipt since a 
similar criticism holds for this item. We have evidence for structural deficiencies 
with the survey question itself that lead to a substantive amount of underreporting. 
Tackling these issues for both items could help to reduce measurement error that 
is not due to concerns of social desirability.
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A.1 RRT Instructions
“I will now introduce you to a technique, that will allow you to keep your personal 
experiences anonymous by means of a coin flip. Even if this might sound strange 
to you, I kindly ask you to help us try this new method. This method is scientifically 
approved and is fun. Would you please get a paper, a pencil and three coins?
You will be able to answer all of the following questions either with ‘Yes’ or 
‘No.’ Before answering each question, I would kindly ask you to flip the three coins. 
Please do not tell me the outcome of this coin flip. According to the outcome, 
please answer as follows:
 • 3 tails; please always respond with ‘Yes’
 • 3 heads; please always respond with ‘No’
 • a mixture; i.e., a combination of heads and tails, such as 2 heads and 1 tail, 
please respond truthfully.
As you can see, chance decides whether you actually respond to the question or 
provide a surrogate answer. Thus, your privacy is always protected. I, as the interviewer, 
will never know the result of your coin toss. Thus, I can never know, why you respond 
with ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Do you have any further questions regarding the technique?
Let us walk through one example together.
If you flip 3 heads, and I ask you if you are 18 years or older, what would you 
reply? (Int: Pause; let the respondent reply first. ‘No,’ according to the rule)
If you flip 3 tails, and I ask you if you are 18 years or older, what would you reply? 
(Int: Pause; let the respondent reply first. ‘Yes,’ according to the rule)
If you have a mixed result, e.g., flip 2 heads and 1 tail, and I ask you if you are 
18  years or older, what would you reply? (Int: Pause; let the respondent reply 
first. The response has to be ‘Yes’1)
Do you have any further questions?” 
(Note to the reader: If there were further questions, the rules were repeated and 
a new example provided.) (Translated from German)
1 This is a requirement of our sampling design.
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A.2 IST Long-List Instructions
“Thank you very much. We are now done with the coin flip method. Please, as of 
now, always respond to each question truthfully. However, please keep the paper 
and the pencil.
I will now read two blocks of two questions each to you. The response to each 
of these questions is numerical. However, it is possible that you will respond with 
‘zero’ to either one or both questions.
I would ask you to write down your individual responses to each question. 
Afterwards, I would ask you to add both responses and only tell me the result. It 
is important that you do NOT tell me your answer to the single questions. As you 
see, I can never know why you give a certain response.
Let us walk through one example together. I will now read two questions to you:
1.: How many persons live in your household, including yourself ?
Please do NOT tell me the answer to that question, but write it down.
2.: How many persons living in your household are aged 18 or older, including 
yourself ?
Please do NOT tell me the answer to that question, but write it down.
(Note to the reader: Interviewers were trained to leave respondents enough 
time at each stage)
Thank you very much. What is your result?
(Note to the reader: These particular questions were chosen for demonstration 
purposes, only because we knew the responses to the individual questions 
from previous survey information. Thus, we were able to ‘validate’ the response 
and check if the respondent understood the method.)
Do you have any further questions regarding the procedure?” (Translated from 
German)
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A.3 ICT Instructions and ICT Lists
“I will now read blocks of 3 to 4 questions each to you. Please indicate how many 
of these questions apply to you. Please do NOT to tell me how you respond to 
individual questions within the list!
Do you have any further questions regarding the procedure?” (Translated from 
German) 
Table A.1 provides an overview of the exact items used in our study.
Table A.1: Lists: item count technique (translated from German)
List Operationalization Short List Long List 
1a 
Did you ever keep a diary capturing monthly 
household expenditures? 
X X 
Does your household own more TV’s than there 
are members of the household? 
X X 
Do you own a mobile phone? X X 
Have you engaged in any undeclared work for a 
private person this year? X 
1b 
Do you use public transportation on more than 
5  days per week? 
X X 
Are you covered by liability insurance? X X 
Did you grow up in the countryside? X X 
Have you engaged in any undeclared work for a 
private person this year? X 
2a 
Have you been invited to a job interview this 
year? 
X X 
Do you pay taxes for your dog? X X 
Do you have health insurance? X X 
Have you engaged in any undeclared work this 
year for a company, which paid you without 
reporting your income to the authorities? 
X 
2b 
Have you ever used public transportation without 
a valid ticket? 
X X 
Are you allowed to carry a gun? X X 
Do you have a driver’s license? X X 
Have you engaged in any undeclared work this 
year for a company, which paid you without 
reporting your income to the authorities? 
 X 
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A.5 Overview of Items and Operationalizations (RRT study)
Table A.3: Operationalizations 
Variable Definition/Question Label Frequencies 
Sample Sample Status Employees  1,613 ( 50.2%) 
Benefit Recipients  1,598 ( 49.8%) 
Undeclared Work 
for a Private 
Person 
Have you engaged in any undeclared work 
for a private person this year? 
Yes  292  ( 9.1%) 
No  2,912 ( 90.9%) 
Undeclared Work 
for a Company 
Have you engaged in any undeclared work 
this year for a company, which paid you 
without reporting your income to the 
authorities?
Yes  269  ( 8.4%) 
No  2,936 ( 91.6%) 
Utility from 
Undeclared Work 
Sample indicator combined with income. 
“How much did you earn last month? 
If you held multiple jobs, please report 
the income from all of them together. 
Please indicate your gross income, that is 
your income before the deduction of tax 
and social security contributions. < Self-
employed> For self-employed jobs, please 
instead indicate your monthly profit 
before tax. <Employees> If you received 
special payments last month, such as a 
Christmas bonus or back payments, do 
not include these. However, do include 
any pay for overtime.” (Open-numerical 
response, categorical response scale in 
case of item nonresponse)
Employee w. Income 
≤ €800 
 415 ( 12.9%) 
Employee w. Income 
> €800 
 1,198 ( 37.3%) 
Benefit Recipient w. 
Income ≤ €800 
 1,259 ( 39.2%) 
Benefit Recipient w. 
Income > €800 
 339 ( 10.6%) 
Preferred Working 
Hours 
“Please assume that you could choose 
your own number of working hours. Please 
also consider the necessary income: How 
many hours would you yourself like to 
work currently?” Categorized in reference 
to the actual current working hours 
(including overtime). 
Adequate (≤ 2 hours)  1,686 ( 52.5%) 
Inadequate (≥ 3 hours)  1,525 ( 47.5%) 
Risk Perception Product of the following two questions, 
divided by 100. Categorization into 
empirical quartiles: 1) “Please imagine 
100 persons who are engaged in 
undeclared work. How many of these 100 
individuals will, in your opinion, be caught 
by the authorities?” 2) “Now please now 
imagine someone who has been engaged 
in undeclared work for 6 months, earning 
€12,000 for full-time work. How much 
will the monetary penalty in your opinion 
be, in the event that this individual is 
discovered by the authorities? Please do 
not include back duties.”
Hardly Any Risk  
(€0 to €120) 
 841 ( 26.2%) 
Low Risk  
(€121 to €600) 
 830 ( 25.8%) 
Medium Risk  
(€601 to €2,500 )
 751 ( 23.4%) 
High Risk  
(€2,501 and more) 
 789 ( 24.6%) 
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Variable Definition/Question Label Frequencies 
Occupational 
Status 
Generated (Hendrickx, 2002, iskoegp) 
for current or last job. Coding of ISCO  88 
according to Erikson Goldthorpe 
Portocarero class scheme (Erikson et al., 
1979). Aggregation to the following
N/A (Never Employed)  399 ( 12.4%) 
Low-High Controllers  692 ( 21.6%) 
Routine Non-Manual  789 ( 24.6%) 
Self-Employed  95  ( 3.0%) 
Manual Supervisor & 
Skilled Manual 
 435 ( 13.5%) 
Semi-Skilled/Unskilled 
Manual 
 801 ( 24.9%) 
Networks  
(Job Search) 
“How many persons do you know, outside 
of your household, who could support you 
finding a job and would really do so?” 
Collapsing one category ‘Nobody’ and the 
remaining cases into terciles. 
Nobody  1,233 ( 38.4%) 
1 to 4 Persons  753 ( 23.5%) 
5 to 10 Persons  819 ( 25.5%) 
11 Persons and more  406 ( 12.6%) 
Organizational 
Membership 
“Now we would like to know if you are 
actively engaged in an organization or 
a club? Are you an active member of ... 
a labor union, 2) a political party, 3) a 
church or religious organization, 4) a club 
for music, sports or culture, 5) another 
organization that I have not mentioned?” 
None  1,859 ( 57.9%) 
At Least One  1,352 ( 42.1%) 
Undeclared Work 
in Network 
“In your opinion, how large is the 
proportion of persons within your entire 
network who are engaged in undeclared 
work?” Collapsing one category ‘Nobody’ 
and the remaining cases into terciles. 
0%  1,456 ( 45.3%) 
1 to 3%  603 ( 18.8%) 
4 to 10%  684 ( 21.3%) 
11% and more  468 ( 14.6%) 
Approval of 
Undeclared Work 
Sum score of seven items (1 = strongly 
agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly 
disagree: “My personal tax burden due 
to taxes and social security contributions 
is too high” (recoded). “Tax honesty pays 
off for me personally.” “Undeclared work, 
causes honest people to have personal 
disadvantages.” “Given the high tax and 
social security burden, it’s the state’s 
own fault that so many people engage 
in undeclared work” (recoded). “People 
engaging in undeclared work should be 
reported.” “Given all the bureaucracy and 
the formalities, it is not surprising that 
so many people engage in undeclared 
work” (recoded). “Please imagine, that 
your neighbor would engage undeclared 
workers on a regular basis. Would you ... 
(1 = strongly approve, 2 = approve, 3  = 
disapprove, 4 = strongly disapprove)” 
(recoded). 
7 to 14 (Disapproval)  945 ( 29.4%) 
15 to 16  818 ( 25.5%) 
17 to 19  895 ( 27.9%) 
20 to 28 (Approval)  553 ( 17.2%) 
Gender Coded by interviewer, derived from name 
and voice. 
Female  1,709 ( 53.2%) 
Male  1,502 ( 46.8%) 
Age “Would you please tell me how old you 
are?” (open-numerical scale in years) 
18 to 34  1,065 ( 33.2%) 
35 to 49  1,176 ( 36.6%) 
50 to 70  970 ( 30.2%) 
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Formal Training “What is the highest formal training 
you obtained? Or are you currently in 
training (vocational training, pupil)? Do 
you have... no vocational qualification and 
are currently not in training? a vocational 
qualification? a college or university 
degree?” 
Pupil / No Degree  656 ( 20.4%) 
Vocational Training  2,110 ( 65.7%) 
Tertiary Degree  445 ( 13.9%) 
Migrant 
Background 
Indicator if respondent or respondent’s 
parents have migrant background: “Let us 
now move on to the topic of country of 
birth, nationality and languages. Were you 
born in Germany?” “Was either of your 
parents born outside of Germany?” 
Yes  934 ( 29.1%) 
No  2,277 ( 70.9%) 
Residence Aggregated using state. East Germany  761 ( 23.7%) 
West Germany  2,450 ( 76.3%) 
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B.1 Regression Estimates for IST
Let Li  be an indicator for the long-list sample (i.e., Li  equals 1 if observation i belongs 
to the long-list sample and else is 0). In the long-list sample, the respondents are 
asked about the sum of a sensitive item S (e.g., hours of undeclared work) and 
a non-sensitive item C (e.g., hours of watching TV). In the short-list sample, the 
respondents are only asked about the non-sensitive item C. The answers of the 
respondents can therefore be written as
 Si + Ci if Li  = 1 (long-list sample)
 Ci else (short-list sample) 
(B.1)
Furthermore, let Xi  = (X1i , ..., Xki , 1)’ and Zi = (Z1i , ..., Zmi , 1)’ be two vectors of 
covariates (each including a constant; typically, Z  = X ) and assume that S and C 
can be modeled as
 (B.2)
where β and γ  are vectors of coefficients and υ and ν are random errors. It follows 
that
   (B.3)
with   and, hence,  . For example, if X = Z = 1, that is, if there 
are no covariates, then an estimate for the mean of S can be gained by regressing 
Y  on L using the least squares method (assuming heteroscedastic errors to 
account for the fact that the error variance depends on L). The slope coefficient 
of the fitted model, , is an estimate of E (S ), the intercept, , is an estimate of 
E(C ). More generally, least-squares regression of Y on L * X and Z (again assuming 
heteroscedastic errors) provides an estimate of effects of covariates X on S; the 
coefficients we are interested in are the ones attached to the interaction term 
L * X . Alternatively, assuming bivariate normality of υ and ν (with variances  
and   and correlation ρ), coefficients can also be estimated by the maximum-
likelihood method, based on the log-likelihood
Yi  = 
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where  is the density function of the standard normal distribution and n  is the 
sample size. Formally,  , but  cannot be identified 
separately in this model so that  is estimated directly. The maximum-likelihood 
approach will yield identical point estimates for β as the least-squares method, 
although standard errors may differ. The results in this chapter were computed 
using the least-squares procedure.
The methods presented can easily be extended to include a third sample of 
respondents for which the sensitive item S was measured via direct questioning. 
Let Di be an indicator for the direct-questioning sample (i.e., Di equals 1 if 
observation i belongs to the direct questioning sample and else is 0). Because S is 
sensitive, S*  is measured in the direct-questioning sample, which is equal to S plus 
social-desirability bias. In the direct-questioning sample, let  , 
where β*  is a coefficient vector that includes social-desirability bias, then we can 
write the regression model across the three subsamples as
  (B.5)
or, equivalently, as
 (B.6)
In the latter form, the coefficients attached to the interaction term L * X provide 
an estimate of the (negative of the) bias in β*. For example, if regressing Y on L, 
(1 – D), and (D + L) (i.e., if no covariates are taken into account), then the coefficient 
attached to L provides an estimate of the effect of the item sum technique (i.e., the 
degree to which the IST leads to a higher average value of the sensitive variable 
than direct questioning), the coefficient attached to (1 – D ) reflects the mean of 
the non-sensitive item C , and the coefficient attached to (D + L ) is an estimate of 
the mean of the sensitive variable based on direct questioning.
In our study, some of the respondents initially assigned to the IST mode 
opted for direct questioning. That is, there is noncompliance with the treatment 
assignment. To gain an intention-to-treat estimate (ITT) of the effect of the IST, 
we employ a two-step procedure, where in the first step we fit model  
using the observations from the (realized) short-list group. In the second step, we 
residualize the (realized) long-list observations using the least-squares estimate  
from the first step and then fit model
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(B.7)
based on the respondents who were initially assigned to the long-list sample or 
to direct questioning, where L˜  is an indicator for initial assignment to the long-
list sample. The least-squares estimate of  is a consistent estimate of the 
intention-to-treat effect of the IST,1 but note that standard errors are biased 
because the additional uncertainty introduced by the variance of  is not taken 
into account. We therefore apply the non-parametric bootstrap procedure across 
the two steps to compute the standard errors (Davison and Hinkley, 1997).
The ITT is a conservative estimate of the causal treatment effect. We can 
improve on the ITT by fitting
  (B.8)
in the second step above (i.e., using Li instead of L˜ i in the equation), while 
instrumenting Li with L˜ i based on a two-stage least squares procedure. Since L˜ i is 
randomized, it is a valid instrument. Such an instrumental variables (IV) estimate 
of  provides a consistent estimate of the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) of the IST.
1 A necessary assumption for the ITT estimate to be consistent is that the respondents opting out of the short-list 
sample (who are completely discarded in our ITT estimation procedure) are not systematically d fferent from the 
respondents opting out of the long-list group. This assumption appears plausible in our case because respondents 
did not know to which of the two IST groups they had been assigned to when deciding to opt for direct questioning 
(we also tested the assumption by comparing the outcomes for the two subgroups; no significant differences were 
found).
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C.1 Validation Studies
Table C.1:  Overview of validation studies (adapted from Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2005a);  
Wolter (2012))
Study Item(s) Response Error RRT-Method Mode N
not exhaustive (RRT) (DQ/RRT) 
Locander/
Sudman/ 
Bradburn 1976 
Voter registration+ 
Library card+ 
Bankruptcy involvement 
Vote primary+ 
Drunken driving 
DQ > RRT 
DQ < RRT 
DQ > RRT 
DQ < RRT 
DQ > RRT 
Unrelated 
question 
technique 
f2f 92, 61* 
93, 61* 
38, 26* 
80, 50* 
30, 23* 
Lamb/Stem 1978 Failing course grades DQ > RRT Unrelated 
question 
technique
f2f 63, 121 
Tracy/Fox 1981 Arrests per person 
= 1 
> 1
DQ > RRT 
DQ < RRT 
DQ > RRT 
Liu and Chow 
1976 
f2f 120, 410
80, 326
40, 84
van der He jden 
et al. 2000 
Social security fraud DQ > (FRT = Kuk) Forced 
response 
technique, Kuk 
f2f 99, 96, 105 
Wolter 2012 Criminal conviction DQ > RRT Forced 
response 
technique 
f2f 208, 309 
+ randomsample,  * effective N; weighted. Bold face typing indicates signicant difference in response error p < 0.1. 
Similar to Wolter (2012) the studies by Folsom (1974) and Kulka et al. (1981) could not be retrieved and are thus 
not included.
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C.2 Social Assistance and Entitlements in Germany
Unemployment Benefits are a benefit of the unemployment insurance that is 
granted when a person becomes unemployed, has completed the qualification 
period and has registered as unemployed. This benefit is a remuneration 
substitute payment. When the eligibility for unemployment benefits has expired 
or the payment does not suffice to secure a livelihood, persons can apply for 
Unemployment Benefit II (UB II) according to the second book of the Social Code.
Since the so called Hartz Reforms in the German social assistance system in 
2005, people are entitled to Unemployment Benefit II (UB II) if they are between 
15 and 64 years of age, capable of working, and if the household they live in—or 
more precisely, benefit community1 — does not have sufficient income to secure 
a livelihood. According to legislation, the ‘standard’ requirements to be able to 
secure a living and the amounts to be paid to each recipient cover, for example, 
the costs of food, clothing and energy in order to satisfy the needs of everyday 
life. In this welfare benefit scheme at the household level, it is usually the head of 
the household who applies for the entire benefit community. In order to establish 
benefit entitlement and receive benefits from the FEA, the household income has 
to be declared along with a series of other relevant information on composition of 
the household. This information is needed to establish eligibility and the amount, 
which is then paid to each benefit community. In certain situations, e.g., in a low 
income situation, it is possible that a benefit community might not be eligible for 
the full amount but that only a share is covered, such as assistance for housing. 
These transfer payments are then sometimes remitted to the landlord directly by 
the FEA, without ever being transferred to the applicant/the benefit community.
1 While a household includes all its members, the definition of a benefit community differs: it “consists of a least 
one person capable of work elig ble for benefits, his/her partner, and the unmarried children under 25 years living 
in the household” (FEA – Federal Employment Agency, 2012). For example a three generation household could by 
definition never be a single benefit community but two separate ones.
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Abstract
This dissertation explores methods to improve the quality of data about sensitive 
labor market topics, such as undeclared work and receipt of basic income support 
in Germany, using surveys of the general population. Due to the sensitive nature 
of both topics, respondents may choose to misreport and adjust their answers in 
accordance with social norms. 
Over the past decades, special strategies—particularly targeted to reduce 
misreporting on sensitive topics—have been developed. One such class of data 
collection strategies are so-called ‘dejeopardizing’ techniques, out of which the 
randomized response technique (RRT) and the item count technique (ICT) are 
the most popular and best investigated ones. The goal is to elicit more honest 
answers from respondents by increasing the anonymity of the question-and-
answer process. These techniques provide prevalence estimates as well as 
estimates of regression coefficients, regressing dependent variables generated by 
means of RRT or ICT on a set of covariates of interest. 
However, these dejeopardizing techniques have not been applied to collect 
data on undeclared work or receipt of welfare benefits in German surveys. This 
dissertation aims at closing this gap using an experimental design that allows 
us to compare the performance of these dejeopardizing techniques to direct 
questioning. In 2010 we conducted two telephone surveys on undeclared work and 
welfare benefit receipt. We experimentally tested whether the RRT, the ICT, or the 
newly developed item sum technique (IST) reduce bias due to social desirability 
compared to direct questioning (under the ‘more-is-better’ assumption and using 
validation data in one study). 
Our results suggest that neither the RRT nor the ICT provide unambiguous 
results with respect to improving the accuracy of reports of the socially 
undesirable behavior, while the IST results were more promising. This dissertation 
provides insights into a variety of practical and theoretical factors contributing 
to a successful implementation of the RRT, the ICT and the IST in labor market 
surveys. 
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation geht der Frage nach, wie das Ausmaß von Schwarz-
arbeit und Arbeitslosengeld-II-Bezug in Deutschland im Rahmen von Befragungen 
der allgemeinen Bevölkerung möglichst valide geschätzt werden kann. Aufgrund 
des heiklen Charakters beider Themen ist davon auszugehen, dass Selbst auskünfte 
häufig nicht der Wahrheit entsprechen und stattdessen in vielen Fällen sozial 
erwünschte Antworten gegeben werden und das Verhalten systematisch unter-
berichtet wird.
Um diesen Antwortverzerrungen entgegen zu wirken, wurden in den letzten 
Jahrzehnten in der empirischen Sozialforschung alternative Befragungstechniken 
entwickelt. So basieren beispielsweise die Randomized Response Technique (RRT) 
und die Item Count Technik (ICT) auf dem Prinzip der verschlüsselten Antworten 
und sollen durch eine Erhöhung der Anonymität in der Interviewsituation sozial 
erwünschtes Antwortverhalten reduzieren. Der Vorteil dieser Erhebungsverfahren 
liegt darin, dass zum einen weniger Annahmen hinsichtlich der Schätzungen ge-
troffen werden und zum anderen mittels statistischer Auswertungen ziel gerichtet 
multivariate Zusammenhänge zwischen einer mit ICT oder RRT ge nerierten ab-
hängigen Variablen und Kovariaten auf individueller Ebene untersucht werden 
können.
Bislang wurden diese Techniken allerdings noch nicht zur Erhebung von 
Schwarz arbeit oder des Bezugs von Arbeitslosengeld-II in Deutschland eingesetzt. 
Die Dissertation schließt diese Lücke und beschäftigt sich mit einem experimen-
tellen Vergleich – sowie einer Weiterentwicklung – von Erhebungstechniken spe-
ziell für heikle Fragen mit einer direkten Befragung im Kontext von Arbeitsmarkt-
surveys. Mittels Fragen zum Thema Schwarzarbeit und zum Arbeitslosengeld-II-
Bezug, wird im Rahmen zweier Bevölkerungsbefragungen aus dem Jahre 2010 
empirisch untersucht ob die RRT, die ICT bzw. die eigens entwickelte Item Sum 
Technik (IST) den Befragten tatsächlich ein höheres Ausmaß sozial unerwünschter 
Antworten entlocken als die direkte Befragung (unter der bekannten ‘more-is-
better’ Annahme sowie mittels einer Validierungsstudie).
Die Befunde zeigen, dass die häufig angenommene Wirkung der RRT oder der 
ICT auf die Bereitschaft der Befragten, sozial unerwünschtes Verhalten zu be-
richten, nicht eindeutig ausfällt. Die Ergebnisse der IST fallen hingegen positiver 
aus. Die vorliegende Dissertation liefert somit Hinweise hinsichtlich verschiedener 
praktischer als auch theoretischer Faktoren, die zu einer erfolgreichen Implemen-
tation der RRT, der ICT und der IST in Arbeitsmarktsurveys beitragen können.



